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SEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROLEugeneF.FamaU[e-mail]yzesthesurvivaloforganizationsinwhichdecisionagentsdonotbearamajorshareofthewealtheffectsoftheirdecisions.Thisiswhattheliteratureonlargecorporationscallsseparationof“ownership”and“control.”Suchseparationofdecisionandriskbearingfunctionsisalsocommontoorganizationslikelargeprofessionalpartnerships,financialmutualsandnonprofits.Wecontendthatseparationofdecisionandriskbearingfunctionssurvivesintheseorganizationsinpartbecauseofthebenefitsofspecializationofmanagementandriskbearingbutalsobecauseofaneffectivecommonapproachtocontrollingtheimpliedagencyproblems.Inparticular,thecontractstructuresofalltheseorganizationsseparatetheratificationandmonitoringofdecisionsfromtheinitiationandimplementationofthedecisions.©E.F.FamaandM.C.Jensen,1983JournalofLawandEconomics,Vol.XXVI,June1983.alsopublishedinFoundationsofOrganizationalStrategy,MichaelC.Jensen,HarvardUniversityPress,1998.ThisdocumentisavailableontheSocialScienceResearchNetwork(SSRN)ElectronicLibraryat:=94034SEPARATIONOFOWNERSHIPANDCONTROL*EugeneF.FamaandMichaelC.JensenJournalofLawandEconomics,Vol.XXVI,June1983,andFoundationsofOrganizationalStrategy,MichaelC.Jensen,HarvardUniversityPress,1998.I.IntroductionAbsentfiat,theformoforganizationthatsurvivesinanactivityistheonethatdeliverstheproductdemandedbycustomersatthelowestpricewhilecoveringcosts.1Ourgoalistoexplainthesurvivaloforganizationscharacterizedbyseparationof“ownership”and“control”—aproblemthathasbotheredstudentsofcorporationsfromAdamSmithtoBerleandMeansandJensenandMeckling.2Inmorepreciselanguage,weareconcernedwiththesurvivaloforganizationsinwhichimportantdecisionagentsdonotbearasubstantialshareofthewealtheffectsoftheirdecisions.Wearguethattheseparationofdecisionandrisk-bearingfunctionsobservedinlargecorporationsiscommontootherorganizationssuchaslargeprofessional*Thispaperisarevisionofpartsofourearlierpaper,TheSurvivalofOrganizations(September1980).InthecourseofthisworkwehaveprofitedfromthecommentsofR.Antle,R.Benne,F.Black,F. Easterbrook,A.Farber,W.Gavett,P.Hirsch,R.Hogarth,C.Holderness,R.Holthausen,C.Horne,J. Jeuck,R.Leftwich,S.McCormick,D.Mayers,P.Pashigian,M.Scholes,C.Smith,G.Stigler,R.Watts,T.Whisler,R.Yeaple,J.Zimmerman,andespeciallyA.Alchian,W.Meckling,andC.Plosser.FinancialsupportforFama’sparticipationisfromtheNationalScienceFoundation.JensenissupportedbytheManagerialEconomicsResearchCenteroftheUniversityofRochester.1Alchian(1950)isanearlyproponentoftheuseofnaturalselectionineconomicanalysis.Forasurveyofgeneralissuesintheanalysisoforganization,seeJensen(1983).2Smith(1776);BerleandMeans(1932);andJensenandMeckling(1976).FamaandJensen19832partnerships,financialmutuals,andnonprofits.Wecontendthatseparationofdecisionandrisk-bearingfunctionssurvivesintheseorganizationsinpartbecauseofthebenefitsofspecializationofmanagementandriskbearingbutalsobecauseofaneffectivecommonapproachtocontrollingtheagencyproblemscausedbyseparationofdecisionandrisk-bearingfunctions.Inparticular,ourhypothesisisthatthecontractstructuresofalloftheseorganizationsseparatetheratificationandmonitoringofdecisionsfrominitiationandimplementationofthedecisions.II.ResidualClaimsandDecisionProcessesAnorganizationisthenexusofcontracts,writtenandunwritten,amongownersoffactorsofproductionandcustomers.3Thesecontractsorinternal‘‘rulesofthegame”specifytherightsofeachagentintheorganization,performancecriteriaonwhichagentsareevaluated,andthepayofffunctionstheyface.Thecontractstructurecombineswithavailableproductiontechnologiesandexternallegalconstraintstodeterminethecostfunctionfordeliveringanoutputwithaparticularformoforganization.4Theformoforganizationthatdeliverstheoutputdemandedbycustomersatthelowestprice,whilecoveringcosts,survives.Thecentralcontractsinanyorganizationspecify(1)thenatureofresidualclaimsand(2)theallocationofthestepsofthedecisionprocessamongagents.Thesecontractsdistinguishorganizationsfromoneanotherandexplainwhyspecificorganizationalformssurvive.Wefirstdiscussthegeneralcharacteristicsofresidualclaimsanddecisionprocesses.Wethenpresentthemajorhypothesesabouttherelationsbetweenefficientallocationsofresidualclaimsanddecisionfunctions.Theanalysisfocusesontwobroadtypesoforganizations—thoseinwhichrisk-bearinganddecisionfunctionsareseparated3SeeJensenandMeckling(1976).4SeeJensenandMeckling(1979).FamaandJensen19833andthoseinwhichtheyarecombinedinthesameagents.Weanalyzeonlyprivateorganizationsthatdependonvoluntarycontractingandexchange.A.ResidualClaimsThecontractstructuresofmostorganizationalformslimittherisksundertakenbymostagentsbyspecifyingeitherfixedpromisedpayoffsorincentivepayoffstiedtospecificmeasuresofperformance.Theresidualrisk—theriskofthedifferencebetweenstochasticinflowsofresourcesandpromisedpaymentstoagents—isbornebythosewhocontractfortherightstonetcashflows.Wecalltheseagentstheresidualclaimantsorresidualriskbearers.Moreover,thecontractsofmostagentsco