不完备契约及其演进_政府_信任和制度_以奶业契约为例

:以奶业契约为例侯守礼王威顾海英():本文基于上海和黑龙江两地考察的五个案例,研究了奶农与乳品加工公司之间的契约类型以及特征,诠释了影响契约的因素,在此基础上分析了不完备契约的演进规律,并提出了政府信任和制度是促进契约制定与执行的理论观点:契约农业产业化制度信任奶业208090!,+!,,!!!!!∀,,WTO,,,:,,,,!!:∀2000,11824,8.5%;#,,;∃,,,,,,,(,2003),(,%46%2004.6∀,%,%,,,!!,,,,,!,,,!!,!)∀,,,,,1.LL,,100,10%,,,,,,,!,,,,2.QQ,1985Q,Q,100,3,,QQ,,Q,,,,,Q,,,19921993Q,,3.QHJGQH200220034,12002000G2000,JJ,,GG,QHGJ,QH,G3G,J4.DZY%47%:∀,,,,,,,,,,,!,D,800,50%J,50%ZYZY2002,2002,ZY,,,,ZY,G,5.ZYZY,,1850,,50%,,,:(12);(3);(4);(5):(1);(2);(34);(5)(),1.产品与资产的专用性(Williamson,1983),,,,,,,,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,,(),,,,,:,;,,;,,2.生产规模,,(100),:,,,%48%:,,(),,,,,,1L,,,,,3QH,G,J,,,,,,,,,3QH,5,,,Kreps,,,!,!(Grimstrategy),,,;,(,1996),!,,,,,,,,(345),,,,,,3.交易双方的市场力量,(20,121,499;23,110,2.8∀,,,,,,,,,,,LG(),,∀,,%49%:∀():&(2003)∋,,20042.20,,!,,#,,,!,,,,∃3QH,,,,G,J,QH,,G(,,,5ZY,,,D,,DZYD,),,,,,,,,,,,,,1000(),,1.小农生产+小市场!,,,,,,,2.公司+农户+市场价!,,,∀,+!,,,,,,%50%:∀,,,,,,,,,,3.公司+农户+政府指导价!,,,,,,,,,,,,,,!4.公司+组织化养殖场+市场价+第三方认证!,,,,,,,,,,,5.组织化养殖场+合作社+公司!,,,,,,,,5ZY,,,,():,,∀,,#,,,1.政府+!,,,,+!:,,,,%51%:∀#,,(,1996),,,!!,,,Williamson,!,(Williamson,1983,1998),,,,++!,,,,;,,(,2003),,;,,,,,,,200311,,,2.20,,,,,,2.信任,,,,,,,,,,∀,,,,,Williamson(1983),,,,,,!,,,;,,,,,,,,,Bonus(1998),,,,,,,,%52%:∀!,,,,,,,,!,,∀?,,,,!,,,,!(,2004),,,#,,,,,,,(2004),,,,,,,,,3.制度,,,,,,,,∃,,(Levi,2000,2003),,(2003),,;;,,,,,,%53%:∀#∃(2004),Levi(2000,2003),(2002)(2000,2001),,,,,,,,,,!(,1996),!,,,,,:∀+!,,,,,#,,,,,,!∃,,,,,,∗1+Bonus:&:∋,:&∋,,1998∗2+MargaretLevi(2000):&:∋,,,:&∋,,2003∗3+OliverWilliamson(1983):&:∋,:&∋,,1998∗4+:&∋,&∋20025∗5+:&∋,&∋20039∗6+:&?∋,&1995∋,,1996∗7+:&∋,&()∋20032∗8+:&:∋,&∋20036,∗9+:&∋,&∋20041∗10+:&∋,,,1996∗11+:&∋,&∋20011∗12+:&∋,&∋20021∗13+():&(2003)∋,,2004(责任编辑:潘劲)%54%:AnalysesofLandAcquisitionCompensationChenBochong&HaoShouyi(34),,,,,,,,Thepaperanalysisthevarietyofpeasantwell-beingonlandacquisitionfromeconomicview,consideringlandacquisitioncompensationshouldincludedurativeincome,riskaverseandskillpromotion.Moreover,thelostterritorypeasantwillshareincrementincomeinlandusevariation.Intheend,thepapersuggestsalandacquisitioncompensationmethodbasedonlandevaluation.EvolvementofImperfectContract:Government,TrustandSystemAnExampleofDairyContractHouShouni,WangWei&GuHaiying(46),,,,,Inordertocomeinlinewiththefiercecompetitioninworldagriculturalfield,thereforminChineseAgriculturalproductionmodelishighlyneeded.AmongalltheagriculturalindustriesofChina,dairyindustryisthefastestdevelopedone.Thefactthatrawmilkproducersanddairyprocessorsarehighlydependablemakestheresearchofdairycontractmorenecessaryandmeaningful.Thisthesis,basedonthefivecasesofShanghaiandHeilongjiangprovince,studiesthekindsandfeaturesofdairycontracts,andanalyzesitsaffectingfactors,thereforeconcludestheevolvingrulesofimperfectcontract,andputforwardsthatgovernment,trustandsystemarethefactorspromotingthestipulationandexecutionofcontract.AnalysesontheBehaviorofGovernmentintheDevelopmentofRuralProductIndustryAssociationsPanJin(55),,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,Thereistheobjectivenecessityforthegovernmenttosetupfromabove,supportandgetinvolvedtheruralproductindustryassociationdirectly.Butinthemeantime,therearesomereasonlessfactorsinthebehaviorofgovernmentinthedevelopmentofruralproductindustryassociations,suchaslackinglaws,thedefectofsupervisorysystemandoverinterventionandsoon.Therefore,itisnecessaryforthegovernmenttospecifyitsbehavior.CHINARURALSURVEY(CRS)ispublishedbimonthlybyInstituteofRuralDevelopmentofChineseAcademyofSocialSciences.EditorinChief:ZhangXiaoshanDeputyEdiforinchief:LiZhouAddress:No.5,JianguomenneiAve.,Beijing,100732,ChinaCodeNo.BM4476OverseasDistributor:ChinaInternationalBookFax:65137559TradingCorporation(P.O.Box399,Beijing,China)No.6,2004(SerialNo.59)