闭环供应链中制造商对废旧品分级定价回收的策略研究

上海交通大学硕士学位论文闭环供应链中制造商对废旧品分级定价回收的策略研究姓名：宿绍鑫申请学位级别：硕士专业：管理科学与工程指导教师：黄培清20070101123RESEARCHONGRADEPRICINGSTRATEGYOFMANUFACTURERFORUSEDPRODUCTSCALLBACKINCLOSED-LOOPSUPPLYCHAINSABSTRACTNowadayssocietyisunderarapideconomydevelopment,withwhichpeoplepaymoreandmoreattentiontotheenvironmentalproblems.Inordertobalancetheeconomydevelopmentandtheenvironmentprotection,foreignresearchersbuiltthetheoryofclosed-loopsupplychains(CLSC),andpracticesprovedthatthetheorycanreallybringbenefitstocompanies.UsedproductscallbackandrecoveryarethetypicalprocessesofCLSC,theirpricingstrategyarethekeyfactorstoinfluencetheprocesses’success.Thethesisproposesagradepricingstrategyofusedproductscallbackandrecoverybasedonreality,anddiscussestheoptimaldecisionandeconomyprofitsofmanufacturers,retailersandconsumersundergameconditions,bymeansofameasurablemodelanalysis.Theactivitiesofusedproductscallbackandrecoveryaremainlyamongmanufacturers,retailersandconsumers,asthekeyparticipatantsofcallbackactivity,thethesisintroducesthefunctions,typicalactivitiesandrelationswithothersatthebeginning,whichmakesawell4preparationforthelaterresearches.Tobuildaquantitativeanalysismodelbasedonthetraditionalpreconditionthatusesasinglepricingstrategyofusedproductscallback,theresearchprovedthatmanufacturersandretailerscangainmoreprofitsandmakeahighercallbackpricewithcentralizeddecision-makingthanwithdecentralizedoneundersinglepricingstrategyprecondition,ifwelookthetwomembersasawholesystem.Andthemanufacturer’sprofitisbetterwhenitisaStackelbergleaderthanitisjustaNashgamer.Also,consumerscangetmorebenefitfromtheusedproductscallbackprocesswithcentralizeddecision-making.Accordingtotheseanalyses,theconclusionisthatmanufacturersandretailersshouldchoosecentralizedpricingdecisionstrategytomakethebestsystemperformance.Afterchangingthesinglepricingstrategytogradepricingstrategyinthemodel’susedproductscallbackprocess,theanalysesgotsimilarresults:underthepreconditionofgradepricingdecision,themanufacturerandtheretailer’stotalprofitisbetterwhentheychoosecentralizeddecision-makingthantheStackelberggame.Themanufacturer’scallbackpriceishigherintheformercondition,too.Consumerscanalsogetmorebenefitfromtheusedproductscallbackprocesswithcentralizeddecision-making.Theconclusionisthatmanufacturersandretailersshouldmakethecallbackpricetogether,andtakeausefulwaytodistributetheprofitsfairly,tohelpmanufacturers,5retailersandconsumersachievetheoptimalsolutionfinally.KEYWORDS:closed-loopsupplychains;usedproductscallback;gradepricingstrategy;gametheory20071172007117200711711.11.1.190901“”239021.1.21“”“”1-1Figure1-1Closed-loopSupplyChainsStructure1.22004GDP20045118GDP3.05%GDP32070801989199221199695%200322005813200671101005IBM20041225000Dell4199119981.45199965%90%21.31231.3.1Fleischmann2001OriginalEquipmentManufacturerOEMOEMOEMKrikke2001OEM5Fleischmann2003IBMKrikke20031.3.2Thierry1995ThierryCopyMagicFleischmann1997GuideVanWassenhove2002/6KroonVrijens1995BergerDebaillie1997/BergerDebaillieMILPJayaraman1999MILP1.3.3CorbettDecroix2001Corbett2001YadavMcGriffLingxiuDong20047Savaskan20041.3.41.41.4.11.4.2892.1——102.22-12-1Jayaraman[19]Thierry(1995)[25]Krikke(2003)[9]Fleischmann(2003)[29]IBM2.2.1ThierryFleischmannGuideKrikke“”2-1“——————”“11——————”[29]Krikke200162-1Figure2-1Closed-loopsupplychainsanditseffecttotheenvironment2-12-22-3122-42-2Figure2-2Structureofproductrecoverybysupplier2-3Figure2-3Structureofproductrecoverybymanufacturer132-4Figure2-4Structureofproductrecoverybyretailer2.2.2——/——//——Thierry[25]Fleischmann[30]GungorGupta[31]14————2.2.3[2,6,21,30,41]——“”——/——“”15——2.3123————25162-5Figure2-5CLSCStructureof“Manufacturer-Retailer-Consumer”173.13.2183.3313-1Figure3-1UsedProductsCallback&RecoveryProcessModelpmcmpmmppc−rcrppmprpxx19rmpp=∆∆rpmp[0,1]∆∈DxrpxrpxD≤()rxfp=()fxmπrππmrπππ=+3.4mprp()()()mmmmmmpcpxpcpfpπ=−−=−−∆31()()()rmrrmrmmpcpxpcpfpπ=−−=−−∆∆32()()mrmrmmpccpfpπππ=+=−−−∆∆33pmcrcmπrππmp∆mπrππmp∆(,)mp∆()fx()krrxfpdp==(0,1)dkdkmp∆200mmppc≤≤−01rmcp≤∆≤−F{(,)0,01}rmmmmcFpppcp=∆≤≤−≤∆≤−34mp∆F,,mrπππ0mp∆F3.4.1max(,)..(,)mmpstpFπ∆∆∈3500mpππ∂=∂∂=∂∆1{[]}0[()]0kkmmmmrmkkmmmmrdppkppccpdppkppccππ−∂=∆−∆+−∆−−=∂∂=∆∆−−∆−−=∂∆36()1mrmkpccpk−−∆=+3721(){(,)}1mrmmkpccYppk−−=∆∆=+38Fπ0mp∆0YYπ,mp∆3811()(1)kkmrkkpccdkπ++−−=+393.4.2(Stackelberg)∆(,)mpF∆∈rπ0∆00rπ∂=∂∆1{[(1)]}0kkkrmmmrdppkpcπ−∂=∆−∆−∆−=∂∆310221(1)rmkckkkp∆=−++311311mp∆311311mπ()()[]1kmrmmmkpcpcpdkπ−=−−+3120mmpπ∂=∂1()[()()()]01kkkkmmrmmmrmkdpcpcppcpkπ−∂=−−+−−−=∂+313*()1mrmkpccpk−+=+314**()(,)(,)11()mrrmmrkpcckckpkkpckc−+∆=−++−[phone]*21()(1)kkmrmkkpccdkπ++−−=+316211*22()(1)kkmrrkkpccdkπ+++−−=+317232*2()(1)mrrkpccpk−−=+318***mrπππ=+319max()()..0mmmmmmppcfpstppcπ=−−∆≤≤−320max()()..01rmrmmrmpcpfpcstpπ=−−∆∆≤∆≤−32111[()(1)]0{[(1)]}0kkmmmmmkkrmmmrdppckkppdppkpcππ−−∂=∆−−+=∂∂=∆∆−−∆−=∂∆322****()(,)(,)11mrmmkpcckpkkpc−∆=−++−333(,)mpF∆∈mπrπ0mπrπmp∆033324313233**21[()]()(1)kkmrrmmkkkpcccpcdkπ+−−−−=+3341**22[()](1)kkmrrrkkkpcccdkπ++−−−=+3352**2()(1)mrrrkpcckcpk−−−=+336******mrπππ=+3373-1*mp≥**mp*rp≥**rp*x≥**x*mπ≥**mπ*rπ≥**rπ*π≥**π253.4.33911()(