基于服务合作的双渠道供应链定价策略及协调机制研究

基于服务合作的双渠道供应链定价策略及协调机制研究重庆大学硕士学位论文（学术学位）学生姓名：章洁指导教师：陈友玲教授专业：工业工程学科门类：工学重庆大学机械工程学院二O一三年五月PricingCompetitionandCoordinationforDual-channelSupplyChainbasedonServiceCooperationAThesisSubmittedtoChongqingUniversityinPartialFulfillmentoftheRequirementfortheMaster’sDegreeofManagementByZhangJieSupervisedbyProf.ChenYoulingSpecialty:IndustryEngineeringCollegeofMechanicalEngineeringofChongqingUniversity,Chongqing,ChinaMay,2013中文摘要I摘要随着电子商务市场的迅速发展，越来越多的企业在传统零售渠道的基础上引入直销渠道，以获得更多的市场份额和更大的经济利润。但是，开设直销渠道也会面临着很多困难。一方面，实证研究显示直销渠道的服务质量成为严重影响消费者网购的因素，而零售商具有直接面对顾客、服务成本较低的优势，制造商的直销渠道的服务处于劣势，制造商如何做好与零售商进行服务合作已经成为其着重考虑的问题。另一方面，制造商引入直销渠道，会对零售商的零售渠道构成威胁，产生渠道冲突。因此，如何制定合理的双渠道价格，协调好渠道成员的利益，也已经成为亟待解决的问题。首先，本文考虑制造商将直销渠道的服务交给零售商完成的情形，构建了双渠道服务合作模型，根据博弈论，得到双渠道服务合作制造商和零售商的Bertrand博弈下、制造商领先的Stackelberg博弈下以及集中决策模式下的定价模型，得到双渠道的制造商和零售商的最优定价，分析了服务水平、服务成本以及批发价格对渠道价格和需求的影响，得到双渠道的定价策略，发现制造商和零售商为了弥补大量的服务成本会提高直销价格和零售价格；制造商应适当降低直销渠道的服务成本且应寻求与服务成本低的零售商合作；制造商总是愿意选择Stackelberg博弈环境与零售商进行竞争。并用Matlab模拟了双渠道价格及利润在不同的服务水平及批发价格下的变化趋势，对双渠道服务合作定价策略中的结论进行了验证，且发现分散决策模式下的双渠道总利润小于集中决策模式下的双渠道总利润。其次，本文对数量折扣协调机制和两部定价机制进行了研究。无论是在制造商领先的Stackelberg博弈还是Bertrand博弈环境下，双渠道利润都可以得到协调与优化，通过设置协调模型中的参数，使得制造商和零售商的利润都得到增加。关键词：服务合作，双渠道，定价策略，博弈论，协调机制重庆大学硕士学位论文II英文摘要IIIABSTRACTWiththerapiddevelopmentofthee-commercemarket,moreandmoreenterprisesintroduceddirectchannelonthebasisofthetraditionalretailchannelstogainmoremarketshareandgreatereconomicprofits.However,establishingthedirectchannelwillfacemanyconstrainedconditions.Ontheonehand,empiricalstudiesrevealthattheservicequalityonthedirectchannelhasanimpactontheconsumers'onlineshopping.Asretailerscangivetheservicetothecustomersdirectly,theirservicecostcanbelowerthanthemanufacturers.Themanufacturer'sdirectchannelserviceisatadisadvantage,sohowtodocooperatewithretailersattheservicecooperationhasbecomethefocusproblemformanufacturers.Ontheotherhand,establishingthedirectchannelwillposeathreattoretailer'sretailchannel,soitcancausethechannelconflict.Therefore,howtoformulatereasonablepriceandcoordinatetheinterestsofthechannelmembers,hasbecomeanurgentproblem.Tobeginwith,thisarticleconsiderstheconditionthatthemanufacturerstransferthedirectchannel’servicestotheretailers.Thestructuremodeofdualchannelservicecooperationisbuilt.Basedongametheory,manufacturerleaderintheStackelberggame,theBertrandgameandthecentralizeddecision-makingmodepricingmodelareestablished.Thentheoptimalpricingcanbeobtained.Throughanalyzingtheinfluencingoftheservicelevel,servicecostandwholesalepricestochannelpricesanddemand,wecanfindthatmanufacturersandretailerswillincreasedirectpriceandretailpriceinordertomakeupforalotofservicecosts.Manufacturersshouldbeproperlyreducetheservicecostofdirectchannelandshouldseekcooperatewiththeretailerswhoseservicecostislow.ManufacturerswillchooseaStackelberggameenvironmenttocompetewiththeretailers.Thechangingtrendsoftheprices,profitandwholesalepricesunderdifferentlevelsofserviceissimulatebyMatlabsoftware.Theconclusionofthepricingstrategyisverified,andwefindthatthetotalprofitsofdualchannelunderthedecentralizeddecision-makingmodeislessthanthetotalprofitsofdualchannelunderthecentralizeddecisionmakingmode.Moreover,thispaperintroducedthequantitydiscountscoordinationmechanismandTwo-PartTariffmechanism.InmanufacturerleadingStackelberggameandBertrandgameenvironment,thedualchannelprofitscanbecoordinatedandoptimized.Throughsettingdifferentcoordinatingparametersinthecoordinationmodel,the重庆大学硕士学位论文IVmanufacturerandretailer'sprofitscanbeincreased.Keywords:ServiceCooperation,DualChannel,PricingStrategy,GameTheory,CoordinationMechanisms目录V目录中文摘要..........................................................................................................................................I英文摘要.......................................................................................................................................III1绪论.........................................................................................................................................11.1研究背景...............................................................................................................................11.2研究问题的提出...................................................................................................................21.2.1服务质量问题............................................................................................................21.2.2渠道冲突问题............................................................................................................31.3研究意义...............................................................................................................................31.4国内外研究现状...................................................................................................................41.4.1双渠道供应链定价策略研究....................................................................................41.4.2双渠道供应链中有关服务的研究............................................................................51.4.3双渠道供应链协调机制研究.....................................................