PRéCIS OF ACTION IN PERCEPTION 1

PSYCHE:ÉCISOFACTIONINPERCEPTION1AlvaNoëDepartmentofPhilosophyUniversityofCaliforniaBerkeleyCA94720-2390U.S.A.©A.Noë[e-mail]12(1),March2006KEYWORDS:sensorimotor,enactive,perception,consciousness,reversinggoggles,restorationofsightinthecongenitallyblind,action,knowledge,vision,skill,body,brain,environment.1.ThebasicideaThemainideaofthisbookisthatperceivingisawayofacting.Perceptionisnotsomethingthathappenstous,orinus.Itissomethingwedo.Thinkofablindpersontap-tappinghisorherwayaroundaclutteredspace,perceivingthatspacebytouch,notallatonce,butthroughtime,byskillfulprobingandmovement.Thisis,oratleastoughttobe,ourparadigmofwhatperceivingis.Theworldmakesitselfavailabletotheperceiverthroughphysicalmovementandinteraction.InthisbookIarguethatallperceptionistouch-likeinthisway:perceptualexperienceacquirescontentthankstoourpossessionofbodilyskills.Whatweperceiveisdeterminedbywhatwedo(orwhatweknowhowtodo);itisdeterminedbywhatwearereadytodo.InwaysItrytomakeprecise,weenactourperceptualexperience;weactitout.Tobeaperceiveristounderstand,implicitly,theeffectsofmovementonsensorystimulation.Examplesarereadytohand.Anobjectloomslargerinthevisualfieldasweapproachit,anditsprofiledeformsaswemoveaboutit.Asoundgrowslouderaswemovenearertoitssource.Movementsofthehandoverthesurfaceofanobjectgiverisetoshiftingsensations.Asperceiverswearemastersofthissortofpatternofsensorimotordependence.Thismasteryshowsitselfinthethoughtlessautomaticitywithwhichwemoveoureyes,headandbodyintakinginwhatisaroundus.WespontaneouslycranePSYCHE::VOLUME12ISSUE12ournecks,peer,squint,reachforourglasses,ordrawneartogetabetterlook(orbettertohandle,sniff,lickorlistentowhatinterestsus).ThecentralclaimofwhatIcalltheenactiveapproachisthatourabilitytoperceivenotonlydependson,butisconstitutedby,ourpossessionofthissortofsensorimotorknowledge.2Oneimplicationoftheenactiveapproachisthatonlyacreaturewithcertainkindsofbodilyskills—e.g.abasicfamiliaritywiththesensoryeffectsofeyeorhandmovements,etcetera—couldbeaperceiver.3Thisisbecause,ineffect,perceivingisakindofskillfulbodilyactivity.Itmayalsobethatonlyacreaturecapableofatleastsomeprimitiveformsofperceptioncouldbecapableofself-movement.Specifically,self-movementdependsonperceptualmodesofself-awareness,e.g.proprioceptionandalso“perspectivalself-consciousness”(thatis,theabilitytokeeptrackofone’srelationtotheworldaroundone).4Asecondimplicationoftheenactiveapproachisthatweoughttorejecttheidea—widespreadinbothphilosophyandscience—thatperceptionisaprocessinthebrainwherebytheperceptualsystemconstructsaninternalrepresentationoftheworld.Nodoubtperceptiondependsonwhattakesplaceinthebrain,andverylikelythereareinternalrepresentationsinthebrain(e.g.content-bearinginternalstates).Whatperceptionis,however,isnotaprocessinthebrain,butakindofskillfulactivityonthepartoftheanimalasawhole.Theenactiveviewchallengesneurosciencetodevisenewwaysofunderstandingtheneuralbasisofperceptionandconsciousness.5IreturntothiscontroversialtopicinChapterSeven.Thisideaofperceptionasaspeciesofskillfulbodilyactivityisdeeplycounterintuitive.Itgoesagainstmanyofourpreconceptionsaboutthenatureofperception.Wetend,whenthinkingaboutperception,tomakevision,nottouch,ourparadigm,andwetendtothinkofvisiononaphotographicmodel.Youopenyoureyesandyouaregiven,atonce,asharplyfocusedimpressionofthepresentworldinallitsdetail.Onthisview,therelationbetweenmovingandperceivingisonlyinstrumental.Itisliketherelationbetweentheluggingaroundofacameraandtheresultingpicture.Theluggingispreliminarytoanddisconnectedfromthephotographitself.Andsowithperceiving.Bymovingyourself,youcancometooccupyavantagepointfromwhich,say,bettertoseeyourgoal.Andthen,havingseenyourgoal,youcanbetterdecidewhattodo.Buttheseeing,andthemoving,havenomoretodowitheachotherthanthephotographandtheschleppingofthecamera,ortheboxer’slefthook,andthetrainingthatpreceededit.Whichistosay,theyhavealottodowitheachother,buttherelationisnonconstitutive:theeffectivenessofthepunchisstrictlyindependentofhowtheboxerlearnedtodoit,andthequalitiesofthepictureareindependentofhowthecameraendedupwhereitwas.SusanHurley(1998)hasaptlycalledthissimpleviewoftherelationbetweenperceptionandactiontheinput-outputpicture:perceptionisinputfromworldtomind,actionisoutputfrommindtoworld,thoughtisthemediatingprocess.Iftheinput-outputpictureisright,thenitmustbepossible,atleastinprinciple,todisassociatecapacitiesforperception,action,andthought.Themainclaimofthisbookisthatsuchadivorceisnotpossible.Idoubtthatitiseventrulyconceivable.Allperception,Iargue,isintrinsicallyactive.Perceptualexperienceacquirescontentthankstotheperceiver’sskillfulactivity.Ialsoargue—butIdon’tturntothisuntillateinthebook(ChapterSix)—thatallPSYCHE:Ë:ACTIONINPERCEPTION3perceptionisintrinsicallythoughtful.Blindcreaturesmaybecapableofthought,butthoughtlesscreaturescouldneverbecapableofsight,orofanygenuinecontent-bearingperceptualexperience.6Perceptionandperceptualconsciousnessaretypes