中国银行业市场结构与绩效研究

重庆大学硕士学位论文中国银行业市场结构与绩效研究姓名：张薇申请学位级别：硕士专业：产业经济学指导教师：陈仲常20050501IWTOSCPIIABSTRACTIndustrialorganizationtheoryprovidesscientificbasisforthegovernmenttoestablishindustrialpoliciesandpromotetheirdevelopment.‘MarketStructure-MarketConduct-MarketPerformance,SCP’paradigmisthekeycontentofindustrialorganizationtheory,whichalwaysfocusesontheresearchofmarketstructure.Bystudyingthesituationandtherelationshipofmarketstructureandperformance,wecanadjustmarketstructuretoachievethegoalofimprovingmarketperformance.AfterChina’sentrytoWTO,financialmarketwillbemoreopenthaneverandbankingindustrywillfacemoredrasticcompetition.Asanimportantindustrialsector,thestabilityandprosperityofbankingindustryhasadirectimpactonthedevelopmentofthewholenationaleconomy.DuetotheparticularityontheprocessofformanddevelopmentofChina’sbankingindustry,therearestilllotsofproblems,whichleadstotheurgentnecessityofreform.ThethesisbeginswiththecurrentresearchofmarketstructureofChina’sbankingindustry.Firstofall,throughtheempiricalanalysisofmarketstructure,thetypeofmarketstructureofChina’sbankingindustryistheoligopoly.Then,themarketperformanceofChina’sbankingindustryismeasuredwithabsoluteandrelativeindexandbyaplyingfactoranalysis,whichindicatesmarketperformanceofChina’sbankingindustryisnotgood,andespeciallystate-ownedbanksareobviouslybehindjoint-stockbanks.Basedontheformertwoparts,thethesisdiscussestherelationshipbetweenmarketstructureandmarketperformanceofChina’sbankingindustryandfindsthatthereisnoobviousstatisticalrelationship.However,thegeneralefficiencyofeachbankisoneofimportantfactorstodeterminethemarketperformance.Meanwhile,italsoindicatesthereasonthatthemonopolizationinChina’sbankingindustryresultsfromadministrationratherthancompetition.Aseriesofirritionalmarketconductsofstate-ownedbanksalsoleadtotheirunsatisfiedmarketperformance.Accordingtoresearchresults,thethesissuggeststhatthereformshouldemphasizeonestablishingtheefficientmarketstructurebyintroducingthecompetitivemechanismandresolvingtheproblemsofstate-ownedbanks.Keywords:BankingIndustry,SCPParadigm,MarketStructure,MarketPerformance1111.12090WTO1.2206011220SCP2WTO1.313-1.4142522.1[5]1232642.22.2.12.2.1.1[3]2.2.1.21=/=/=/27=/2CRnHerfindahlIndex,HILorenzCurveGinicoefficientRosenbuluthIndexCRnHI1CRnnnn∑∑===NiiniinXXCR11CRnXnXiXiNXn48NXiiXCRnn28CRn2HI∑∑====niiniiSXXHI1212)(XXiiinSiiHIHI=0HI=1HI1/nHI0HIHIHIHIHIHINNHIHIN=1/HI2.2.1.32.1292.1Table2.1TypesofMarketStructurefromBainCR4%CR8%ICR475----2065CR475CR88520-10060CR46575CR88535CR45045CR87530CR43540CR845CR430CR840J.S..,19811963CR870%40%CR870%20%CR840%()CR820%()CR820%CR820%70%CR870%2.2.22.2.2.12.2.2.2210(WheelockandWilson,1995)(Gilliaganetal,1984)(BergerandHumphrey,1992)[17][19]2.2.2.3121121=/2=/3=/4=/5=/6=/7=/8=/2129=/10=/11=/12=/2.32.3.1SCP—--MarketStructure-MarketConduct-MarketPerformanceSCP2030Chamberlin,E.HEdward.S.MasonJoe.S.BainC.KaysenJ.W.MckieJ.Markham19592.1[18]SCP2.1SCPFig2.1TraditionalSCPFramework213SCP()2.3.2SCP—2060J.StiglerWilliamson,O.EH.DemsetzR.PosnerY.McgeeSCP8090SCPPCSSCP2.22.2SCPFig2.2AmendedSCPFramework214SCPSCP2.3.3(L.Mises)SCP2.3.4W.J.BaumolJ.C.PancerR.D.Willing2152.42.4.120Beston(1965,1972)BellandMurphy(1968)80BergerHanweckandHumphrey(1985,1987)Cebenoyan(1988)Lawrence(1986,1989)HunterandTimme(1986,1990)Kolari(1987)Clark(1988)ShafferandDavid(1991)PulleyandHumphrey(1993)Tseng(1999)Ashton(2001)2090U(Bergeretal,1993;Tichy,1990;Humphrey,1990,1985;Clark,1988;Kolariand,Zardkoohi,1987)(Tichy,1990)(McallisterandMcmanus,1993)(Clark,1996)80(Gropper,1991)AlhadeffFisherRhoadesFreixasandRochetClaessensandLaeven(2003)PanzarandRosse(1987)50BeckKuntandLevine(2003)791980-1997216(AmelandLiang,1997)(Shaffer,1993;Shaffer,1982;NathanandNeave,1989;Molyneuxetal,1994;Liang,1997)PetersonandRajan201999SCP2002SCP20032000199920012003Translog200220022172.4.2---Smirlock(1985)Rhoakes(1985)EvanoffandFortier(1998)FrameandKamerschen(1997)Gilbert(1984)40BergerandHannan(1989)CalemandCarlino(1991)-JeonMiller(2002)-BergberHumphfrey(1997)(DEA)(FDH)(SFA)(DFA)(TFA)BergerHumphrey(1997)1226962DEA6024SFA20DFA16TFA[39]-2001DEA2001DEA2181993-19982001DEA20032003X1997-2001MalmquistX(2003)2.52.5.119202800019302300019901237019959984199986982001831319871980199312193,6711101010025%1001200263013547CR430%,CR839.87%,CR1042.77%,CR2051.94%[5]198019981018.6%36.7%12529.1%51.2%5037.1%62.7%10046.8%70.9%2.22.2Table2.2ChangeofMarketConcentrationofU.S.BankingIndustry8CR819901237093916275322.3%19911194991686389625.7%19921149688736340126.4%19931100184466340128.1%19941049180186559729.7%1995998476866645430.4%1996957574216731834.3%1997921672346946335.5%Berger,Demsetz,Strahan,19992.31090%100ABNAmro,Rabo,NMBPostbank80%-DenDenskeBank220Unibank60%5199841%200345.6%2.3*Table2.3MarketConcentrationofBankingIndustryinSomeDevelopedCountries(%)*19901994199786.856.759.272.271.274.763.260.883.257.956.958.948.076.775.090.285.698.326.845.94647.240.754.138.63337.423.22024.878.466.683.395.7**79.886.51***83.992.649.254.952.922.61619.9*3**1992***1991LandesbankLandesbank221199658273119838.5%50250(Altunbas