我国上市银行高管薪酬与银行绩效的实证分析

I摘要银行业是我国经济健康运转的重要基础，银行业发展的好坏对社会经济有着举足轻重的影响，而银行高管对其所在银行的经营业绩又起着至关重要的作用。自从我国商业银行改制以来，上市商业银行高管的天价薪酬越来越引起社会的广泛关注和质疑。同时，随着改革开放的不断推进，拥有完善的产业结构和先进的高管薪酬激励机制的外资银行全面地融入到我国金融行业的竞争中来，而我国商业银行的薪酬激励制度并不完善，其对银行高管的激励作用没有外资银行显著，这导致我国很多高层管理人才的流失。上市银行高管的薪酬是否过高？高管人员的天价薪酬是否能对银行的综合绩效产生显著影响？怎样使高管薪酬与商业银行的业绩达到内在的一致性？采取怎样的措施来吸引管理人才为银行创造价值？面对这些问题，我国商业银行应该如何制定合理的薪酬管理制度，使上市商业银行的利益达到最大化。本文在参考国内外相关文献的基础上，以我国沪深两市的14家商业银行作为研究样本，搜集这些样本2009年至2013年共五年的相关财务数据并整理成面板数据，建立回归模型对我国上市商业银行高管薪酬与其业绩之间的关系进行实证研究。实证结果表明：我国上市商业银行高管薪酬基本上与银行经营绩效存在一定相关性，但薪酬的激励作用比较有限。这是由于银行高管的薪酬激励更多考虑的是其对银行盈利增加的激励，而对提升银行资本使用效率的激励却考虑的较少。从高管薪酬激励的有效性来看，虽然我国商业银行高管薪酬的增加与每股收益指标保持高度同步的关系，但银行的资产收益率却反而下降，这反映出高薪并没有带来实际的高效，说明我国商业银行对高管提供的薪酬所起到的激励作用并不十分理想，成本控制能力不强，整体经营的资源配置不合理。根据实证的结论，本文针对银行高管薪酬激励制度存在的问题，认为进一步完善我国银行业高管薪酬制度还需要：建立健全业绩考核评价机制；健全完善上市银行高管薪酬信息披露制度；重视长期激励，完善组合激励；加强内部监督，完善银行治理机制等。关键词：上市银行高管薪酬薪酬激励经营绩效IIABSTRACTThebankingindustryisanimportantbasictoourhealthyoperationoftheeconomy.Thedevelopmentofthebankingindustryplaysadecisiveroleonthesocialeconomy,andthebank'sexecutivesareplayingavitalroleontheiroperatingperformance.SinceChina'scommercialbanksreformed,doubtsandconcernsaboutthesky-highcostofthebank'sexecutivesareraisingwidespreadly.Atthesametime,withthecontinuousadvanceofthereformandopening-up,foreign-fundedbankswhichowntheimprovedindustrialstructureandtheadvancedseniormanagers'compensationmechanismfullyintegratedintoourfinancialindustrycompetition.HoweverChina'scommercialbankscompensationincentivesystemisnotveryperfect,theincentiveeffecttotheseniorexecutivesislessfarfromthantheforeignbanksdo,whichcausethebiglossofseniormanagers.Isthelistedbankexecutives'paymenttoohigh?Whetherthesky-highcostofthebank'sexecutiveshaveagreatsignificanceontheperformanceofthebank?Howtomakeseniorexecutives'paymentandthebankperformanceachieveconsistency?Howtotakemeasurestoattractseniorexecutivestocreatemorevaluetoourcommercialbanks?Facedwiththeseproblems,China'scommercialbanksshouldmakereasonablesalarymanagementsystemtomaximizetheirbenefits.Basedontherelatedliteratureathomeandabroad,thispaperselect14listedcommercialbanksasstudysamples.Collecttherelevantfinancialdatafrom2009to2013andsortoutintopaneldata,thenestablishregressionmodeltodotheresearchontherelationshipbetweenseniorexecutives'paymentandbanks'performance.Theempiricalresultsshowthat:theseniorexecutives'paymentoftheChina'slistedcommercialbankhasacertainrelationshipwiththebankperformance,buttheincentivefunctionofcompensationislimited.Thisisbecauseourseniormanagers'compensationmechanismpaymoreattentiontothebanks'increasedprofitability,notthecapitalefficiency.Althoughtheincreaseoftheseniormanagers'compensationandtheper-shareearningsindexmaintainahighlysynchronousrelationship,butthebank'sreturnonassetsindexfalls.Itreflectsthatthehighsalarydidn’tbringactualefficiency.Itshowsthattheseniormanagers'compensationwhichChina'scommercialbanksprovidedidn’tmakeanIIIidealresult,thecostcontrolabilityisweakandtheoverallallocationofresourcesisirrational.Therefore,inthispaper,aimingatsolvingtheproblemsexistinginChineseexecutivecompensationsystem,banksshouldtakethefollowingsuggestions：reformChinesebankingexecutivecompensationincentivesystem;improvethedisclosuresystemofthelistedbankexecutivecompensation;highlightthelong-termincentive,improvetheincentivecombination;strengtheninternalsupervisionandimproveinternalgovernancemechanismcontinuouslyetc.KeyWords：ListedbanksSeniorManagers'CompensationCompensationIncentivePerformanceofListedBanksIV目录摘要..............................................................IABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................................II绪论...................................................................................................................................................70.1研究背景和意义.................................................70.1.1研究背景..................................................70.1.2研究意义..................................................80.2文献综述.......................................................90.2.1国外文献综述..............................................90.2.2国内文献综述.............................................110.3研究思路和内容................................................150.3.1研究思路.................................................150.3.2研究内容.................................................240.4研究方法......................................................250.5创新点与不足..................................................250.5.1本文创新点...............................................250.5.2不足之处.................................................261上市银行高管薪酬与银行绩效的理论分析...............................271.1相关概念厘定..................................................271.1.1高级管理人员.............................................271.1.2高管薪酬.................................................271.1.3公司绩效.................................................281.2高管薪酬与银行绩效的理论基础..................................291.2.1委托—代理理论...........................................291.2.2公司治理理论.........