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1、TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructureMichaelC.JensenHarvardBusinessSchoolandWilliamH.Meckling*UniversityofRochester1.Introduction1.1.MotivationofthePaperInthispaperwedrawonrecentprogressinthetheoryof(1)propertyrights,(2)agency,and(3)financetodevelopatheoryofownershipstructureforthefirm.Inadditiontotyingtogetherelementsofthetheoryofeachofthesethreeareas,ouranalysiscastsnewlightonandhasimplicationsforavarietyofissuesintheprofessionalandpopularliteratureincludingthede。
2、finitionofthefirm,the“separationofownershipandcontrol,”the“socialresponsibility”ofbusiness,thedefinitionofa“corporateobjectivefunction,”thedeterminationofanoptimalcapitalstructure,thespecificationofthecontentofcreditagreements,thetheoryoforganizations,andthesupplysideofthecompletenessofmarketsproblems.Ourtheoryhelpsexplain:1.whyanentrepreneurormanagerinafirmwhichhasamixedfinancialstructure(containingbothdebtandoutsideequityclaims)willchooseasetofactivitiesforthefirmsuchthatthetotalvalueofthefirm。
3、islessthanitwouldbeifhewerethesoleownerandwhythisresultisindependentofwhetherthefirmoperatesinmonopolisticorcompetitiveproductorfactormarkets;2.whyhisfailuretomaximizethevalueofthefirmisperfectlyconsistentwithefficiency;3.whythesaleofcommonstockisaviablesourceofcapitaleventhoughmanagersdonotliterallymaximizethevalueofthefirm;4.whydebtwasrelieduponasasourceofcapitalbeforedebtfinancingofferedanytaxadvantagerelativetoequity;5.whypreferredstockwouldbeissued;6.whyaccountingreportswouldbeprovidedvolun。
4、tarilytocreditorsandstockholders,andwhyindependentauditorswouldbeengagedbymanagementtotestifytotheaccuracyandcorrectnessofsuchreports;7.whylendersoftenplacerestrictionsontheactivitiesoffirmstowhomtheylend,andwhyfirmswouldthemselvesbeledtosuggesttheimpositionofsuchrestrictions;8.whysomeindustriesarecharacterizedbyowner-operatedfirmswhosesoleoutsidesourceofcapitalisborrowing;9.whyhighlyregulatedindustriessuchaspublicutilitiesorbankswillhavehigherdebtequityratiosforequivalentlevelsofriskthantheaver。
5、agenonregulatedfirm;10.whysecurityanalysiscanbesociallyproductiveevenifitdoesnotincreaseportfolioreturnstoinvestors.1.2TheoryoftheFirm:AnEmptyBox?Whiletheliteratureofeconomicsisrepletewithreferencestothe“theoryofthefirm,”thematerialgenerallysubsumedunderthatheadingisnotactuallyatheoryofthefirmbutratheratheoryofmarketsinwhichfirmsareimportantactors.Thefirmisa“blackbox”operatedsoastomeettherelevantmarginalconditionswithrespecttoinputsandoutputs,therebymaximizingprofits,ormoreaccurately,presentvalu。
6、e.Exceptforafewrecentandtentativesteps,however,wehavenotheorywhichexplainshowtheconflictingobjectivesoftheindividualparticipantsarebroughtintoequilibriumsoastoyieldthisresult.ThelimitationsofthisblackboxviewofthefirmhavebeencitedbyAdamSmithandAlfredMarshall,amongothers.Morerecently,popularandprofessionaldebatesoverthe“socialresponsibility”ofcorporations,theseparationofownershipandcontrol,andtherashofreviewsoftheliteratureonthe“theoryofthefirm”haveevidencedcontinuingconcernwiththeseissues.Anumber。
7、ofmajorattemptshavebeenmadeduringrecentyearstoconstructatheoryofthefirmbysubstitutingothermodelsforprofitorvaluemaximization,witheachattemptmotivatedbyaconvictionthatthelatterisinadequatetoexplainmanagerialbehaviorinlargecorporations.Someofthesereformulationattemptshaverejectedthefundamentalprincipleofmaximizingbehavioraswellasrejectingthemorespecificprofit-maximizingmodel.Weretainthenotionofmaximizingbehavioronthepartofallindividualsintheanalysisthatfollows.1.3PropertyRightsAnindependentstreamo。
8、fresearchwithimportantimplicationsforthetheoryofthefirmhasbeenstimulatedbythepioneeringworkofCoase,andextendedbyAlchian,Demsetz,andothers.AcomprehensivesurveyofthisliteratureisgivenbyFurubotnandPejovich(1972).Whilethefocusofthisresearchhasbeen“propertyrights”,thesubjectmatterencompassedisfarbroaderthanthattermsuggests.Whatisimportantfortheproblemsaddressedhereisthatspecificationofindividualrightsdetermineshowcostsandrewardswillbeallocatedamongtheparticipantsinanyorganization.Sincethespecificatio。
9、nofrightsisgenerallyaffectedthroughcontracting(implicitaswellasexplicit),individualbehaviorinorganizations,includingthebehaviorofmanagers,willdependuponthenatureofthesecontracts.Wefocusinthispaperonthebehavioralimplicationsofthepropertyrightsspecifiedinthecontractsbetweentheownersandmanagersofthefirm.1.4AgencyCostsManyproblemsassociatedwiththeinadequacyofthecurrenttheoryofthefirmcanalsobeviewedasspecialcasesofthetheoryofagencyrelationshipsinwhichthereisagrowingliterature.Thisliteraturehasdevelop。
10、edindependentlyofthepropertyrightsliteratureeventhoughtheproblemswithwhichitisconcernedaresimilar;theapproachesareinfacthighlycomplementarytoeachother.Wedefineanagencyrelationshipasacontractunderwhichoneormorepersons(theprincipal(s))engageanotherperson(theagent)toperformsomeserviceontheirbehalfwhichinvolvesdelegatingsomedecisionmakingauthoritytotheagent.Ifbothpartiestotherelationshipareutilitymaximizers,thereisgoodreasontobelievethattheagentwillnotalwaysactinthebestinterestsoftheprincipal.Theprin。
本文标题:Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior,Agency Cost
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