公允价值计量在我国会计核算中的应用研究(外文翻译参考)

毕业设计（论文）外文参考资料及译文译文题目：公允价值会计的危机:正确理解最近的辩论学生姓名：葛慧敏学号：0901208036专业：会计学所在学院：商学院指导教师：王思武职称：讲师2013年3月10日TheCrisisofFairValueAccounting:MakingSenseoftheRecentDebate*ChristianLauxGoethe-UniversityFrankfurtandChristianLeuzTheUniversityofChicagoBoothSchoolofBusiness&NBERApril2009(ForthcominginAccounting,OrganizationsandSociety)AbstractTherecentfinancialcrisishasledtoavigorousdebateabouttheprosandconsoffair-valueaccounting(FVA).ThisdebatepresentsamajorchallengeforFVAgoingforwardandstandardsetters’pushtoextendFVAintootherareas.Inthisarticle,wehighlightfourimportantissuesasanattempttomakesenseofthedebate.First,muchofthecontroversyresultsfromconfusionaboutwhatisnewanddifferentaboutFVA.Second,whiletherearelegitimateconcernsaboutmarkingtomarket(orpureFVA)intimesoffinancialcrisis,itislessclearthattheseproblemsapplytoFVAasstipulatedbytheaccountingstandards,beitIFRSorU.S.GAAP.Third,historicalcostaccounting(HCA)isunlikelytobetheremedy.ThereareanumberofconcernsaboutHCAaswellandtheseproblemscouldbelargerthanthosewithFVA.Fourth,althoughitisdifficulttofaulttheFVAstandardsperse,implementationissuesareapotentialconcern,especiallywithrespecttolitigation.Finally,weidentifyseveralavenuesforfutureresearch.KeyWords:Mark-to-market；Fairvalueaccounting；Financialinstitutions；Liquidity；Financialcrisis；Banks；Procyclicality1.IntroductionTherecentfinancialcrisishasturnedthespotlightonfair-valueaccounting(FVA)andledtoamajorpolicydebateinvolvingamongotherstheU.S.Congress,theEuropeanCommissionaswellbankingandaccountingregulatorsaroundtheworld.CriticsarguethatFVA,oftenalsocalledmark-to-marketaccounting(MTM),1hassignificantlycontributedtothefinancialcrisisandexacerbateditsseverityforfinancialinstitutionsintheU.S.andaroundtheworld.2Ontheotherextreme,proponentsofFVAarguethatitmerelyplayedtheroleoftheproverbialmessengerthatisnowbeingshot(e.g.,Turner,2008;Veron,2008).3Inourview,thereareproblemswithbothpositions.FVAisneitherresponsibleforthecrisisnorisitmerelyameasurementsystemthatreportsassetvalueswithouthavingeconomiceffectsofitsown.Inthisarticle,weattempttomakesenseofthecurrentfair-valuedebateanddiscusswhethermanyoftheargumentsinthisdebateholduptofurtherscrutiny.Wecometothefollowingfourconclusions.First,muchofthecontroversyaboutFVAresultsfromconfusionaboutwhatisnewanddifferentaboutFVAaswellasdifferentviewsaboutthepurposeofFVA.Inourview,thedebateaboutFVAtakesusbacktoseveraloldaccountingissues,likethetradeoffbetweenrelevanceandreliability,whichhavebeendebatedfordecades.Exceptinrarecircumstances,standardsetterswillalwaysfacetheseissuesandtradeoffs;FVAisjustanotherexample.Thisinsightishelpfultobetterunderstandsomeoftheargumentsbroughtforwardinthedebate.Second,therearelegitimateconcernsaboutmarkingassetvaluestomarketpricesintimesoffinancialcrisisoncewerecognizethattherearetiestocontractsandregulationorthatmanagersandinvestorsmaycareaboutmarketreactionsovertheshortterm.However,itisnotobviousthattheseproblemsarebestaddressedwithchangestotheaccountingsystem.Theseproblemscouldalso(andperhapsmoreappropriately)beaddressedbyadjustingcontractsandregulation.Moreover,theconcernaboutthedownwardspiralismostpronouncedforFVAinitspureformbutitdoesnotapplyinthesamewaytoFVAasstipulatedbyU.S.GAAPorIFRS.Bothstandardsallowfordeviationsfrommarketpricesundercertaincircumstances(e.g.,pricesfromfiresales).Thus,itisnotclearthatthestandardsthemselvesarethesourceoftheproblem.However,asourthirdconclusionhighlights,therecouldbeimplementationproblemsinpractice.Itisimportanttorecognizethataccountingrulesinteractwithotherelementsoftheinstitutionalframework,whichcouldgiverisetounintendedconsequences.Forinstance,wepointoutthatmanagers’concernsaboutlitigationcouldmakeadeviationfrommarketpriceslesslikelyevenwhenitwouldbeappropriate.ConcernsaboutSECenforcementcouldhavesimilareffects.Atthesametime,itisimportanttorecognizethatgivingmanagementmoreflexibilitytodealwithpotentialproblemsofFVA(e.g.,intimesofcrisis)alsoopensthedoorformanipulation.Forinstance,managerscouldusedeviationsfromallegedlydepressedmarketvaluestoavoidlossesandimpairments.Judgingfromevidenceinotherareasinaccounting(e.g.,loansandgoodwill)aswellastheU.S.savingsandloans(S&L)crisis,thisconcernshouldnotbeunderestimated.Thus,standardsettersandenforcementagenciesfaceadelicatetradeoff(e.g.,betweencontagioneffectsandtimelyimpairment).Fourth,weemphasizethatareturntohistoricalcostaccounting(HCA)isunlikelytobearemedytotheproblemswithFVA.HCAhasasetofproblemsaswellanditispossiblethatfor3certainassetstheyareassevere,orevenworsethantheproblemswithFVA.Forinstance,HCAlikelyprovidesincentivesengageinsocalled“gainstrading”ortosecuritizeandsellassets.Moreover,lackoftransparencyunderHCAcouldmakemattersworseduringcrises.Weconcludeourarticlewithseveralsuggestionsforfutureresearch.Basedonextantempiricalevidence,itisdifficulttoevaluatetheroleofFVAinthecurrentcrisis.Inparticular,weneedmoreworkonthequestionofwhethermarketpricessignificantlydeviatedfromfundamentalvaluesduringthiscrisisandmoreevidencethatFVAdidhaveaneffectaboveandbeyondtheprocyclicalityofas