寡头垄断_非线性定价与市场分割

云南财经大学学报2010年第3期(总第143期):2009-12-28:教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目中国垄断行业服务质量监管问题研究(08JA790087):徐伟康(1979-),男,安徽安庆人,首都经济贸易大学数量经济研究中心博士研究生,研究方向为博弈论与微观计量经济理论寡头垄断非线性定价与市场分割徐伟康(首都经济贸易大学数量经济研究中心,北京100026):在非对称双寡头垄断消费者的阿罗!普拉特风险规避度为常数的假设条件下,分析非对称双寡头企业的非线性定价行为与市场均衡认为:当双寡头企业都基于各自的边际成本实现最优非线性定价时,两企业的价格套餐会发生交叉,进而产生市场分割,需求量大的消费者会选择低成本企业的价格套餐,而低需求量的消费者偏好则相反而双寡头企业进行价格博弈并形成竞争时,两企业的竞争性均衡价格同样会发生交叉,进而也会产生市场分割主要结论将为寡头垄断行业的价格规制提供一些理论启示:寡头垄断;非线性定价;市场分割:F2725:A:1674-4543(2010)03-0035-07:(IR)(IC),!!!,,,Katz(1984)[1]Borenstein(1985)[2]Varian(1989)[3],,,,,Thisse(1985)[4],();Stole(1995)[5]Armstrong(2001)[6]Rochet(2002)[7]();Holmes(1989)[8],Rochet(2003)[9]Stole(2007)[10],,:,∀35∀云南财经大学学报,,,,,,,(2008)[11]!!!,,,,p1p2f1f2,??,,,,,,,,(),,,2070,,,20,,,,,,(),,,,,,,,,()112,c1c2,c1c2,T1=p1q1+f1,T2=p2q2+f2(p1,f1)(p2,f2)122,#[,],g(),G(),,,3:u()=V(qi),i=1,2,:V∃(q)0,∀36∀徐伟康:寡头垄断非线性定价与市场分割V%(q)0,,-V%(q)/V∃(q)=,!!!4,5qi()(pi,fi)i,,1,2c1c2,c1c2,,,?(),,:1=&[(p1-c1)q1()+f1]g()d(1)2=&[(p2-c2)q2()+f2]g()d(2)(pm1,fm1)(pm2,fm2)(),,1,(pm1,fm1),(pm2,fm2)2c1c2,,pm1pm2fm1fm21pm1pm2fm1fm2:11:pm1pm2:,f1f2,f1f2:fmi=V(qi())-pmiqi()i=1,2(3)p1,(IR),0,fi=V(qi())-piqi()(IC),:V∃(qi())=pmii=1,2(4)(4):pmi(3),:1=&[(p1-c1)q1()+V(q1())-p1q1()]g()d(5)2=&[(p2-c2)q2()+V(q2())-p2q2()]g()d(6)qi(~)=E[qi()]=&qi()g()d,(pm1,pm2),:(pm1-c1)!q1(~)/!p1+q1(~)-q1()=0(7)∀37∀云南财经大学学报(pm2-c2)!q2(~)/!p2+q2(~)-q2()=0(8):(pmi-ci)/pmi(4):!qi(~)/!pi=[V%(qi(~))]-1i=1,2(9)(7)(8):(pm1-c1)=-~V%(q1(~))[q1(~)-q1()](10)(pm2-c2)=-~V%(q2(~))[q2(~)-q2()](11)(4)(10)(11):(pm1-c1)/pm1=[q1(~)-q1()](12)(pm2-c2)/pm2=[q2(~)-q2()](13):(pm1-c1)/pm1=(pm2-c2)/pm2,pm1pm2(4):!qi()/!=-[V%(qi())]-1V∃(qi())=()-1i=1,2(14)#[,],(14):!q1()/!=!q2()/!=()-1(15)qi(~)-qi():qi(~)-qi()=&!qi()/!di=1,2(16)(15)(16):q1(~)-q1()=q2(~)-q2()(17)(17):(pm1-c1)/pm1=(pm2-c2)/pm2(18)c1c2,pm1pm211:fm1fm2(3):fm1-fm2=V(q1())-V(q2())-[pm1q1()-pm2q2()]V(q1())-V(q2())-[pm1q1()-pm1q2()]=V∃(q^1)[q1()-q2()]-pm1[q1()-q2()](19),q^#(q2(),q1()),(19)V∃(q1())=pm1V%(q)0:V∃(q^)pm1(20)fm1-fm201pm1pm2fm1fm2,(2008)2,*12,u1(*)=u2(*),#[,*)2,#(*,]1,:1,∀38∀徐伟康:寡头垄断非线性定价与市场分割*,#[,*)2,#(*]1,(),(),12,,,,,p1p2f1f2,1,2,,,p1p2f1f2,2,1p1=p2f1=f2,,c1c2,1,c1p1∋c2,2p1p2f1f2,p1p2f1f2p1p2f1f2p1p2f1f2,,(2009)[12]2,p1p2f1f2,:c1p1p2c2c1c2,:p1c1c2p2,Tirole[13],,p1p2f1f2p1p2f1f2,,1,p*1c1,2,p*2c2(pc1,fc1)(pc2,fc2)(),pc1c1,pc2c2,(2008),,2,,,,,,,,,,12,,2!!!,:p1=c1,p2=c2p1p2,212:,,,,,,(1)∀39∀云南财经大学学报,(1)(2),,,,,,2#[,*),,(#(*,])1,2,,2(),,,,,2(),,1(),,,20093G,WCDMACDMA2000,2G(GSM)TD-SCDMA,,,(),TD-SCDMA,3G,,TD-SCDMA,,TD-SCDMA,WCDMACDMA2000,,,!!!,,,,(),,:[1]Katz,M.PriceDiscriminationandMonopolisticCompetition[J].Econometrica,1984,52:1453-1471.