产权制度与我国上市商业银行公司治理结构的研究

摘要亚洲金融危机以来，商业银行公司治理问题在国际上引起了广泛关注。目前中国内地商业银行体系主要由4家国有商业银行、12家股份制商业银行、112家城市商业银行、211家外资商业银行以及为数较多的农村和城市信用社组成。截止2007年年底，我国共有13家商业银行先后上市。本文借鉴国内外关于公司治理的研究，从产权制度入手研究上市商业银行治理结构，通过国内上市商业银行与外资银行绩效的比较，进而选取七家上市商业银行作为样本，分析了股权结构、公司治理和经营绩效的关系。分析认为，股权结构是公司治理结构的产权基础，股权结构、公司治理、经营绩效三者之间存在着顺次的、不可逆的关系，公司治理是联结股权结构和经营绩效的中间环节。在寻找合理的股权结构，进而完善公司治理结构时，公司经营绩效可以作为衡量股权结构是否合理、公司治理结构是否完善的一个指标。公司治理直接影响到公司的经营绩效，只有股权结构合理才可能形成完善的公司治理结构，进而才能保证公司取得良好的经营业绩。我国上市银行的经营绩效相对于外资银行较低，而股权集中度相对于外资银行较高，这相对于英美国家商业银行股权比较分散的结构大有不同，分散的股权结构有利于股东之间的权力制衡,在某种程度上更有利于银行经营绩效的提高。针对上述情况，并通过对国外商业银行公司治理模式的分析，本文认为，我国要完善上市银行公司治理，必须通过在股权结构的调整、内部治理结构的完善以及公司治理外部环境建设的加强等方面采取措施，在产权理论的基础上，构建上市银行共同治理模式，形成由股东、债权人以及公司内部的人力资本为治理主体的，包括外部市场和监管机构在内的内外部共同治理的体系。在当前继续深化金融业改革和发展成果的背景下，本文的研究对于完善我国上市银行自身的公司治理，而且对于我国国有商业银行以及其他商业银行的公司治理改革也有一定的借鉴作用，具有重要的理论和现实意义。关键词产权制度，商业银行，上市银行，公司治理ABSTRACTSincetheAsianfinancialcrisis,theissueofthegovernanceofcommercialbanksintheinternationalarenacausedwidespreadconcern.China'smainlandcommercialbankingsystemconsistsoffourstate-ownedcommercialbanks,12joint-stockcommercialbanks,112citycommercialbanks,211foreign-fundedcommercialbanks,aswellasquiteafewruralorurbancreditcooperatives.Attheendof2007,China's13commercialbankshavetobelisted.Inthispaper,drawingondomesticandinternationalresearchoncorporategovernanceaswellasthepropertyrights,wecanstudythemanagementstructureoflistedcommercialbanks.Comparingtheperformanceofthedomesticlistedcommercialbanksandtheforeign-fundedcommercialbanks,furthermore,selectingsevenlistedcommercialbanksasasampleforanalyzingtherelationshipoftheownershipstructure,thecorporategovernanceandtheperformance,theanalysisshowsthattheownershipstructureisthebasisofpropertyrightsofthecorporategovernancestructure.Thereisanorderlyandnonreversiblerelationshipamongtheownershipstructure,thecorporategovernanceandtheperformance.Thecorporategovernanceistheintermediatelinkbetweentheownershipstructureandtheperformance.Intheresearchofareasonableownershipstructureforimprovingthecorporategovernancestructure,thecorporateperformancecanserveasameasureofareasonableownershipstructureandaperfectcorporategovernancestructure.Thecorporategovernanceisadirectimpactonthecorporateperformance.Onlyareasonableownershipstructurecouldleadtoaperfectcorporategovernancestructure,whichcanensurethecompanytomakeagoodperformance.TheperformanceofChina'slistedbanksislowerthanthatoftheforeignbanks.Buttheconcentrationofownershipishigherthanthatoftheforeignbanks.TheChinesebanks’structureisquitedifferentfromthedispersedshareholdingstructureoftheUnitedKingdomortheUnitedStates.Thedispersedownershipstructureisinfavorofthechecksandbalancesbetweentheshareholders.Tosomeextent,itismoreconducivetotheimprovementoftheperformanceofbanks.Inresponsetotheabovecircumstancesandbyanalyzingthegovernancemodeloftheforeigncommercialbanks,thispaperarguesthatperfectingChina'slistedbanks’governance,itisnecessarytoadjusttheshareholdingstructure,toimprovetheinternalgovernancestructureandstrengthentheconstructionoftheexternalenvironmentofthecorporategovernance.Onthebasisofthetheoryofpropertyrights,weshouldbuildacommongovernancemodelofthelistedbanks.Toformaninternalandexternalco-governancesystem,whosegovernancebodyconsistsoftheshareholders,thecreditorsandthecompany'sinternalhumancapital,andwhichincludestheexternalmarketandtheregulatorybodies.Inthebackgroundsofthecurrentcontinuingdeepeningofthereformationandthedevelopingoutcomeofthefinancialcircles,thisstudyisinfavoroftheperfectionofthecorporategovernanceofChina'slistedbanks.Furthermore,thereisareferencefunctiontoChina'sstate-ownedcommercialbanksaswellastheothercommercialbanksincorporategovernanceandreformation,whichhasanimportanttheoreticalandpracticalsignificance.YangQinghua(internationaltrade)DirectedbyProfessorGanAipingKEYWORDSpropertyrightssystem,commercialbanks,listedbanks,corporategovernance目录绪论..........................................................................................................................................................1第一节研究背景及意义.........................................................................................................1第二节国内外研究的现状.....................................................................................................2第三节本文的创新点..............................................................................................................3第一章产权制度及商业银行公司治理结构...........................................................................4第一节产权理论.......................................................................................................................4第二节公司治理结构涵义的界定.......................................................................................5第三节商业银行公司治理的特殊性及内涵界定............................................................7第四节公司治理的理论基础................................................................................................9一、两权分离理论...............................................................................................................9二、委托代理理论..................................................