您好,欢迎访问三七文档
当前位置:首页 > 商业/管理/HR > 企业财务 > 平狄克-微观经济学(下)(复旦大学中国经济研究中心主任-张军)
Chapter11PricingwithMarketPowerChapter11Slide2TopicstobeDiscussedCapturingConsumerSurplusPriceDiscriminationIntertemporalPriceDiscriminationandPeak-LoadPricingChapter11Slide3TopicstobeDiscussedTheTwo-PartTariffBundlingAdvertisingChapter11Slide4IntroductionPricingwithoutmarketpower(perfectcompetition)isdeterminedbymarketsupplyanddemand.Theindividualproducermustbeabletoforecastthemarketandthenconcentrateonmanagingproduction(cost)tomaximizeprofits.Chapter11Slide5IntroductionPricingwithmarketpower(imperfectcompetition)requirestheindividualproducertoknowmuchmoreaboutthecharacteristicsofdemandaswellasmanageproduction.Chapter11Slide6CapturingConsumerSurplusQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCIfpriceisraisedaboveP*,thefirmwilllosesalesandreduceprofit.PCPCisthepricethatwouldexistinaperfectlycompetitivemarket.AP*Q*P1Between0andQ*,consumerswillpaymorethanP*--consumersurplus(A).BP2BeyondQ*,pricewillhavetofalltocreateaconsumersurplus(B).Chapter11Slide7CapturingConsumerSurplus•P*Q*:singleP&Q@MC=MR•A:consumersurpluswithP*•B:PMC&consumerwouldbuyatalowerprice•P1:lesssalesandprofits•P2:increasesales&andreducerevenueandprofits•PC:competitivepriceQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCAP*Q*P1BP2Chapter11Slide8CapturingConsumerSurplusQuantity$/QDMRPmaxMCPCAP*Q*P1BP2QuestionHowcanthefirmcapturetheconsumersurplusinAandsellprofitablyinB?AnswerPricediscriminationTwo-parttariffsBundlingChapter11Slide9CapturingConsumerSurplusPricediscriminationisthechargingofdifferentpricestodifferentconsumersforsimilargoods.Chapter11Slide10PriceDiscriminationFirstDegreePriceDiscriminationChargeaseparatepricetoeachcustomer:themaximumorreservationpricetheyarewillingtopay.Chapter11Slide11P*Q*Withoutpricediscrimination,outputisQ*andpriceisP*.VariableprofitistheareabetweentheMC&MR(yellow).AdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QPmaxWithperfectdiscrimination,eachconsumerpaysthemaximumpricetheyarewillingtopay.ConsumersurplusistheareaaboveP*andbetween0andQ*output.D=ARMRMCOutputexpandstoQ**andpricefallstoPCwhereMC=MR=AR=D.ProfitsincreasebytheareaaboveMCbetweenoldMRandDtooutputQ**(purple)Q**PCChapter11Slide12P*Q*ConsumersurpluswhenasinglepriceP*ischarged.VariableprofitwhenasinglepriceP*ischarged.AdditionalprofitfromperfectpricediscriminationQuantity$/QPmaxD=ARMRMCQ**PCWithperfectdiscrimination•Eachcustomerpaystheirreservationprice•ProfitsincreaseAdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscriminationChapter11Slide13QuestionWhywouldaproducerhavedifficultyinachievingfirst-degreepricediscrimination?Answer1)Toomanycustomers(impractical)2)CouldnotestimatethereservationpriceforeachcustomerAdditionalProfitFromPerfectFirst-DegreePriceDiscriminationChapter11Slide14PriceDiscriminationFirstDegreePriceDiscriminationThemodeldoesdemonstratethepotentialprofit(incentive)ofpracticingpricediscriminationtosomedegree.Chapter11Slide15PriceDiscriminationFirstDegreePriceDiscriminationExamplesofimperfectpricediscriminationwherethesellerhastheabilitytosegregatethemarkettosomeextentandchargedifferentpricesforthesameproduct:Lawyers,doctors,accountantsCarsalesperson(15%profitmargin)CollegesanduniversitiesChapter11Slide16First-DegreePriceDiscriminationinPracticeQuantityDMRMC$/QP2P3P*4P5P6P1Sixpricesexistresultinginhigherprofits.WithasinglepriceP*4,therearefewconsumersandthosewhopayP5orP6mayhaveasurplus.QSecond-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QDMRMCACP0Q0Withoutdiscrimination:P=P0andQ=Q0.Withsecond-degreediscriminationtherearethreepricesP1,P2,andP3.(e.g.electricutilities)P1Q11stBlockP2Q2P3Q32ndBlock3rdBlockSecond-degreepricediscriminationispricingaccordingtoquantityconsumed--orinblocks.Second-DegreePriceDiscriminationQuantity$/QDMRMCACP0Q0P1Q11stBlockP2Q2P3Q32ndBlock3rdBlockEconomiesofscalepermit:•Increaseconsumerwelfare•HigherprofitsChapter11Slide19PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination1)Dividesthemarketintotwo-groups.2)Eachgrouphasitsowndemandfunction.Chapter11Slide20PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination3)Mostcommontypeofpricediscrimination.Examples:airlines,liquor,vegetables,discountstostudentsandseniorcitizens.Chapter11Slide21PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscrimination4)Third-degreepricediscriminationisfeasiblewhenthesellercanseparatehis/hermarketintogroupswhohavedifferentpriceelasticitiesofdemand(e.g.businessairtravelersversusvacationairtravelers)Chapter11Slide22PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationObjectivesMR1=MR2MC1=MR1andMC2=MR2MR1=MR2=MCChapter11Slide23PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationP1:pricefirstgroupP2:pricesecondgroupC(Qr)=totalcostofQT=Q1+Q2Profit()=P1Q1+P2Q2-C(Qr)Chapter11Slide24PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationSetincrementalforsalestogroup1=00(11)111QCQQPQMCQCMRQQP11111)(Chapter11Slide25PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationSecondgroupofcustomers:MR2=MCMR1=MR2=MCChapter11Slide26PriceDiscriminationThirdDegreePriceDiscriminationDeterminingrelativeprices)11()11(11222111EPMREPMREPMRd:Then:RecallChapter11Slide27PriceDi
本文标题:平狄克-微观经济学(下)(复旦大学中国经济研究中心主任-张军)
链接地址:https://www.777doc.com/doc-3883455 .html