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当前位置:首页 > 财经/贸易 > 资产评估/会计 > 财务会计理论―Earnings management2a
1EarningsManagementChapters1111-2EarningsManagement(EM)•Definition–Choiceofaccountingpoliciestoachievesomespecificmanagerobjective•CanAlsoIncludeManagementofRealVariables–R&D,advertising,maintenance–TimingofdisposalsEarningsManagementTechniques•RevenueRecognition•AccountingPolicyChange•TimingofAdoptionofNewStandards•Restructuring,Writeoffs,AssetSales,Provisions•Accruals(Discretionary)34IllustrationsOperatingcashflowaspercashflowstatement$1,000Lessamortization/depreciationexpense$-50Add:Increasein(net)accreceivableduringtheyr+40Add:increaseininventoryduringtheyr+100Add:Decreaseinaccountspayable&accruedliabilitiesduringtheyear+30120Netincomeasperincomestatement$1,1205PatternsofEarningsManagement•Takingabath.•Incomeminimization:politicallyvisiblefirmduringperiodsofhighprofitability.•Incomemaximization:forbonuspurposesandtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation.•Incomesmoothing:portrayalessriskyincomestreamEvidenceofEarningsManagementforBonusPurposes•Acontractualmotivation–Bonusplanhypothesis:tomanagecashbonus(e.g.Healy1985)–Confinedtobonusesbasedonnetincome–Evidenceofupwardearningsmanagementwhennetincomebetweenbogeyandcap•Measuringdiscretionaryaccruals–Healyusedtotalaccrualsasproxy–NowusuallybasedonJonesmodel6OtherEarningsManagementMotivations•Othercontractualmotivations–Debtcovenanthypothesis:tomanagedebtcovenants(e.g.Sweeney1994)–Politicalcosthypothesis•Tolowerpolitical“heat”(e.g.Jones(1991))7OtherEarningsManagementMotivations•Tomeetinvestors’earningsexpectations–Strongnegativesharepricereactionifexpectationsnotmet–Damagetomanagerreputationifexpectationsnotmet•Initialpublicofferings:–Toincreaseproceedsofnewshareissues•Others:–CEOChanges:Murphy&Zimmerman(1993)–Taxation89EarningsManagementOpportunisticbehavior(BadEM)EfficientContracting(GoodEM)EMtoconveymanager’sinformationtoinvestorsEMasadevicetomanipulateearningsDifferentviewsofEarningsManagementTwoversionsofEarningsManagementGoodEarningsManagement•Blockedcommunicationmayinhibitdirectdisclosureofearningsexpectations•Discretionaryaccrualmanagementasawaytocrediblyrevealmanagement’sinsideinformationaboutearningsexpectations(e.g.Demski&Sappington1987)•Shareholdersmayalsowanttoseethemanagersprovideahighincomefiguretooasthisbindthemanagementtoahighertarget.10GoodEarningsManagement–Managerfoolishtoreportmoreearningsthancanbemaintained–Managereportedearningstoanamountmanagementexpectswillpersist•Earningsmanagementasatoolforthemanagertocommunicatethefirm'sexpectedlong-run,persistentearningspotential.11BadEarningsManagement•ContractingPerspective–Healy(1985)–Jones(1991)–Dechow,Sloan,andSweeney(1996)–Hanna(1999)1213Healy(1985)TheEffectofBonusSchemeonAccountingDecisions.JAE.April1985.•Bonusplan:bogiesandcaps–Ifnetincomeislow=takeabath.–Ifincometoohigh=shifttothefuture.•Henceadoptincome-increasingpoliciesbetweenbogiesandcap.•Results:–AverageaccrualsnegativeintheLOWgroup&inthehighgroup:UPP–PositiveintheMID.14Jones(1991)•Jones,J:EarningsManagementDuringImportReliefInvestigation,JAR1991.•Studiedactionsoffirmsapplyingforimportrelief(ITC)tofirms“unfairly”affectedbyforeigncompetition•Almostallfirmsinsample:discretionaryaccrualssignificantlynegativeinITCinvestigationyears.•Significantnegativeaccrualsnotfoundinyearsimmediatelyprecedingandfollowinginvestigation.•Conclusion:Firmssystematicallychoseaccrualpoliciestoimprovetheircaseforimportreliefprotection,consistentwiththepoliticalcosthypotheses.15Dechow,SloanandSweeney(1996)•Evidencebasedon92firmschargedbytheUSSECforaccountingmatters•ThesefirmssucceededatborrowingmoreandissuingmoresecuritiesCookieJarAccounting(Hanna1999)•Investorsandanalystslooktocoreearnings,ignoringprovisionsforextraordinaryandnon-recurringitems•Managercompensationcalculationsoftennotpenalizenon-coreprovisions,suchaswritedowns&provisionsforrestructuring•Butcurrentnon-coreprovisionsmayincreasecoreearningsinfutureyears,throughloweramortizationandabsorptionoffuturecosts–cookie-jaraccounting•Asaresult,managerstemptedto“overdose”onnon-coreprovisions,therebyputtingearnings“inthebank”16NortelNetworkCorp•In2001and2002,$5Bprovisionsmadeforthecostofcontractcancellations,baddebts,layoff,plantclosures,overstatingthelossesofthese2years.•In2003,Nortelreversed“excess”provisionsbycreditingtooperatingexpense,withoutproperdisclosure•Nortel’scompensationplanprovidedforbonusesifthecompanyreturnedtoprofitability.Seniorexecutivesreceivedmillionsinbonusesin2003basedonoverstatedprofits.•Result:classactionlawsuits,CEO,CFOandcontrollerfired.Lossofconfidence.Fileforbankruptcyin2009.17Standardsettersresponsetobadearningsmanagement•SFAS146:–Prohibitedrecordingliabilityforrestructuringuntilarealliabilityhasincurred.–Provisionmeasuredatfairvalue.Excessprovisionsnotallowed•IAS37–Provisionforpaymentsmustbeprobableandcapableofreliableestimation.Provisionvaluedatfairvalue–Noexcessprovision–Provisionsmustbeusedonlytoabsorbcostsforwhichprovisionoriginallysetup18Standardsettersresponsetobadearningsmanagement•Doesthestandardssolveproblemofabuseofprovisions?•Managementcontrolstiming•Fairvaluesrequireestimation
本文标题:财务会计理论―Earnings management2a
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