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对外经济贸易大学硕士学位论文反补贴争端中政府行为分析与策略选择姓名:霍红燕申请学位级别:硕士专业:行政管理指导教师:邓宇20080401I2008316WTOWTO2006IIAbstractChinahadbeenconfrontedwith16casesofanti-subsidyinvestigationsfromCanada,AmericanandAustraliabeforetheendMarch,2008.Theothercountries,suchasEuropeandJapan,plantorevisetheirdomesticcountervailinglawinordertomakethemapplicableforChina.Theanti-subsidymainlyinvestigatesgovernment’ssubsidybehaviorsandpolicies.Itwillcausegreatdamagetotheconductionofonegovernment’smacroeconomiccontrolmeasures.Thefrequentanti-subsidyinvestigationsputthere-positioningofgovernmentroleandcopingstrategyontheagenda.Thispaperadopttheapproachofgame-theory,regressionanalysisandcasestudyBasedontheexpositionofthesubsidyandanti-subsidyinstitution,analyzethegovernmentbehaviorsandrolesinthedisputeofanti-subsidy.Besides,thepapermakesacasestudyofthecopperplatepaper.Afterthereflectionofthecurrentsituationofthegovernmentrole,thepaperpointouttheroadofgovernmentroletransformationfromtheangleofmicroscopy,microscopyandStrategy.Thepapertrytofindoutthebestgovernmentchoiceinthedisputationofanti-subsidy,andtoexploreanefficient,safesubsidymeasure.Thepaperdemonstratestheexportcreditpolicyisbetterthantheexportrebatepolicyfromtheaspectofcost-benefit.Thecollaborationofthetradecountriescanachievethemaximumwelfareforthecountrythemselvesaswellastheworldwelfare.TheChinesegovernmentshouldremodeltheirrole,taketheinitiativeandoptimizethegovernmentstrategyintheanti-subsidydispute.Thispaperismainlydividedintofiveparts.Partoneintroducesthebackground,methodology,thecurrentresearchandtheinnovationofthispaper.Parttwoexplainstherelevantinternationalrulesofsubsidy,anti-subsidy,therelationsbetweenanti-subsidyandanti-dumping.Partthreeintroducesthegovernmentrolesintheanti-subsidydispute.Inpartfour,thepapershowsthegovernmentreactionintheanti-subsidydispute,andgavesuggestiontotheanti-subsidy.Attheend,thepapermadeaconclusion,pointoutthecontributionanddefectofthepaper.Keywords:Subsidy,Countervailingmeasures,Governmentrole,Strategychoice2008420111.12001WTO20200720014.2612007200111.62622221738200623.512180200625.79558200620.82004200720083161.1WTO2WTO31(2001)2002WT02003200420052005200520062006200620074AgreementonSubsidiesandCountervailingMeasuresSCMWTO1.4522.12.1.1SCMSCMSubsidiesSCM12632.1.2CountervailingmeasuresSCMSCMWTO42.2SCM4WTO200367SCM3WTOSCM56SCM31WTOWTO199912312000112.3Anti-Dumping2.182.152.12.4WTOSCM27SCM9577SCM200112WTOWTO101WTOSCM1SCMSCM2562SCM3SCM35A5B20002.2WTO752006516SCM25SCM25112iiiiii/iv/v7WTO2005121102.2WTO1.2.3.1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.5A5BWTO882000511GATT1994619946SCMWTObSCM14abcdSCMWTOWTODWTOSCMSCM2710111215SCM278913WTOWTOSCM27101112158913SCM61WTOSCM32.5129109AlanO.Sykes,CountervailingDutyLaw:AnEconomicPerspective,ColumbiaLawReview,March1989.10200771333.13.1.1199711200212200513200714···15111997199712200212113200741420055152004111416162004915WTO3.1.22001SCMWTOWTO1617WTOSCMSCMSCM18SCMSCMSCM432004331199720011917()2006121820065119WTOSCM200641720SCM21WTOWTO2001200345627332220WTO20056212002622()WTOWTOWTO23WTO20045193.23.2.13.1ABAA20BB(1010)3.1SCM3.21234aecgbdfhWTOAx1-xBy1-y21AVlsV1nAV1Vlsya+(1Y)cV1nYe+(1Y)gVlxVls+(1x)V1nx[ya+(1y)c]+(1x)[ye+(1Y)g]BV2cV2nV2V2cxb+(1x)fV2nxd+(1x)hV2yV2c+(1y)V2ny[xb+(1x)f]+(1y)[xd+(1x)h]BAABAB3.2.2AB2224199411252624200622520051026200511233.1199620063.11999200613.31.0000.9880.9770.9881.0000.9830.9970.9821.0000.9880.97721SPSS13.01999-2006010000200003000040000500006000070000800009000019961997199819992000200120022003200420052006243.23.22Y1X1Y1a1b1X1µ13.13.1RRRDW0.9880.9750.97137612.346BBetaTP8582.4443355.5092.5880.04384.4355.4750.98815.4210.000R0.975DW2.346P084.435184.43531SPSS253.33.32Y1X1Y1a2b2X2µ23.2RRRDW0.9970.9940.99318142.038BBetaTP7688.0931161.1316.6210.00114.0730.0430.99732.2770.000R0.994DW2.038P014.073114.073263.33.3.120061031NewpageDOC20061120DOC19912006121DOC124DOC1215200719()27200733010.90%20.35%18.16%200742007914WTO41994233017WTOWTOWTOWTOWTO200710187.444.2520.357.410.9044.257.420071020200711203.3.219982810.9044.25WTOWTO2944.14.1.1WTO2728294.1.22720022820065292002630304.1.3SCMSCMWTOSCMWTO30P1989131WTO4.1.4SCMWTO31WTO20.357.410.9044.2531WTO20043232334.24.2.1WTOSCMSCMSCMWTOWTO4.2.23220061033200623334WTOSCM4.2.33534WTOSCM2006435WTOSCM()20038343637384.2.43620061037WTOSCM()200383820071135WTO4.2.5WTOWTOWTOWTOWTOWTO39WTO39WTOSCM()2003836WTOWTOWTOWTO4.34.3.1404.3.24020031237414.3.3424.3.441WTO2005422007838434443.2003121442007113955.11.2.3.4.WTO5.240[1]2005[2]20061[3]2005111[4]WTO2001[5]200711[6]2006111[7]200661[8]19
本文标题:反补贴争端中政府行为分析与策略选择
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