几种不同信息结构下的供应链收入共享契约协调研究

三峡大学硕士学位论文几种不同信息结构下的供应链收入共享契约协调研究姓名：向士令申请学位级别：硕士专业：控制理论与控制工程指导教师：游文霞20090401II1)2)3)IIIAbstractSupplychainisanenterprisenetworkwhichiscomposedofmanyindependentbenefitentities,eachmemberhasdifferentbenefitgoal,whicharenotalwaysconsistentwiththewholesupplychain'sincome.Inordertoguaranteesystem'scompetitiveadvantageinthemarket,howtodrivethememberenterpriseactfromsupplychain’smostsuperiormotionangleisthecentralcontentofsupplychaincoordination.Asaneffectivewayofallocatingcooperationriskandachievingthesystemoptimization,revenuesharingcontractreceivesacademicandbusinessattentionsincreasingly.Intheactualmarket,member'sincomeisinfluencedbymanykindsoffactors,supplier'ssupplyabilityandthelevelofretailer'ssaleefforthasimmediateinfluenceonthesalesvolume.Moreover,Stemmingfromownbenefitconsideration,rationalretailerpossiblyconcealsownrelatedinformationtothesupplier.Forasinglesupplier,singleretailercomposedinsoleproductsupplychain,thecoordinationmechanismwithrevenuesharingcontractunderdifferentinformationstructuresisstudied,andconditionsthatcontractparametersshouldsatisfyisdeducedfortheoptimizationofoverallsystemefficiency,themaininnovationsandtheconclusionsareasfollows:1)Supplier’ssupplyabilityhasdirectimpactsonthesales,thereforeplayinganimportantroleinthesupplychaincoordination.Inthispaper,supplier’ssupplyabilityisintroducedtothesupplychainmodeling,whichissolvedbyLagrangemultipliermethod.Comparingtheprofitsofmembersinintegratedsupplychainwiththatofthedecentralizedone,theimpactsofsupplier’ssupplyabilityonthemembers’profitsaresummarized.Itshowsthatprice-onlycontractandrevenue-sharingcontractbothcoordinatethesupplychainwhenthesupplyabilityisinsufficient,whilethesupplyabilityissurplus,onlycanrevenue-sharingcontractachievethecoordination.2)Reconstructingthemembers’revenuefunctions,supplychaincoordinationisanalyzedwhenthedemandisrelevanttoretailer’spromotionaleffort.Itisshownthatthecoordinationcannotbeachievedbyrevenue-sharingcontractintheassumedcondition;however,theparetooptimalitycanberealizedbyaddingeffortcostsharingbetweensupplychainmemberstothetraditionalrevenue-sharingcontract,thusachievingthechannelcoordination.3)Informationstructureshaveinfluenceontheprofitsofsupplychainmembers.Inthispaper,thetwo-stagesupplychaincomprisesasupplierandaretailer,andtheleaderisIVsupplierwhiletheretaileristhefollower.Supplier’soptimalrevenue-sharingstrategyisconcludedwhenpriceisretailer’sprivateinformationbasedontheprinciple-agenttheory.Itisproventhatinformationasymmetryresultsininefficiencyoftheentiresupplychain.Atlast,theconclusionofthispaperissummarized;members’riskpreference,contracts’executioncostandtheempiricalanalysisofstudyarepointedtobenextresearchdirections.Keywords:supplychaincoordinationrevenuesharingcontractsupplyabilityeffortlevelprivateinformationI1(Michael.E.Porter)[1](SupplyChainManagement)(CentralizedSupplyChain)(DecentralizedSupplyChain)211.1[2]2050[3-4]1.11.1[5](seamlessly)()()31)2)[6][7-14][15-20]1.2[21]4[15]1)2)3)CachonandLariviere[10]2005[22]()1.2.1Cachon[10][22]GiannoccaroPontrandolfo[13]()Pasternack[23]Cao[24]1)2)3)Chung[25]5[26]1.2.2[27][28][27][29]1.2.3DanaandSpier[12]Wang[30]ChauhanProth[31]Wang[32],,[33][34][35]6James,DanaSpier[36]1)2)1.2.4Mortimer[11],7Gerchak[37]()Dana[12],[38]Blockbuster,658[39]ChangJiang[40]BaiChong-en,TaoZhiqiangWuChangqi[41]JAAvanderVeen,VVenugopal[39](win-win)Wang,JiangShen[30]Wall-MartAmazon26.4%50%Pasternack[14]GerchakWang[37](Revenue-plus-surplus-subsidyContract)[42]7[43][20][44]1.31.3.11)2)3)1.3.281)2)3)1.4922.1StephenNew[45]1)2)()3)()[46]2.1102.12.22.2.1[47]MaloneCrowston[48](cooperation)(collaboration)Hoppe[49]GanSethiYan[50]1)(reservationprofit)2)(downsideriskconstraint)3)BernsteiFedergruen[51]112.2.2(EOQ)(Newsboy)NashStackelberg2.2.2.11)()[52]2)19802050,2.2.2.21)Nash[53]12(Cournot)(Hotelling)2)Stackelberg(Stackelberg)2.2.2.31)(participationconstraint)(individualrationalityconstraint)(feasiblemechanism)2)(incentivecompatibilityconstraint)(implementable)13()[38]2.32.3.1()2.2scpq()Wqx2.2scp()Wqqqx14(centralcontrol)cΠ(incentive)(decentralizedcontrol)dΠdcΠΠdΠcΠGiannoccar[12]20041)2)2.3.21)2)153)()()()4)Giannoccaro,I,P.Pontrandolfo[13],[22],2.42.4.1()wswcsc[54]BlockbusterInc[55]658Mortimer[11]167%CachonandLariviere[10]2.4.2LF(leader-followergame)Dx()fx:()Fx:F(0)0F=()1()FxFx=−0()()Exxfxdxµ∞==∫Dqpwscrcφ00()()()()qSqqxfxdxFxdx∞=∧=∫∫xq()Sqq=xq≤()Sqx=()TΠ⋅()rΠ⋅()sΠ⋅172.4.3()()()TrsqpSqccq∏=−+(2.1)()Sq()1()SqFqq∂=−∂*11srcccqFp−+=−(2.2)(2.2)φ()(1)()()rrsqpSqwcqφ∏=−−+(2.3)*11(1)srcwqFpφ−+=−−(2.4)**crqq=wφ(1)rswccφφ=−−(2.5)()(1)()rrTqqφ∏=−∏(2.6)()()rsTqqφ∏=∏(2.7)(2.6)(2.7)183[3][56][57]3.1LF(leader-followergame)kqqkqqk≥kvg()Iq()()IqqSq=−()Lq()()LqSqµ=−srccc=+rcsc3.2()()()()()()TpSqvIqgLqcqpvgSqcvqgµΠ=+−−=−+−−−()TΠ⋅pq1900()()()()qSqqxfxdxFxdx∞=∧=∫∫xq()Sqq=xq≤()Sqx={}()()()..0TMinimizepvgSqcvqgstqkµΠ=−−+−−−−≤(3.1)0()()Exxfxdxµ∞==∫x(3.1)[58]LagrangeLagrange()TLqkλ=Π+−(3.2)(3.2)λLagrange0λ≥(3.2)q()()()0LSqpvgcvqqλ∂∂=−−+−−+=∂∂(3.3)(3.3)*0q*101cvqFpvgλ−+−=−−+(3.4)k1)*0qk0