中国国有银行的资本金谜团

(100872):,,,,,,,:,,,,,,,,,,,,(,1996;,1994),70%,,30%(,2002)(,1997;1998;1999),,,,();,,,,,,,,,,,,:,;;;;,03:,,1978,4218%,33165%23155%,70%,,,,2000,3%,,10%;84%,,1998,()28%,()4%;1999,GDP17%(Stern,2001),50%;()71.79%(ChenweiandZhangjie,2002),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,197825%(,1996a),,,,,,,,,,2090,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,()1320031,1990(M2/GNP)100%,(,1996),,;,,,,,,,,,(,1998,pp.6265),,,,,1989,9%,11%(,1998,p177),,,,,19964134%19982700,1999,14000,20004162%(,2002,p1219),,,,,,,,,(Tobin,1998,p1189),,,?,,,,,,,,,,,23:(Qian,1993),19791984,()3319%,1991,6618%Mckinnon(1993,p1277),,3P419851996,()19103%(,1998,p157)1999,580,638901%(,2000),,,,,1998270014000:,,,?!,,:,(Mishkin,2001),,,,,,,,,,?,,,(,1997),,;;,,,,,,,,?,,:E=rD(1),E,r,D,:r=1E=D(2)r=0E=0(3),,,,,,:(r=1),,;(r=0),,,,,,,,(1,0),(1P21P3)3320031,,,,,1,;,0,,1;,,,,,,(8%),,,:,,(Mishkin,2001),,()(),,,,,,(),,,,,,Mishkin(2001),:ROE=BPE(4)(4),ROE,B,E,B,E,ROE,,,;,:ROEsob=BfscPEnrc(5)(5),ROEsob,Bfsc,EnrcEnrc,,,,,,,,,,,43:,;,,,20023,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(5),,Bfsc,:Enrc-EBfsc-B(6)(4)(5),,:ROBsobROE(7)(7),Enrc-EBfsc-B,,,,,ROEsobROE,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(5),,,,,,,,,,,,5320031(2002),,,01;(),,,,,,,,,,,(,2000),,2000:,9,1994:,1,1996:1996:,,,2002:,,2002:,18,1996:,1,1997:,6,1998:,,1999:,,,2000:,4ChenweiandZhangjie,2002,FinancialArrangementsfortheGrowthofChinasNon2SOEs,WorkingPaper,Berlin:BerlinSchoolofEconomics.Mckinnon,R.I.,1993,TheOrderofEconomicLiberalization:FinancialControlintheTransitiontoaMarketEconomy,secondedition.Balti2more:JohnsHopkinsUniversitypress.Mishkin,F.S.,2001,TheEconomicsofMoney,Banking,andFinancialMarkets,HarperCollinsCollegePublishers.Qian,Yingyi,1993,LessensandRelevanceoftheJapaneseMainBankSystemforFinancialReforminChina.CenterforEconomicPolicyRe2search,StanfordUniversityPress.Stern,N.H.,2001,ReformPerspectivesinChina:theUnderstandingoftheWorldBank,speechdeliveredatBeijingandQinghuaUniversity.Tobin,J.,andGolub,S.S.,1998,Money,CreditandCapital,Mcgraw2HillCompanies,Inc.(:)(:),,,,20021063:TheMysteryofChinasState2ownedBanksCapitalZhangjie(SchoolofFinance,RenminUniversityofChina)Thepaperarguesthatthewell2functioningofthestate2ownedbanks(SOBs)inChinaundertheconditionofsevereundercapital2izationandahighratioofbadloansshouldbeattributedtotheexistenceofaspecialcapitalstructure.Inthisstructure,thestateistheshareholderofSOBsonthebasisofthereputationitownsratherthanonthebasisofthecapitalitprovides.Thepartyactuallyprovidingthecapitalarehouseholds.Betweenthetwoparties,thereexiststheallianceintermsofcapitalwhichhasvigorouslysup2portedthegovernmentseffortinthedirectionofmobilizingfinancialresidualsviaSOBs.Thecosthasbeentheincreasingrisksre2sultingfromlow2qualitybankloans.Undoubtedly,thegovernmentismorethanwillingtoresolvetherisksthroughreformingSOBs.However,thestatereputationisunseparable.Andthatiswhyreformsintermsofcapitalstructurehaveendedinfailure.Inlightofthissituation,thefeasiblealternativeistoreformSOBsfromtheassetstructure.KeyWords:capitalofbanks;financialresidual;statereputation;reformofSOBsJELClassification:H810,P350,G210CanMonetaryPolicyInterferewiththeExcessiveFluctuationofStockPrice?FengYongfu(WestsouthUniversityofFinanceandEconomics)Theauthorfirstcomeupwiththequestion:Canmonetarypolicyirontheexcessivefluctuationofstockprice?(1)ThePortfolioSe2lectionModelintheperfectmarketshows:Underthegivenconditions,thestockpricewillneverbeoverratedorundervalued.Theperfectadjustingsystemofthemarketdoesnotneedtheinterferenceofmonetarypolicy;(2)afteradjustingtherestrictionsofper2fectmarket,thePortfolioSelectionModelshows:first,undertheinformationcostrestriction(informationcostisminimum),markethasthefunctiontodoself2corrections.Second,allpremisesforcentralbanksinterferencehaventbemet.(3)ThePortfolioSelec2tionModelundertheparticularrestrictionsinChinamakesitclearthat:Thehighexpectedrateofyieldiscoveredmainlybythehigh2riskpremiumandhightransactioncost.Interestrateregulationcanneverinfluencethehighrateofyieldintheascendingpro2cessofthestockprice,andalsotheserioushold2upproblemsinthedescendingprocess.Inall,themonetarypolicycandonothingtointerferewiththeexcessivefluctuationofstockprice.KeyWords:MonetaryPolicy;StockPricefluctuationJELClassification:E420,G100Money,Taxes,andFederalTransferinanEndogenousGrowthModelwithMultipleLevelsofGovernmentXiaoYun&GongLiutang(WuhanUniversity,Pekinguniversity)ThispaperextendsBarro(1990)modelandGongandZou(2002)model.Itpresentsastandard,dynamic,endogenousgrowthmodelwithcash2in2advanceconstraintandmultiplelevelsofgovernment.Taxonincome,consumption,andcapitalareneededtofinanceanexogenousstreamofgovernmentsexpenditures.ThemodeldealswithNashEquilibriumandexamineseffectsoffederaltaxes,localtaxes,moneycreation,degreeofliquidity,andfederaltransferongrowthrate.Italsodiscussesgrowth2maximizingandwelfare2maximizingchoicesoftaxes,moneycreationandfederaltransfer.Ingeneral,moneycreationcanstimulatetheeconomytogrowslightly.Andthehigheristhedegreeofliquidity,thehigheristhegrowthrate.Althoughdifferenttaxeshavedifferenteffects,localwealthtaxdistortstheeconomymostseverelyamongalltaxes.Nextweextendthemodeltothecasew