1999-OBrien-Selective-Policy-Implementation-in-Rur

SelectivePolicyImplementationinRuralChinaKevinJ.O'Brien;LianjiangLiComparativePolitics,Vol.31,No.2.(Jan.,1999),pp.167-186.StableURL:=0010-4159%28199901%2931%3A2%3C167%3ASPIIRC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-IComparativePoliticsiscurrentlypublishedbyPh.D.PrograminPoliticalScienceoftheCityUniversityofNewYork.YouruseoftheJSTORarchiveindicatesyouracceptanceofJSTOR'sTermsandConditionsofUse,availableat://@jstor.org.:102008SelectivePolicyImplementationinRuralChinaKevinJ:02BrienandLianjiangLiApatternofselectivepolicyimplementationhasemergedintheChinesecountry-side,assomecadresconscientiouslyenforceunpopularpolicieswhilerefusingtocarryoutothermeasuresthatvillagerswelcome.Suchofficialsoftengotoextraordi-narylengthstourgecommunitymemberstopaytheirtaxesandfees,toacceptcre-mationinsteadofburial,andtocomplywithbirthcontroledicts,yetignoreordistortpoliciesthatbanunauthorizedappropriationandrequirerespectforvillagers'rightsandinterests.Theseruralleadersoftenviolateprohibitionsontheuseofforce,side-steplimitsonpeasantburdens,andderailelectoralreformsthatareintendedtoimproveaccountability.Theysometimeseventurnawell-likedcentralpolicy,suchaseconomicgrowth,intoaharmfullocalpolicythatjustifieswastefulinvestmentandmoreextraction.Whydocadresactinthisway?HowdoChinesestreet-levelbureaucratsdefinetheirtasksanddistinguishbetweenpoliciesthatmustbeimple-mentedandthosetheycansafelyignore?'Street-LevelDiscretionandPolicyDeliveryThatgrass-rootsofficialscarryoutsomepoliciesbutnotothersishardlynews.Buthowmuchdiscretionstreet-levelbureaucratsenjoyhasbeenamatterofdebate.Someanalystsarguethatimplementorsusuallyhavelimitedroomformaneuverbecausetheirsuperiorshavewaystoshapetheirpreferencesandconstraintheirbehavior.Adoptingatop-downapproach,theseresearchersmaintainthatfront-linebureaucratsmainlyaffectstrategiesforachievinggoalsratherthanthegoalsthem-selves.Theynotethatskilfulhigh-leveladministratorscanstructureimplementation,reducethenumberofvetopoints,andpermitoutsiders(includingordinarycitizens)tooverseepolicydelivery.Theyremindusthatperformanceevaluationremainslargelyinthehandsoftopdecisionmakersandthat,evenwhenconditionsforsuc-cessfulimplementationareabsentatfirst,fine-tuningmaybeanalternativetoaccommodation.^Otherstudentsofbureaucracyseemoreopportunitiesforstreet-leveldiscretion:theyargue,infact,thatitisvirtuallyinevitable.Theseresearchersfocusonmotivesthatemergefromwithinorganizationsandunderscoreunintendedconsequencesandperverseincentives.'Theiranalysisbeginsbyidentifyingnetworksofmicrolevelactorsinvolvedinpolicydelivery,includingimplementors,otherofficials,andpri-ComparativePol1tic.sJanuaq1999vatecitizens.Then,theyinquireaboutgoals,activities,problems,andcontacts.Theytypicallyfindthatlocalconditionstrumpcentralplansandthatsuperiorshavelimit-edleverageoverprogramadministrators.4Analysisfromthebottomuphasshownthatimplementorshavemanyresourcesforresistanceandcanfrequentlyturncen-tralmandatestowardlocalends.Theyhavehighlightedthecircumscribedbutreallatitudethatstreet-levelbureaucratspossessandhavearguedthatfront-lineofficialsoftenchangepolicyastheyexecuteit.'Bothapproacheshavemuchtosayaboutbureaucraticworking,shirking,andsabotage.6Butneitherapproachaloneiswell-suitedtoexplainwhyanimplementorwhoisresponsibleforarangeofpoliciesexecutessomewellandotherspoorly.Tounderstandwhy,itisnecessarytocombinethetop-downemphasisoncentralcontrolwiththebottom-upemphasisonstreet-leveldiscretion.'Thismixedstrategyencour-agesustoconsideralltheincentivesagrass-rootsofficialfaces,boththosethatemergefromtheday-to-dayenvironmentandthosestructuredintothesituationfromonhigh.Drawingonbothapproaches,wecanseewhystreet-levelbureaucratsaresometimesprincipledagentsandsometimeswilydefiersofthewishesoftheirsuperiors.8RuralChinaisaprimelocationtoexamineselectiveimplementationbecauseChinesegrass-rootscadreshaveaparticularlywiderangeofresponsibilities.Theyaregeneralists.Unlikestreet-levelbureaucratsinmanycountries,Chineseruralcadresarenotemployeesofasingleagencyassignedalimitednumberoftasks,butratherbureaucrats-cum-polit