商业银行经济激励方式比较分析

66Vol.6No.6200412JournalofShanghaiUniversityofFinanceandEconomicsDec12004:F832133:A:100920150(2004)06200252081,2(11,200433;21,200433):,,,:;;,,,(BerleandMeans,1932;FamaandJensen,1983),,,,,(JensenandMeckling,1976;Holmstrom,1979),,(GrossmanandHart,1983,1986),,,,,(Holmstrom,1982;Mirrless,1999),,,,,,,,,,,(RubinsteinandYaari,1983;Macleod,1988):2004208221:(70241020):(1976-),,,;(1953-),,,,©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.(1995),(1997),,;,(1997),,,,,:;;,,,,,,,,,,,,,11,y=a+,E()=0,V()=22,,,,,,atat,sat,ltyt,s=at+Ssat,s-Lsat,l+,,Ss,Ls,Ss0,Ls0,,622004©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.,,t:yt,l=at+Ssat,s-Slat,s+Llat,l-Lsat,l+=yt,s-Slat,s+Llat,lSl,,SlSs0,Ll,LlLs0,,w,t=yt,l-wt(w,,w),x=w-c(a)(catat,sat,l)21(1),,,,E(u(x))=u(E(x)),x,,,,(maxE(u()))(maxE())t=yt,l-w,:maxE()=maxE(yt,l-w)(2),,au(x)=-e-rxRa(x)=-u(x)u(x),Ra(x)=r,,Ra(x)0;,,Ra(x)=0;,,Ra(x)0ru(x)=-e-rx,xE(x),V(x),E(u(x))=+--e-rx12V(x)e(x-E(x))22V(x)dx=-e-r[E(x)-rV(x)2](certaintyequivalent)CEu(CE)=E(u(x)),-e-rCE=-e-r[E(x)-rV(x)2],CE=E(x)-12rV(x),CE,u(CE)=726©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.E(u(x)),u(CE)u(x)=-e-rxr0u(x)=re-rx0,u(x),u(CE)aCE,maxCE=max[E(w-c(a))-12rV(w-c(a))],,31,,,,;,(),,,:maxE(yt,l-w)s.t.max[E(w-c(a))-12rV(w-c(a))]E(w-c(a))-12rV(w-c(a))CE0,,,,,()11,,,:w=w0x=w0-c(a)CE=E(x)-12rV(x)=w0-c(a)c(a)=12a2t+12a2t,s+12a2t,l(,,)CE,9CE9at=9CE9at,s=9CE9at,l=0,a3t=a3t,s=a3t,l=0,,,,,,822004©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.21,,,,,:w=s+a(yt,s-y0)yt,sy0s-min[b(y0-yt,s),F]yt,sy0,s,,a,b,F,y0(1)yt,sy0,,w=s+a(yt,s-y0),:x=s+a(at+Ssat,s-Lsat,l+-y0)-c(at,at,s,at,l):CE=s+a(at+Ssat,s-Lsat,l-y0)-c(at,at,s,at,l)-12r2a2:a3t=a0,a3t,s=aSs0,a3t,l=-aLs0,,(2)yt,sy0y0-yt,sF,,,w=s-b(y0-yt,s)=s+b(yt,s-y0),a3t=b0,a3t,s=bSs0,a3t,l=-bLs0,,(3)yt,sy0y0-yt,sF,,,w=s-bF,a3t=a3t,s=a3t,l=0,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,31,,,,,,:w=s+yt,s+yt,l,s,,926©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.:x=s+(at+Ssat,s-Lst,l+)+(at+Ssat,s-Slat,s+Llat,l-Lsat,l+)-c(at,at,s,at,l):CE=s+(at+Ssat,s-Lsat,l)+(at+Ssat,s-Slat,s+Llat,l-Lsat,l)-c(at,at,s,at,l)-12r(2+2)2,:a3t=+0a3t,s=Ss+(Ss-Sl)a3t,l=(Ll-Ls)-Ls(1)(+)SsSl,at,s0,;(+)SsSl,at,s0,(2)Ll(+)Ls,at,l0,;Ll(+)Ls,at,l0,,,,41,,:w=s+max(0,-E),s,,E,,,0,-E0,w=s,a3t=a3t,s=a3t,l=0-E0,:w=s+(-E)=s+[(yt,l-w)-E]=11+(s+yt,l-E):x=11+[s+(at+Ssat,s-Slat,s+Llat,l-Lsat,l+)-E]-c(at,at,s,at,l):032004©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.CE=11+[s+(at+Ssat,s-Slat,s+Llat,l-Lsat,l)-E]-c(at,at,s,at,l)-12r1+22:a3t=1+0a3t,s=(Ss-Sl)1+0a3t,l=(Ll-Ls)1+0,,,,,,,,,,,,;,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,(),,,,136©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.:[1]Berle,AdolfA.andMeans,GardinerC.TheModernCorporationandPrivateProperty[M].NewYork:MacmillanPublishingCo.,1932.[2]Grossman,StanfordandHart,Oliver.AnAnalysisofthePrincipalnAgentProblem[J].Econometrica,51:7n45,1983.[3]GrossmanS.J.andO.Hart.TheCostsandBenefitsofOwnership:ATheoryofVerticalandLateralIntegra2tion[J].JournalofPoliticalEconomy,vol.94,pp691n719,1986.[4]Fama,EugeneF.andJensen,MichaelC.SeparationofOwnershipandControl[J].JournalofLawandEconomics,XXV:301n325,1983.[5]Holmstrom,Bengt.MoralHazardandObservability[J].BellJournalofEconomics,10:74n91,1979.[6]Holmstrom,Bengt.MoralHazardinTeams[J].BellJournalofEconomics,13:324n340,1982.[7]JensenM.C.andW.H.Meckling.TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandCapitalStructure[J].JournalofFinancialEconomics,11,305n360,1976.[8]Macleod,W.Equity,Efficiency,andIncentivesinCooperativeTeams[M].InAdvancesintheEconomicAnal2ysisofParticipatoryandLaborManagedFirms,3:5n23,1988.[9]Mirrless,JimA.TheTheoryofMoralHazardandUnobservableBehavior:PartI[J].ReviewofEconomicStudies,66:3n61,1999.[10]Rubinstein,A.andMYaari.RepeatedInsuranceContractsandMoralHazard[J].JournalofEconomicTheo2ry,30:74n97,1983.[11].[M].:,1998.[12],,.[M].:,,1997.[13].[J].,1997,(1).[14].:.[J].,1995,(4).AComparativeAnalysisofCommercialBanksEconomicIncentiveModeZHANGWen1,CHENXuenbin2(1.SchoolofFinance,ShanghaiUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Shanghai200433,China;2.InstituteofFinance,FudanUniversity,Shanghai200433,China)Abstract:Thispaperdiscussestheissueofeconomicincentiveofcommercialbanks.Basedonprinciplenagenttheoryandincentivenrestrictivetheory,weconstructaneconomicincen2tivedynamicgametheorymodelofcommercialbanksandusethismodeltocompareandanalyzetheeffectsofthefollowingfourtypicalsalaryincentivepatterns,namely,fixedincomepattern,profitguaranteeandresidualallotpattern,annualsalarypatternandstockoptionpatternonthemanagersbehavior.Finally,weproposesomecorrespondingpolicysuggestionsbasedonthere2sultsofmodels.Keywords:commercialbank;economicincentive;gametheoryanalysis232004©1995-2005TsinghuaTongfangOpticalDiscCo.,Ltd.Allrightsreserved.