周其仁《新制度经济学》

•–•1566-•1779graphien,••1896•1897•1918-----–1958•••••1850••••1––––•––––•––••––••••––2–•––••••–••–––•–––••(I)–––––––•(EconomicMan)3––•••-(Alchian:)–••–––••••–•–––••••––••––––4––••+••••/•••••–––••3–4-5––•5••••••––•–––••––––•–630-930205–43•••••6••–––•–•–(commonpeople)•––•••ownership:–therighttomakephysicaluseofphysicalobjects–therighttoincomefromit–thepowerofmanagement,includingthatalienation•••–––Norights,notax–A.Alchian•Alchian(Apropertyrightisasociallyenforcedrighttoselectusesofaneconomicgood)•sociallyenforcedright)––?–•(selectusesof)––7Alchian(1•propertyrightsstrength)–..ismeasuredbyitsprobabilityandcostsofenforcement–..dependonthegovernment,informalsocialactions,andprevailingethicalandnormalnorms–sociallyenforcedrightAlchian2•---Aprivatepropertyrightisoneassignedtoaspecificpersonanditsalienableinexchangeforsimilarrightsoverothergoods–(specificperson,orindividual)–(alienableinexchange)••••–––•ThouShallNotSteal?••••scarcity••=8––––––••––••••1959•–Barzel–––––•–––––•9••Y.Barzel–•Economicpropertyrights:anindividualsabilitytoconsumethegood(ortheservicesoftheasset)directlyortoconsumeitindirectlythroughexchange.•Legalrights:whatthestateassignstoaperson––publicdomain:•/••––()••••••••••••10••(1968)TragedyoftheCommoncommon,opentoall•ScottGordon(1954):thateverybodyspropertyisnobodysproperty.••(PrisonersDilemma,PD)(Dawes,1973)•(Olson,1965)coercion•(Leviathan)-•:•E.Ostrom•-----••••CPRs(Common-PoolResource):Anaturalorman-maderesourcesystemthatissufficientlylargeastomakeitcostlytoexcludepotentialbeneficiariesfromobtainingbenefitsfromitsuse5211•publicgoods•CPRs•Ostrom(1990)CPRs•60012245•1630atar)maestro•1•2•••(common-propertyrights)•rentdissipation)12••••=••••••••••••••••13•••••(1)(2)••••••••–––••••–––•••••F.A.Hayek,TheEvolutionoftheMarket:TradeandCivilization–..tradeisolderthanagricultureoranyothersortofregularproduction;14–InEuropethereisevidenceoftradeoververygreatdistanceseveninthePaleolithicage,atleast30,000yearsago.–TradeOlderthantheStateTheFatalConceit,p.39.•••••••EdgeworthBox••usevalue)(marginalusevalue)•–123456–MUV:1.000.900.800.700.600.50–MUV:2.001.601.200.800.400.00••=•=4•0.602.40•=15A.Alchian•••–––•–•––––•••––•1928––16–•infra-marginalanalysis••----•––––••••theprocesstorepresentthepropertydeSoto)–Theyhavehousesbutnottitles,cropsbutnotdeeds;businessesbutnotstatutesofincorporation.••?•–––•••coordination)•----•••17•••••••••••FernandBraudel):II,P4-127)•G.WilliamSkinner(1964):•••••--------Samuelson,Economics,p2118••(TheMarketP7-8)Economistdealswiththedeterminationofmarketprices,butdiscussionofthemarketitselfhasentirelydisappearedWhy?Ifaneconomictheoryassumesthattransactioncostsarenonexistent,marketshavenofunctiontoperform,Thisanalysisshowswhythereisagainfromtrade,butitfailstodealwiththefactorswhichdeterminehowmuchtradethereisorwhatgoodsaretraded.Marketsareinstitutionsthatexisttofacilitateexchange,inordertoreducethecostofcarryingoutexchangetransactions.Theprovisionofmarketsisanentrepreneurialactivity(TheEvolutionoftheMarket)•Theexpansionoforderintounknown•Unknown?•Spontaneousactions•Tradeolderthanthestate•Requiresseveralproperty,libertyandjustice11•AvnerGreif1993Maghribi•(coalition)(reputationmechanism)(informationtransmission)(MultilateralPunishment)•(MerchantsLaw)••••••••19•:•pricediscrimination••••123456MUV:1.000.900.800.700.600.50MUV:2.001.601.200.800.400.00•••---••GreshamsLaw••••AB•(counter-market)20••(contact)(commitmentproblem)•••••/••6•••••••21•••••-----••••GeorgeAkerlof(1970),Lemonsasymmetricinformation.••attributes)••••••••1•••22•2•••••3•••+•••4••5••••6•23••7••••••••••(?)?••••102021247••••••••456••••••---1•Thereisacostofusingthepricemechanism.Themostobviouscostoforganizingproductionthroughthepricemechanismisthatofdiscoveringwhattherelevantpricesare.------TheNatureoftheFirm,1937•Thedelineationofrightsisanessentialpreludetomarkettransactions.-------FCC,1959(2)Inordertocarryoutamarkettransactionitisnecessarytodiscoverwhoitisthatonewishestodealwith,toinformpeoplethatonewishestodealwithandtowhatterms,toconductnegotiationsleadinguptoabargain,todrawupthecontract,toundertaketheinspectionneededtomakesurethatthetermsofthecontractarebeingobserved,andsoon.---------Theproblemofsocialcost,1960•(1)•(2)••253-6%1•transactionsarecostly.••102••3•setupsupportingsystem)4•:26rightvsrights5•Arrow(1960):transactioncostsarethecostsofrunningtheeconomicsystem.•1987•measurement)•WallisandNorth(1988):47-55%ofGNPin1970USeconomy;and26%in1870.(withoutsetupcost)Scherer(1987):theaveragemarketingcostwas49%ofthefinalconsumerpriceinWestGermanyin1959.(1)()•YC=F(YP)Transactioncost=YPYC(2)•MaxR=PCYCPPYPs.t.YC=F(YP)••••••••••278••••••••••••1•8088••8282(1)•Coase(1937):TheNatureoftheFirmEconomicsystemworksitself?ThepriceoffactorAbecomeshigherinXthaninY.Asaresult,AmovesfromYtoXYetintherealworldwefindthattherearemanyareaswherethisdoesnotapply.IfaworkmanmovesfromdepartmentYtodepartmentX,hedoesnotgobecauseofachangeinrelativeprices,butbecauseheisorderedtodoso.2•Ofcourse,thisfacthasnotbeenignoredbyeconomists.Marshall:organizationasafourthfactorofproductio