接管行为与公司治理之关联性研究

TheStudyofRelationshipBetweenTakeoverandCorporateGovernance(RogerC.Y.Chen)(Chia-HsiangKang)[e-mail]BetweenTakeoverandCorporateGovernance199120011155binarylogisticregression81.82%1.2001Enronworld-comXeroxGlobalCrossingTycoArthurAndersen(corporategovernance)200278%Johnson(2000)(takeover)Manne(1965)Fama(1980)FamaJensen(1983)Jenson(1993)WeirLaing(2002)DayhaPowell(1999)(takeover)2.2.1Prowse(1998)Johnson(2000)2001ShleiferandVishny(1997)(2002)()2.22.2.1LaPorta(1999)2720%63.5%Claessens(2000)LaPorta(1999)83.4%Yeh(2001)1997199825170.1%58.2%Claessens(2002)LaPorta(2002)(cashflowright)(controlright)(1)(incentiveeffects)(2)(entrenchmenteffects)Classessens(2000)LaPorta(1999)(2002)19971998251Volpin(2002)50%LaPorta(2002)(common-lawcountries)2.2.2(2002)(AuditCommittee)(1)JensenandMeckling(1976)(1998)(2001)(2002)(2)(3)Morck(1988)0%5%5%25%25%ToddMitton(2002)398ADR2.32.3.1Healy(1992)1979198450Switzer(1996)Healy19671987324(1999)Palepu(1986)North(2001)North(2001)SongandWalking(1993)DahyaandPowell(1999)FrankandMayer(1996)Tobin’QDayhaandPowell(1999)SongandWalkling(1993)Weir(1997)(2002)WeirandLaing(2002)19971998154Binarylogisticregressionmodel57%2.3.2(2002)2.3.3Pound(1988)(1)(2)(3)(1998)(1997)2.3.42002(NYSE)20011922165%3%20023.3.1199112001121155(1999)(2002)(Merger)WeirandLaing(2002)(2002)3.23.3()3.43.4.1(1)(2)(3)(10)(dummy)(4)(10)(dummy)(5)()(6)(10)(dummy)3.4.2(1)LaPorta(1999)(2002)50%3-1A30%50%20%A()20%A30%20%50%A30%30%A20%A30%(50%×20%)40%30%50%20%A3-1.A(2)(3)(dummy10)LaPorta(1999)3.4.3CFRMVAROEEPS(1)(CFR)CFR==(EBIT)+(2)(MVA)MVA==()×()(3)(EPS)EPS=ÝŠOŒÒÉ(4)ROE=žÜ‰v3.4.4(1)(2)Beatty(1994)3.5Binarylogisticregressionmodel1011113.6(1)(2)4.4.14.1.14.14.24.152%4.14.24.1t-valuep-value46.6717.58-3.7530.001***64.7223.4514.896.68-1.820.08*19.4414.780.280.45-0.9020.3750.380.490.210.41-2.7030.012**0.410.511.175.31.4540.15710.284.270.90.311.440.1610.830.386.674.15-2.250.033**11.612.636.24.171.8530.074*4.344.080.760.44-1.280.2120.90.31*10%**5%***1%4.2t-valuep-value46.6717.58-0.0290.97746.8423.2214.896.68-4.80.00***25.0610.50.280.450.70.490.210.410.210.41-2.530.02**0.520.5111.175.30.160.88115.540.90.310.3720.7120.870.356.674.15-4.470.00***16.2511.946.24.174.690.00***1.412.850.760.442.530.02**0.450.51*10%**5%***1%4.1.2(EPS)(ROE)(CFR)(MVA)4.34.44.54.3t-valuep-valueEPS-0.742.92-0.830.41-0.272.45ROE-8.5727.38-0.790.43-5.2122.17CFR3.227.720.670.52.337.83MVA4.48E+094.44E+09-1.540.135.31E+095.78E+09*10%**5%***1%4.4t-valuep-valueEPS-0.742.92-5.210.00***2.022.87ROE-8.5727.38-5.280.00***10.8711.13CFR3.227.72-6.420.00***11.686.9MVA4.48E+094.44E+09-3.420.00***1.47E+102.47E+10*10%**5%***1%4.5t-valuep-valueEPS-0.272.45-4.310.00***1.32.14ROE-5.2122.17-4.470.00***7.710.48CFR2.337.83-6.360.00***9.926.73MVA5.31E+095.78E+09-2.120.04**1.71E+104.42E+10*10%**5%***1%4.2Logistic4.611Waldtest750%81.82%85.45%83.64%logistic25%30%WaldTest81.82%Loglikehoodtest4.8LoglikehoodTest0Cox&ShellR2NagelkerkeR49%65.4%48.3%64.3%HosmerandLemeshowTest24.6LogisticWaldTestP-value0.01060.31140.577-0.1417.24390.007***2.02984.64540.031**1.32123.30140.069*-0.08131.4270.023**0.60560.64630.4210.02670.19870.6560.28748.04570.005***1.9723.9870.046**0.00910.06160.8-0.86146.46220.011**18.60545.39220.02**554581.82%554785.45%83.64%*10%**5%***1%50%4.7LogisticWaldTestP-value-0.117815.43210.001***2.1055.23340.022**1.07472.60650.106-0.08762.72250.099*0.26398.10760.004***2.10826.09560.014**-0.93929.16520.002***21.49559.45150.002***554581.82%554581.82%81.82%*10%**5%***1%50%4.8P-value-2LogLikehoodTest78.3210.00***GoodnessofFitTest85.199Cox&SnellR20.49NagelkerkeR20.654HosmerandLemeshowTest2.30020.97-2LogLikehoodTest80.0160.00***GoodnessofFitTest84.194Cox&SnellR20.483NagelkerkeR20.643HosmerandLemeshowTest2.46490.963*10%**5%***1%5.19912001LogisticLogLikehoodTest50%81.82%2002159-1872002200276-99200119981998199920021997Beatty,C.A.,1994,Wanted:ThePerfectTinyAcquisition,BusinessQuarterly,summer,51-59.Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,andH.P.Lang,2000,TheSeparationofOwnershipandcontrolinEastAsianCorporation.JournalofFinancialEconomics58,81-112.Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,andH.P.Lang,2002,DisentanglingtheIncentiveandEntrenchmentEffectsofLargeShareholding.JournalofFinance57,2741-2776.Dahya,J.andR.Powell.,1999,TopManagementChangesFollowingHostileandFriendlyTake-Overs.ACCAResearchReportNo.61,London.Fama,E.F.,1980,AgencyProblemsandtheTheoryoftheFirm.JournalofPoliticalEconomy88,134-145.Fama,E.F.andM.C.Jensen.,1983,SeparationofOwnershipandControl.JournalofLawandEconomics26,301-349.Franks,J.andC.Mayer,1996,Hostiletakeoversandthecorrectionofmanagerialfailure,JournalofFinancialEconomics40,163-181.Healy,P.,K.G.Palepu,andR.S.Ruback,1992,DoesCorporatePerformanceImproveafterMergers?,JournalofFinancialEconomics31,135-175Healy,P.,K.G.Palepu,andR.S.Ruback,1997,WhichTakeoversareProfitable?StrategicorFinancial?,SloanManagementReview38,45-57.Jensen,M.C.,W.H.Meckling,1976,Theoryofthefirm:Managerialbehavior,agencycostandownershipstructure.JournalofFinanc