[2]Borenstein,S.PriceDiscriminationinFree-EntryMarkets[J].RandJournalofEconomics,1985,16:380-397.[3]Varian,H.R.PriceDiscrimination[C]//InR.Schmalellsee,R.D.Willig,eds.TheHandbookofIndustrialOrganization.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1989.[4]Thise,J.F.,Vives,X.OntheStrategicChoiceofSpatialPricePolicy[J].AmericanEconomicReview,1988,78:122-137.[5]Stole,L.NonlinearPricingandOligopoly[J].JournalofEconomicsandManagementStrategy,1995,4:529-562.∀40∀徐伟康:寡头垄断非线性定价与市场分割[6]MarkArmstrong.,JohnVickers.CompetitivePriceDiscrimination[J].TheRANDJournalofEconomics,2001,32(4):579-605.[7]Jean-Charles,Roche,tLarsA.Stole.NonlinearPricingwithRandomParticipation[J].TheReviewofEconomicStudies,2002,69(1):277-311.[8]Thomas,J.Holmes.TheEffectsofThird-DegreePriceDiscriminationinOligopoly[J].TheAmericanEconomicReview,1989,79(1):244-250.[9]Roche,tJ.C.,L.A.Stole.TheEconomicsofMultidimensionalScreening[C]//Dewatripon,tM.,L.P.Hansen,S.J.Turnovsky,eds.InAdvancesinEconomicTheory:EighthWorldCongress.CambridgeUniversityPress,2003.[10]Stole,L.A.PriceDiscriminationinCompetitiveEnvironment[C]//M.Armstrong,R.Porter,eds.TheHandbookofIndustrialOrganization.Amsterdam:NorthHolland,2007.[11]徐伟康,王文举.寡头垄断企业的非线性定价行为[J].财经科学,2008,(7):72-78.[12]徐伟康.寡头垄断非线性定价与非对称均衡[J].产业经济评论,2009,(2):120-133.[13](法)泰勒尔.产业组织理论[M].北京:中国人民大学版社,1996.:Duopoly,NonlinearPricingandMarketSegmentationXUWei-kang(ResearchCenterofQuantitativeEconomics,CapitalUniversityofEconomicsandBusiness,Beijing100026,China)Abstract:TheauthoranalyzesthenonlinearpricingbehaviorsandthemarketequilibriumofasymmetricduopolyenterprisesundertheassumptionthattheasymmetricduopolyandtheArrow-Pratt(sriskaversionofcustomersareconstants.Hebelievesthatwhentheoptimalnonlinearpricingoftheduopolyenterprisesisachievedbasedontheirmarginalcosts,theirpricingpackagesarecrossedwhichleadstomarketsegmentation.Highlevelconsumerswillchoosethepricingpackageoflowcostenterprise,withthelowlevelconsumersinthecontrary.Whenduopolyenterprisesmakepricegameandresultincompetition,thecompetitiveequilibriumpricewillbecrossed,whichfurtherleadstomarketsegmentationaswel.lTheconclusionofthepaperwillgivesometheoreticalenlightenmenttothepriceregulationofduopolyindustry.Keywords:Duopoly;NonlinearPricing;MarketSegmentation∀41∀