71我国医药类上市公司董事会治理与经营绩效实证研究

重庆大学硕士学位论文我国医药类上市公司董事会治理与经营绩效实证研究姓名：陈波申请学位级别：硕士专业：工商管理指导教师：刘星20060301I(corporategovernance)(1994)—91A(2004):IIABSTRACTBycorporategovernance,wemeanakindofinstitutionalframeworkcomposedoftheowners,theboardofdirectorsandtheseniorexecutivestaff,i.e.thesuperiormanagers.Thiskindofstructureformscertainbalancedrelationshipbetweenthreedescribedabove.Throughthisstructure,theownerstrusttheirownassetstotheboardofdirectorsofthecompany;andtheboardofdirectorsarethepolicy-makingbodyofcompany,havingthepowertoemploy,toreward,topunishandtodismisstheiremployees;theseniorexecutivesareemployedbytheboardofdirectors,makinguptheexecutivebodyundertheleadershipofboardofdirectors,managingtheenterpriseswithintherangeofmandateoftheboardofdirectors.(WuJinglian,1994).Becauseofthetwolayersofentrustmentinthemanagementofthecompany,namely,theAgentrelationshipbetweentheshareholdersandtheboardofdirectors,andtheclientagebetweentheboardandthemanagers,theboardofdirectorsbeingagents,aswellasclients,theboardofdirectorsoccupiesthepivotstatusincompany'sadministrationstructure.Soboththepropertyrightstructureandthedevelopmentstrategyofcompanyrestontheboardsofdirectorseventually.Becauseofkeystatusoftheboard,themendoftheinternalstructureandtheoperationoftheboard,andtheimprovementofthecompany’sperformance,becomethecrucialtaskofsettingupaneffectiveadministrationstructureofboardofdirectors.Thispaperhereinadoptsthecombinedmethodsofdemonstrationresearchandcriterionresearch,withthedemonstrationresearchpredominated.Wewilltakethe91medicineA-sharelistedcompany(2004)inourcountryassamples,mainlyfocusonthreerespectsofthemanagementoftheboardofdirectorsofmedicineoflistedcompanyinourcountry:namelythemanagementoftheinternalstructureofboard;themanagementoftheoperationoftheboard;themanagementoftheboardandtheperformanceofthecompany.Thiswillbeanomni-directionalandomni-perspectivestudyofthestateofthemedicinelistedcompanyinourcountry.Ouraimistobenefitthemanagementoftheboardofthemedicinelisted-companyandtheimprovementoftheperformanceofthecompanyKeyword:Medicine,ListedCompany,GovernanceOftheBoardOfDirectors,ManagementPerformance1111.1“”(Cadburycode.1992)“”[1]1990200412137737055.5711688.647211.43[2]?1220021911.217.7%4.43013.8%[3]20049113756.62%20040.0869200364.31%91131.12004Table1.1tableofthepayoffofeachshareofthelisted-companyin2004inChina()()/20042003200420030.40880.238724240.0401-0.303710100.31150.34296161-0.05160.230042420.20960.15354646-0.02320.154067670.17350.20112242240.05230.064129300.24610.149559590.30410.275910100.46020.38101251250.1961-0.0049330.05580.085535370.15650.133895970.10130.099616170.20680.109941410.29020.12791521530.15130.102857580.04580.076883850.08690.19029192-0.05890.024629290.04210.029776811.31.3.11.3.1.114(Wcisbach.1998)60%CEOCEO(Fama,1993)“”1.3.1.2(LiptonandLorsch,1992)107—9(Jensen,1993)78(Yermack,1996)1984—1991452(Q)1.3.1.3Vafeas(1999)19901994307VafeasVafeasLiptonLorchLiptonLorchLiptonLorchConger(1998)Conger151.3.1.4Bhagat(1999)“”Morck,ShlieferVishny(1998)Q()HermalinWelsbach(1991)(Kelin.2000)1.3.1.5(Mace,1971)206070(1996)2090CEO(RechnerandDalton,1991)(Boyd,1995)CEO1.3.21.3.2.1(2001)1998199991“—”U()(2001)1996123128716“”1.3.2.2(2000)19981231519AQ(2002)(2003)561112.2811(2002)2501.3.2.32001(2002)20011151T(2001)(2001)19991.3.2.4(1998)17(2002)“”(2002)1.3.2.5(2002)20026971.41.4.191A123451.4.2“”“18”91()1.4.31.1Fig.1.1Technocialrouteofthispaper292—2.1[4]2.2—[5]2102.3[6]2.4[7]211“”2.5-3123[8]Prowse(1998)Nestor(1999)Berglof(1999)Gugler(1999)3.1(Anglo-Saxon)“”(Roe,1994)“”19901914—(1933),(1933),(1934)313“”3.13.1Anglo-SoxonFig.3.1ThemodelofcorporationgovernanceofAnglo-SoxonResourcefrom:RobertA.G.MonksandNeilMinow,corporategovernanceblackwellbusiness,page2433.2314Moerland(1995)3.23.2Fig.3.2ThemodelofcorporationgovernanceofJapanesecompanies—()413200453.3“”“”“”:()3.33153.3Fig.3.3ThemodelofcorporationgovernanceofGermancompanies:199942Gierke“Verbamdspersonlichkeit”“”25%3.4“”“”“”()“”“”“”“”“”“”“”“”3163.1Table3.1characteristicsofAnglo-SoxonJapaneseGermanyandSoutheasternAsianCountries1.2.3.1.2.3.1.2.1.2.3.3173.5“”——3.4Fig.3.4ThemodelofcorporationgovernanceofChina20015“”318“”3.691200441944.14.1.14.1(91)Table4.1Theoverallstockobligeestructureofmedicinelisted-companiesinChina(sample:91,Unit:tenthousand)2380493.6527797146.5860371318.3587176951.767718363.726537268.9499979444.2639100%33.4866%15.5984%7.4334%0.7714%1.5656%41.1446%9120049133.49%15.60%7.43%0.77%41.14%1.57%41.14%60.30%(2002)4.1.24.2(91)Table4.2Analysisoftheproportionofstate-heldstock(sample:91)30%4953.85%30%—50%1516.48%50%—70%2021.98%70%77.69%91100%91200442030%46.15%50%29.67%70%7.69%30%46.15%30%65.64%(2002)“”4.1.3——4.3(91)Table4.3Analysisoftheproportionofthefirststockholder(sample:91)30%3942.86%30%—50%2729.67%50%—70%2325.27%70%22.2%91100%91200430%5257.14%50%2527.47%270%2.2%9138.62%57.14%42.86%11354214.1.44.4(91)Table4.4Thestructureofthestockobligebasedonasset(sample:91)5148.79%35.93%5%016.57%33.71%5—154428%18.07%9.23%2.41%3.34%38.95%15—302043.07%15.17%8.66%0.18%038.11%30—50740.73%18.04%5.81%0.003%035.41%50645.52%9.5%00