Solidary Groups,Informal Accountability,and Local

AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewVol.101,No.2May2007DOI:10.1017.S0003055407070153SolidaryGroups,InformalAccountability,andLocalPublicGoodsProvisioninRuralChinaLILYL.TSAIMassachusettsInstituteofTechnologyWhywouldgovernmentofficialsinauthoritarianandtransitionalsystemswhereformaldemo-craticandbureaucraticinstitutionsofaccountabilityareoftenweakeverprovidemorethantheminimumlevelofpublicgoodsneededtomaintainsocialstability?Findingsfromauniquecombinationofin-depthcasestudyresearchandanoriginalsurveyof316villagesinruralChinaindicatethatevenwhenformalaccountabilityisweak,localofficialscanbesubjecttounofficialrulesandnormsthatestablishandenforcetheirpublicobligations.Theseinformalinstitutionsofaccountabilitycanbeprovidedbyencompassingandembeddingsolidarygroups.Villageswherethesetypesofgroupsexistaremorelikelytohavebetterlocalgovernmentalpublicgoodsprovisionthanvillageswithoutthesesolidarygroups,allotherthingsbeingequal.Formalinstitutionsofaccountabilityareoftenweakindevelopingcountries(Bardhan2002).Statesinthesecountriesoftenlackstrongbu-reaucraticinstitutionsforcontrollingcorruptionandmakingsurethatlowerlevelofficialsaredoingtheirjobs.Democraticinstitutionssuchaselectionsthatal-lowcitizenstoholdlocalofficialsaccountablemaybeweakandunreliableorevennonexistent.Yetinthesecountriessomelocalofficialsstillperformbet-terthanothers.Undertheseconditions,howdocit-izensmakegovernmentofficialsorganizeandfundthepublicgoodsandservicesthattheywantandneed?Thisquestionisimportantforpractical,political,andtheoreticalreasons.Practicallyspeaking,peopleevery-whereneedtheirgovernmentstoprovideroads,educa-tion,cleanwater,andotherpublicgoodsandservicesthattheyhavetroubleproducingontheirown.Theprovisionofthesebasicpublicgoodsandservicesmat-tersdeeplyforthequalityofpeople’sliveseverywhere.Politically,howeffectivelygovernmentsprovidethesegoodsandserviceshasanenormousimpactontheirlegitimacy.ManyofthedevelopingcountriesinAsia,Africa,andLatinAmericathatstrugglethemosttoprovidebasicpublicgoodsarealsothecountriesstrug-glingthemosttobuildeffectivestatesandmaintainregimestability.Thisquestionisalsoimportantfromatheoreti-calperspective.Existingexplanationsofgovernmen-LilyL.TsaiisAssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,77MassachusettsAvenue,E53-425,Cambridge,MA02139([e-mail]).IamindebtedtoElizabethPerry,GrzegorzEkiert,RobertPutnam,andThedaSkocpolfortheirinvaluableadviceandsup-portatvariousstagesoftheproject.EarlierversionsofthispaperbenefitedgreatlyfromcommentsprovidedbyEdwardYoung,AdamBerinsky,MelaniCammett,AndreaCampbell,MaryGallagher,JohnGerring,FrancesHagopian,DavidLaitin,ChappellLawson,De-vraMoehler,DanielPosner,SusanRose-Ackerman,JamesScott,TianjianShi,participantsoftheWorldBankSeminarSeriesonthePoliticalEconomyofGovernanceReform,theChinaResearchSem-inaratOxfordUniversity,theDemocracy,Governance,andIdentityWorkshopattheUniversityofMichigan,andsixanonymousreview-ers.NathanCisnerosandWilliamTildenprovidedvaluableeditorialassistance.talperformanceandvariationingovernmentalpublicgoodsprovisionhavefocusedprimarilyontheroleofstrongdemocraticandbureaucraticinstitutions.The-oriesofinstitutionaldesignarguethatthekeytogoodgovernmentisprovidingformaldemocraticin-stitutionsanddevolvingpowertolocallevelssothatcitizenscanmonitorandsanctionofficialseffectively(e.g.,Dahl1971;O’Donnell1996;Rose-Ackerman2005;Seabright1996).Theoriesofcivilsocietyandsocialcapitalarguethatvoluntaryassociations,interestgroups,andassociationalactivitycanimprovegovern-mentalperformanceindemocraticsystems(BoixandPosner1998;EdwardsandFoley1998;Ehrenberg1999;Putnam1993).Inconsolidateddemocracieswherefor-malinstitutionsensuretheincorporationofcitizendemandsintothepolicymakingprocess,autonomousassociationsandinterestgroupscanhelpcitizensvoicetheirdemandsmoreeffectively.Otherstudiessuggestthatdemocraticinstitutionsmaynotbenecessaryforgoodgovernmentalpublicgoodsprovision,buttheseargumentsstillrelyontheexistenceofeffectiveandcoherentformalstateinstitutions.PeterEvans(1995),forexample,arguesthatdevelopmentalstatesdifferfrompredatorystatesintwoways.First,developmen-talstatesgeneratebureaucracieswithcorporatecoher-enceandstrongbureaucraticinstitutionsofinternalaccountability.Second,developmentalstatesare“em-bedded”inthesensethatthestateforgesinformalconnectionswithpowerfulbusinessinterests.Corpo-ratesolidarityenablesthestatetoresistslidingintopatron–clientrelationshipswithsocietalinterests.WaiFungLam(1997)findsthatirrigationgovernanceinTaiwaniseffectivebecausestrongcommunitynormsworkintandemwithformalbureaucraticadmini-stration.Butwhataboutgovernmentalpublicgoodspro-visionincountrieswhichlackstrongdemocraticandbureaucraticinstitutionsofaccountability?Pub-licgoodsprovisionisoftenmuchmoreofaprob-lem,bothpracticallyandpolitically,indevelopingcountrieswithnondemocraticortransitionalsystems.Howdoweaccountforvariationinlocalgovernmen-talperformanceandpublicgoodsprovisioninthesesystems?355SolidaryGroups,InformalAccountability,andLocalGoodsProvisioninRuralChinaMay2007