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BankRisks,RiskPreferencesandLendingPreliminaryandincompleteTomaszChmielewskiMay9,2005AbstractTherecentdebateontheimpactofcapitalregulationonbankbehav-iourshowsthatriskexposuresofbanksmightinuencetheamountofloansnewlygrantedtothenon- nancialsector.Thepaperanalysesimplicationsofthisrelationshipfortheroleof nancialstabilityanalysisintheconductofmonetarypolicy.Thisrolestemsfromthefactthatthe nancialinstabil-itycaninuencethemonetarytransmissionmechanism.Afteramonetarypolicyshockthemarketpriceofriskandloanlossdistributionchange.Thecreditspreadsforloansalreadygrantedmightthenbenotenoughtocoverexpectedlossesandthedefaultprobabilityofabankincreases.Ifthebankintendstomaintainthepreviousleveloftheprobabilityofdefault,eitheradditionalcapitalorachangeintheassetstructureisneeded.Thisconsti-tutesanadditionalwayinwhichmonetarypolicymightinuencethesupplyofbankloans.TheimplicationsofthepresentedmodelaretestedusingthedataforthePolishbankingsectorduringtheperiod1997-2004.Assuminghomogeneityofborrowersacrossbanksitisshownthatvariablesproxyingbankriskpreferencesandthelevelofriskundertaken(alsowheninteractedwithamonetarypolicymeasure)aresigni cantinregressionsexplainingchangesintheamountofbankloansupply.NationalBankofPoland,FinancialSystemDepartmentandWarsawSchoolofEconomics,ChairofMonetaryPolicy(tomasz.chmielewski@mail.nbp.pl).ApartoftheresearchpresentedinthepaperwasconductedduringmyvisitattheEuropeanCentralBank,DirectorateGeneralResearch.IwouldliketothankM.Brzoza-Brzezina,M.Ehrmann,A.G÷ogowski,P.Hartmann,M.Kolasa,K.-G.Lindquist,T.Opiela,D.SerwaandZ.Pola´nskiforveryusefuldiscussions,commentsandsuggestionsatthedi¤erentstagesoftheproject.Allerrorsandomissionsre-mainmyown.ThepaperpresentsonlymyviewsandopinionsandnotnecessarilythoseoftheinstitutionsIama¢liatedwith.11.IntroductionThe nancialsystemsabilitytoprovide nancialintermediationservicesinanundisturbedande¢cientwayisoneofthemajorissuesinthe nancialstabilityanalysis.Itisconsideredtoconstitutea nancialsystemscontributiontogrowthopportunitiesofthewholeeconomy.Therecentdebateontheimpactofcapitalregulationonbankbehaviourshowsthatriskexposuresofthebanksmightinu-encetheamountofloansgrantedtothenon- nancialsector(e.g.FrootandStein,1998;Fur ne,2001;CebenoyanandStrahan,2004;Repullo,2004).Ontheotherhand,thereisstillanunresolvedproblemofthenatureoftherelationshipbetweenthe nancialandmonetarystability.Especially,itreferstotheextenttowhichmonetarypolicymakersshouldtake nancialstabilityissuesintoconsideration.Thispapercombinesboththeseaspects.Monetarypolicydecisionsinuencethestructureofbanksriskpro lesandmarketriskpricing.Inreactiontothecentralbankbehaviour,commercialbanksadjusttheirbalancesheets.Thesead-justmentsinuencetheloansupplyasbankriskappetitechanges.However,ifthestabilityofthebankingsectorhadbeenalreadyimpaired,theincreasedriskinessofbankassetsmightbecomeanobstacleforsmoothfunctioningofthe nancialintermediationprocessandresultinalargedecreaseinbankloansupply.Toavoidalargerthanexpectedoutputreaction,itmightbebene cialformonetaryauthor-itiestomonitorthebehaviourand nancialstandingof nancialintermediaries.Theprobleminhandiscloselyrelatedtotheanalysisofthemonetarytransmis-sionmechanismandmightbede nedasananalysisofthebanklendingchannelinthe nancialstabilitycontext.Afteramonetarytighteningthemarketpriceofriskandloanlossdistributionchange.Thecreditspreadsfortheloansalreadygrantedmightthenbenothighenoughtocoverexpectedlossesandthedefaultprobabilityofabankincreases.Ifthebankintendstomaintainthepreviousleveloftheprobabilityofdefault,eitheradditionalcapitalorachangeintheassetstructureisneeded.Asraisingnewcapitalisusuallycostly,thelattersolutionmightbetheonlyavailableoneforthebankintheshortrun.Inthisrespectthebankreactionstemsonlyfromthepresentbalancesheetstructure(beingaresultofpreviousdecisions)andreects,interalia,abanksrisktakingstrategy.Thisconstitutesanadditionalwayinwhichmonetarypolicymightinuencethesupplyofbankloans.Unlikethetraditionaltheoryofthebanklendingchannel(e.g.KashyapandStein,1995),thepresentedargumentdoesnotrelyonbanksbeingconstrainedbyreserverequirements1.Itmightbe,therefore,moresuitableforeconomieswerecentralbanksfollowthedirectinationtargetingstrategy.Thereasoningpresentedinthispaperisalsodistinctfromthebankcapitalchannel1Itisalsodistinctfromtheborrowersbalancesheetchannel(e.g.Kashyapetal.,1993;GertlerandGilchrist,1994),asitdoesnotrefertonewlendingopportunities.2(VandenHeuvel,2002),asthecapitalconstraintisratherendogenous2(e.g.Bar-riosandBlanco,2003).Banksareassumedtousecapitalallocationasapartoftheirinternalriskmanagementprocedures.Ifthemonetarypolicyreallyinuencestheloansupplybecausebanksadjusttheirlendingtochangesintheirassetrisk,theeconometricspeci cationusedtotestthebanklendingchannelshouldbeaugmentedwithvariablesproxyingbankriskpreferencesandthelevelofriskpresentinbankbalancesheets(i.e.assetquality).Thispaperproposestheshareofloanstothenon- nancialsectorintotalassetsandtheshareofloansgrantedtohouseholdsintheloanstothenon- nancialsectorasproxiesforbanka
本文标题:Bank Risks, Risk Preferences and Lending
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