您好,欢迎访问三七文档
当前位置:首页 > 法律文献 > 理论/案例 > 【哈佛法律评论】Volume123
617VOLUME123JANUARY2010NUMBER3©2010byTheHarvardLawReviewAssociationARTICLESCOMPLEMENTARYCONSTRAINTS:SEPARATIONOFPOWERS,RATIONALVOTING,ANDCONSTITUTIONALDESIGNJideO.NzelibeandMatthewC.StephensonTABLEOFCONTENTSI.SEPARATIONOFPOWERSANDELECTORALACCOUNTABILITY:ANOVERVIEW..................................................................................624II.HOWSEPARATIONOFPOWERSAFFECTSRATIONALRETROSPECTIVEVOTING.............................................................................627A.TheBaselineCase:ASingleElectedAgent...................................................................627B.TheImpactofSeparationofPowersonElectoralStrategiesandPoliticalBehavior.....................................................................................................631III.IMPLICATIONSOFTHEANALYSIS...................................................................................636A.PresidentialEmpireBuilding.........................................................................................637B.ResponsibilityShifting.....................................................................................................639C.Gridlock..............................................................................................................................643D.VoterWelfare......................................................................................................................645IV.LIMITATIONSOFTHEARGUMENT..................................................................................647A.RationalRetrospectiveVoting.........................................................................................647B.EffectiveElectoralDiscipline..........................................................................................650C.ClarityofResponsibility..................................................................................................652CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................653618COMPLEMENTARYCONSTRAINTS:SEPARATIONOFPOWERS,RATIONALVOTING,ANDCONSTITUTIONALDESIGNJideO.Nzelibe∗andMatthewC.Stephenson∗∗ThisArticleexploreshowtheseparationofpowersaffectsvoters’electoralstrategies,andhowthisinteractioninfluencestheperformanceofdifferentinstitutionalarrangements.Weshowthatwhenonepoliticalagent,suchasthePresident,actsunilaterally,votersarelikelytorespondasymmetricallytopolicysuccessesandfailuresinordertooffsettheriskthatthePresidentmaybebiasedor“captured”byspecialinterestgroups.Whenpoliticalagentsactinconcert—suchaswhenthePresidentseekscongressionalauthorizationforapolicyinitiative—voterspreferamorerefinedstrategy,withlessacuteasymmetriesbetweenpoliticalrewardsandpunishments.Ouranalysishaspositiveandnormativeimplications.First,itsuggeststhatpresidentsdonotalwaysprefertooperatewithaslittlecongressionalinterferenceaspossible.Second,itprovidesarationalistaccountfor“responsibilityshifting”byelectedofficials—behaviorthatisusuallythoughttoderivefromvoterconfusionorirrationality.Third,itsuggeststhatseparationofpowersdoesnotnecessarilyinduce“gridlock”orotherwisereducethelikelihoodofpolicychange.Fourth,itsuggeststhatalthoughseparationofpowersenhancestheefficacyoftheelectoralconstraintonpoliticians,voterwelfareishigherwhenseparationofpowersis“optional”ratherthanmandatory,aswhenthePresidentmayseekcongressionalauthorizationforpolicyinitiativesbutisnotrequiredtodoso.hevoter,thepoliticaltheoristV.O.Keyonceobserved,isthe“ra-tionalgodofvengeanceandofreward.”1Theextenttowhichvoterscaninfluencepolicychoicesbyrewardingorpunishingpoliti-cianshaslongbeenacentralconcernforbothpoliticalscienceandle-galscholarship.Fewpoliticalsystems,however,relysolelyonvoter–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––∗ProfessorofLaw,NorthwesternUniversityLawSchool.∗∗AssistantProfessorofLaw,HarvardLawSchool.WearegratefultoDavidAusten-Smith,KennethAyotte,DavidBaron,DavidBarron,JackBeerman,TomBrennan,LisaBressman,RyanBubb,EthanBuenodeMesquita,AlvaroBustos,JohnCoates,EinerElhauge,DickFallon,JakeGersen,JimGreiner,LouisKaplow,DarylLevin-son,KaterinaLinos,DanMeltzer,GerryNeuman,AnneJosephO’Connell,NathanielPersily,EricPosner,ToddRakoff,MaxSchanzenbach,KenShepsle,JedShugerman,KathySpier,DavidSuper,AdrianVermeule,AbeWickelgren,JohnYoo,KathyZeiler,andparticipantsinfacultyworkshopsatHarvard,Michigan,Columbia,USC,andGeorgetownLawSchools,aswellaspar-ticipantsattheHarvardConferenceonPoliticalEconomyandPublicLaw,forhelpfulcommentsonearlierdrafts.1V.O.KEY,JR.,POLITICS,PARTIES,&PRESSUREGROUPS568(5thed.1964).Ironically,Key’sspecificusageofthisfamousandoft-misquotedphrasewasskeptical:“TheFoundingFa-thers,bytheprovisionformidtermelections,builtintotheconstitutionalsystemaprocedurewhosestrangeconsequenceslackexplanationinanytheorythatpersonifiestheelectorateasarationalgodofvengeanceandofreward.”Id.Nonetheless,asProfessorLarryBartelshasob-served,thisphrasehasbecomecommonlyassociatedwithV.O.Key’smoreoptimisticaccountoftherationalretrospectivev
本文标题:【哈佛法律评论】Volume123
链接地址:https://www.777doc.com/doc-393455 .html