我国发电市场的市场力分析及其监管对策研究

上海交通大学硕士学位论文我国发电市场的市场力分析及其监管对策研究姓名：孟令春申请学位级别：硕士专业：西方经济学指导教师：管毅平20060101IIIIIISTUDYONANALYSISOFMARKETPOWEROFGENERATIONMARKETANDREGULATIONINCHINAABSTRACTInChina’srestructuredelectricitymarket,whichseparationofnetworkoperationsandgeneration,andmakingelectricgenerationmarketcompetitive,thegeneratorsastheentitiesoftakingpartinmarketcompetitioncanusuallymakeuseofdominantmarketshare,transactionacrossmarkets,tradingconditionsofmarketandoperatingstateofsystemtocarryoutitsmarketpowerformanipulatinggenerationmarket,inordertogainreasonlessexcess-benefit.Afteranalyzingconditionofmarketoperatingandstrategyofgenerator’sbehavior,thatdesignsaapplicableregulationsystemandcorrespondingregulationrulesformarketefficientcompetitioniskeytoelectricpowerregulationorganize.Thisthesisanalyzesgenerator’ssupplybehavior,basedonthreefactorsthatinfluencethemarketpower.Attheendofthethesis,somesuggestionsfordesigningapplicablemarkettradingsystemandregulationsystem.IVAcombinationofpositiveandnormativemethodsisusedinthisthesisonthebasisofIndustrialOrganizationTheory;analyticalskillssuchasstatistics,comparing,examplegivingandgametheoryarealsoemployedinthisthesis.Reviewingthedevelopmentofliteratureonmarketpower,thethesisintroducesthedefinition,sources,performanceandmeasurementindexofitinelectricitymarket.ApplyingtheTheoryofIndustrialOrganization,GameTheory,thethesisanalyzesthecurrentsituationofgenerationmarket,collusionbetweengeneratorsandmarketentryinChina,whichinducemarketpower.Thencomparinggenerationmarketconcentrationbeforeandafterseparationofnetworkoperationsandgeneration,themeasurementindexofconcentrationHIisemployedastooltometermarketpowerinmarketpowermeteringanalysisofthisthesis.Finally,thethesisbringsforwardsomesuggestionsofmitigatingmarketpoweringenerationmarket.ResearchresultsofthisthesishelpChinatobuildelectricitypowerregulationsystemandregulationruleswithcurrentChina’srestructuredelectricitymarket,forstandardizingmarketparticipants’behaviorandenhancingefficiency.Theseconclusionsdrawninthispapercanbereferredbyelectricitypowerregulationorganizationforestablishingreformdesigningandininstitutingrules.VKEYWORDS:GenerationMarket,MarketPower,MarketStructure,Regulation1208019982002452+511MarketPower21998220002001PG&E2+53,[1][2][3]PowerExchangePoolTacticCollusionPoolPowerExchange[4]Pool4PoolMCPPay-as-Bid200010NewElectricityTradingArrangements[5][6][6]ISO5[7]ISO20003FERC[8]662342567CollusionCartel8[9]WorkablyCompetitive9[10]PoolPX2-1ABC1000MW600MW70%C300MWCMust-Run100MW200MW700MWABC=600MWFigure2-1GenerationOwnershipConcentrationisaReasoncausingMarketPower[11](E&W)NationalPowerPowerGenWithholdingFERCFERC10Pool(PX)2-2ABCABBC50MW100MWC400MWABBCC30/MWh150MW1120/MWhABCFigure2-2TransmissionCongestionDividesOneBigPowerSystemintoSmallIslands20/MWh30/MWhPool2-3a2-3b12DPQSFigure2-3(a):PricingUnderCircumstancesofRelativeScarcityPsPdPQDSFigure2-3(b):PricingUnderCircumstancesofTrueScarcitydP13sP2-4adP2-4bSDPPsQFigure2-4(a):PricingwithInelasticDemandandAdequateSupplyPQDSFigure2-4(b):UnderTrueScarcity,theMarketMaynotCleardPBQPQBPPP0P2-5aPQ1P2-5b23SS-14BQ0P1PPQMQPQPQ0P1P3S2SPQMQPPP0S2QPS1QBFigure2-5(a):ProfitsofSellerwithBaseloadandPeakingCapacityPBPQP1P0S3QBFigure2-5(b):ImpactonPriceandProfitofWithholdingPeakingCapacityPB1520002001200050$/MWh800$/MWh2-6[12]Figure2-6WeeklyAverageAhead-dayClearingPriceofPXintheCaliforniaCrisis01002003004005006007008009004/30/20005/14/20005/28/20006/11/20006/25/20007/9/20007/23/20008/8/20008/20/20009/3/20009/17/200010/1/200010/12/200010/29/200011/12/200011/26/200012/10/200012/24/2000AveragePrice($/MW·h)NationalPowerPowerGen199312199719982000NewElectricityTradingArrangements[13]AustralianCompetitionandConsumerCommission199711254814/MWhNEPOOL16HI[14]nXX∑∑===11iiXiinXXCR2-1nCRniXinn=4n=8(LornezCurve)17(GiniFactor)2-7OSOSOPS1001005050OSPAB2-7Figure2-7LornezCurveBAA+==2-20101HIHIHerfindalHI∑==niiXXHI12)/(2-318ni,,2,1Λ=niXiXHInuHI/)1(2+=2-4uu=0nHI/1=∞→n0→HIn=11=HIHIHIHI≥HI30003000HI≥18001800HI≥14001400HI≥10001000HI≥500500HIHIHI[16][17][18][19][20]LernerIndexPCMPrice-CostMarginIndexPMCPLernerI-=2-5PMC19CournotLernerHI[21]hHILernerI=2-6hPCMMCMCPPCMI-=2-7DOJPCMI5%PCMIPCM[22][19]203[23]1232[24]320002111IPP222[25])1(≥NNNiiqiiicqqTC=)(Ni,,2,1Λ=0≥c3-1bQaQp-=)(0,bacaNqqqQ++=Λ213-2AAA1q111111)(max1cqqqbacqqQpNiiq-⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛-=-=∑=p3-3cqbbqaqNii---=∂∂=∑=211120p3-4ANqqq,,,32Λ∑=--=NiiNqbcaqqqR232212),,,(Λ3-5cNccqqqΛ==21q23iiqq=3-5qNbcaq)1(212---=⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛-==+-=1)1(NNbcaNqQbNcaqccc3-61++=-=NNcabQapcc222)()1()(cciqbbNca=+-=p3-71=N3-63-72=N∞→N0lim=∞→cNqbcaNNbcaQNcN-=⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛-=∞→∞→1limlim3-83-1N=1q1QmQcQ-1n=2n=4n=∞Figure3-1:EquilibriumofCournotandtheNumberofGenerators3-12476%12313141514/94/164/1964/2564/256=1.5%3-1)1()1/(42+NN3-933-2kWkW37971938126462565726863377123225209771483354414643733683109209271224384495260793133043203573340464717185764412989219676867885562283738471616310358305562332491623434068132530%ABKPQQMQDPDPMKMCDRD3-2Figure3-2OptimalPricingofDominantCompany263-2ABAResidualdemandRD,KRDADPMP272Tacitagreements2850%4nMpMP