战略经济(竞争分析)07-战略宣言

EconomicsofStrategySlideshowpreparedbyRichardPonarulCaliforniaStateUniversity,ChicoChapter7StrategicCommitmentBesanko,Dranove,ShanleyandSchaefer,4thEditionStrategicCommitment
Strategiccommitmentsaredecisionsthathavelongrunimpactandarehardtoreverse(Example:Installationofadditionalproductioncapacity)
Thesedifferfromtacticalmoveswhichareeasytoreverseandhaveonlyashortrunimpact(Example:Astorecuttingthepriceoncertainitems)StrategicCommitment
Toachievethedesiredresult,thecommitmentshouldbe–Visible–Understandable–Credible
Tobecredible,thecommitmentshouldbeirreversibleCommitmentValueofAnnouncements
Ifafirmhasanestablishedreputationatstake,evenannouncementofintentiontoactcanhavecommitmentvalue
Ifthefirmfailstomatchactionstowords,itsreputationwillsuffer
SmallerandnewerfirmscannotuseannouncementstoindicatecommitmentReversibleandIrreversibleMoves
Reversiblemovesaremorelikelytobematchedbyrivalsthanirreversiblemoves
Evidencefromtheairlineindustrysupportsthisview
AirlinesquicklyrespondtopricecutsbyrivalsthantomoveslikeacquisitionofanothercarrierStrategicCommitmentandCompetition
Strategiccomplementsandstrategicsubstitutesareconceptsonhowafirmreactstoprice/quantitychangebyacompetitor
ToughcommitmentsandsoftcommitmentsareconceptsthatcaptureactionsbyafirmthatputsitscompetitorsatadisadvantageStrategicComplements
Whenafirm’sactioninducestherivaltotakethesameactiontheactionsarestrategiccomplements
InBertrandduopolymodelpricesarestrategiccomplements
Apricecutistheprofitmaximizingresponsetocompetitor’spricecutStrategicSubstitutes
Whenafirm’sactioninducestherivaltotaketheoppositeactionstheactionsarestrategicsubstitutes
InCournotduopolymodelquantitiesarestrategicsubstitutes
Aquantityincreaseistheprofitmaximizingresponsetocompetitor’squantityreductionSoftCommitmentsandToughCommitments
Theimmediateeffectofatoughcommitmentisanadverseimpactontherival
Example:Afirminvestsinanewprocessthatreducesunitcostsothatitcanloweritsprice,forcingtherivaltoloweritsprice
ToughcommitmentconformstothetraditionalviewofcompetitionSoftCommitmentsandToughCommitments
Theimmediateeffectofasoftcommitmentisafavorableimpactontherival
Tounderstandwhysoftcommitmentsmaymakesense,weneedtolookatboththedirectandthestrategiceffectsTwoEffectsofCommitments
Acommitmentmayhaveadirectandastrategiceffectonthefirm’sprofitability
Directeffectisthechangeinthepresentvalueofprofitsassumingthattherival’stacticsareunaffectedbythecommitment
Thestrategiceffectisthefurtherchangeinthepresentvalueofthefirm’sprofitsduetotherivaladjustingitstacticsTheValueofSoftCommitment
Afirmthatmakesasoftcommitmenttoraiseitspricemayexperienceanegativedirecteffectonitsprofitability
Iftheoptimalresponseoftherivalistoraiseitsprice,thestrategiceffectcanbebeneficial
Ifthestrategiceffectissufficientlylarge,thenetbenefitfromthecommitmentwillbepositiveAnAnalysisofSoftandToughCommitments
Inthefirststageafirmmakeseitherasoftcommitmentoratoughcommitment
Foreachofthetwocases,thesecondstagecompetitionbetweentherivalswillbeeitherCournotorBertrandScenariostobeAnalyzedBertrandToughCournotToughBertrandSoftCournotSoftSecondStageFirstStageCournotAfterSoftCommitmentCournotAfterSoftCommitment
Firm1shiftsitsreactionfunctiontotheleft,committingtoproduceless(thanpre-commitmentlevel)foreverylevelofrival’soutput
Rival’sreactionhurtsFirm1bymakingitsoutputfallfurther
Firm2producesmorethanwhatitproducedwithoutFirm1’ssoftcommitmentBertrandAfterSoftCommitmentBertrandAfterSoftCommitment
Firm1commitstochargeahigher(thanthepre-commitmentlevel)priceforeverypricelevelpickedbytherival
Firm2’sreactionprovidesaevenhigherprice(forbothfirms)
BothfirmsbenefitfromFirm1’ssoftcommitmentCournotAfterToughCommitmentCournotAfterToughCommitment
Firm1commitstoahigherthanpreviousoutputforeveryoutputchoiceoftherival
Firm2’sreactionfunctionmakestheequilibriumoutputofFirm1evenhigher
Firm2produceslessthanwhatitproducedwithoutthetoughcommitmentfromFirm1BertrandAfterToughCommitmentBertrandAfterToughCommitment
Firm1commitstoalowerpricebyshiftingitsreactionfunctiontotheleft
Firm2’sreactionfurtherlowerstheequilibriumprice
BothfirmsenduphurtbyFirm1’stoughcommitmentStrategicEffectsoftheCommitmentsFirm1’sCommitmentSecondStageCompetitionStrategicEffectonFirm1SoftCournotNegativeSoftBertrandPositiveToughCournotPositiveToughBertrandNegativeCantheNegativeStrategicEffectbeForestalled?
Ifthedirecteffectispositiveandthestrategiceffectnegative,canthefirmforestallthelatter?
Example:Thenetpresentvalueofcostreducingcommitmentispositive.Canthenegativestrategiceffectbeavoidedbyrefusingtolowertheprice?CantheNegativeStrategicEffectbeForestalled?
Iftheprofitmaximizingstrategy(afterthecommitment)istolowertheprice,rivalwillassumethatthefirmwilldoso
ItisdifficulttoconvincearivalthatyourfirmwillactagainstitsowninterestinthesecondstageATaxonomyofStrategicCommitmentsFirm1’sStrategyCommitmentPostureCommitmentActionTop-DogStrategyToughMakeSubmissiveUnderdogToughRefrainSuicidalSiberianSoftMakeLeanandHungryLookSoftRefrainWhenSecondStageActionsareStrategicSubstitutesATaxonomyofStrategicCommitm