英文版罗斯公司理财习题答案Chap001

CHAPTER1INTRODUCTIONTOCORPORATEFINANCEAnswerstoConceptQuestions1.Thethreebasicformsaresoleproprietorships,partnerships,andcorporations.Theadvantagesanddisadvantagesofsoleproprietorshipsandpartnershipsare:Disadvantages:unlimitedliability,limitedlife,difficultyintransferringownership,hardtoraisecapitalfunds.Someadvantages:simpler,lessregulation,theownersarealsothemanagers,sometimespersonaltaxratesarebetterthancorporatetaxrates.Theprimarydisadvantageofthecorporateformisthedoubletaxationtoshareholdersofdistributedearningsanddividends.Someadvantagesinclude:limitedliability,easeoftransferability,abilitytoraisecapital,andunlimitedlife.Whenabusinessisstarted,mosttaketheformofasoleproprietorshiporpartnership.2.Tomaximizethecurrentmarketvalue(shareprice)oftheequityofthefirm(whetherit’spubliclytradedornot).3.Inthecorporateformofownership,theshareholdersaretheownersofthefirm.Theshareholderselectthedirectorsofthecorporation,whointurnappointthefirm’smanagement.Thisseparationofownershipfromcontrolinthecorporateformoforganizationiswhatcausesagencyproblemstoexist.Managementmayactinitsownorsomeoneelse’sbestinterests,ratherthanthoseoftheshareholders.Ifsucheventsoccur,theymaycontradictthegoalofmaximizingthesharepriceoftheequityofthefirm.4.Suchorganizationsfrequentlypursuesocialorpoliticalmissions,somanydifferentgoalsareconceivable.Onegoalthatisoftencitedisrevenueminimization;i.e.,providewhatevergoodsandservicesareofferedatthelowestpossiblecosttosociety.Abetterapproachmightbetoobservethatevenanot-for-profitbusinesshasequity.Thus,oneansweristhattheappropriategoalistomaximizethevalueoftheequity.5.Presumably,thecurrentstockvaluereflectstherisk,timing,andmagnitudeofallfuturecashflows,bothshort-termandlong-term.Ifthisiscorrect,thenthestatementisfalse.6.Anargumentcanbemadeeitherway.Attheoneextreme,wecouldarguethatinamarketeconomy,allofthesethingsarepriced.Thereisthusanoptimallevelof,forexample,ethicaland/orillegalbehavior,andtheframeworkofstockvaluationexplicitlyincludesthese.Attheotherextreme,wecouldarguethatthesearenon-economicphenomenaandarebesthandledthroughthepoliticalprocess.Aclassic(andhighlyrelevant)thoughtquestionthatillustratesthisdebategoessomethinglikethis:“Afirmhasestimatedthatthecostofimprovingthesafetyofoneofitsproductsis$30million.However,thefirmbelievesthatimprovingthesafetyoftheproductwillonlysave$20millioninproductliabilityclaims.Whatshouldthefirmdo?”7.Thegoalwillbethesame,butthebestcourseofactiontowardthatgoalmaybedifferentbecauseofdifferingsocial,political,andeconomicinstitutions.8.Thegoalofmanagementshouldbetomaximizethesharepriceforthecurrentshareholders.Ifmanagementbelievesthatitcanimprovetheprofitabilityofthefirmsothatthesharepricewillexceed$35,thentheyshouldfighttheofferfromtheoutsidecompany.Ifmanagementbelievesthatthisbidderorotherunidentifiedbidderswillactuallypaymorethan$35persharetoacquirethecompany,thentheyshouldstillfighttheoffer.However,ifthecurrentmanagementcannotincreasethevalueofthefirmbeyondthebidprice,andnootherhigherbidscomein,thenmanagementisnotactingintheinterestsoftheshareholdersbyfightingtheoffer.Sincecurrentmanagersoftenlosetheirjobswhenthecorporationisacquired,poorlymonitoredmanagershaveanincentivetofightcorporatetakeoversinsituationssuchasthis.9.Wewouldexpectagencyproblemstobelesssevereinothercountries,primarilyduetotherelativelysmallpercentageofindividualownership.Fewerindividualownersshouldreducethenumberofdiverseopinionsconcerningcorporategoals.Thehighpercentageofinstitutionalownershipmightleadtoahigherdegreeofagreementbetweenownersandmanagersondecisionsconcerningriskyprojects.Inaddition,institutionsmaybebetterabletoimplementeffectivemonitoringmechanismsonmanagersthancanindividualowners,basedontheinstitutions’deeperresourcesandexperienceswiththeirownmanagement.TheincreaseininstitutionalownershipofstockintheUnitedStatesandthegrowingactivismoftheselargeshareholdergroupsmayleadtoareductioninagencyproblemsforU.S.corporationsandamoreefficientmarketforcorporatecontrol.10.Howmuchistoomuch?Whoisworthmore,JackWelchorTigerWoods?Thesimplestansweristhatthereisamarketforexecutivesjustasthereisforalltypesoflabor.Executivecompensationisthepricethatclearsthemarket.Thesameistrueforathletesandperformers.Havingsaidthat,oneaspectofexecutivecompensationdeservescomment.Aprimaryreasonthatexecutivecompensationhasgrownsodramaticallyisthatcompanieshaveincreasinglymovedtostock-basedcompensation.Suchmovementisobviouslyconsistentwiththeattempttobetteralignstockholderandmanagementinterests.Inrecentyears,stockpriceshavesoared,somanagementhascleanedup.Itissometimesarguedthatmuchofthisrewardissimplyduetorisingstockpricesingeneral,notmanagerialperformance.Perhapsinthefuture,executivecompensationwillbedesignedtorewardonlydifferentialperformance,i.e.,stockpriceincreasesinexcessofgeneralmarketincreases.