Beyond the Social Contract：toward global justice

BeyondtheSocialContract:TowardGlobalJusticeMARTHAC.NUSSBAUMTHETANNERLECTURESONHUMANVALUESDeliveredatAustralianNationalUniversity,CanberraNovember12and13,2002andatClareHall,UniversityofCambridgeMarch5and6,2003636-p.qxd4/19/20042:00PMPage413MARTHANUSSBAUMisErnstFreundDistinguishedServiceProfessorofLawandEthicsattheUniversityofChicago.ShewaseducatedatNewYorkUniversityandreceivedaPh.D.fromHarvard.ShehastaughtatOxford,Brown,andHarvard,andwasaresearchadvisorattheWorldInstituteforDevelopmentEconomicsResearch,Helsinki,apartoftheUnitedNationsUniversity.SheisafellowoftheAmericanPhilosophi-calSocietyandtheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences.Shehasre-ceivedtheNYUDistinguishedAlumniAward,theBarnardCollegeMedalofDistinction,andsheisanacademicianintheAcademyofFin-land.AmonghermanypublicationsareTheFragilityofGoodness:LuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy(1986,updatededition2000);Love’sKnowledge(1990),whichreceivedthe1991PENSpielvogel-DiamondsteinAwardforthebestcollectionofessays);CultivatingHumanity:AClassicalDefenseofReforminLiberalEducation(1997),whichwontheNessBookAwardoftheAssociationofAmericanCollegesandUniversitiesandtheGrawemeyerAwardinEducation;SexandSocialJustice(1998),whichwonthebookawardoftheNorthAmericanSoci-etyforSocialPhilosophy;andUpheavalsofThought:TheIntelligenceofEmotions(2001).636-p.qxd4/19/20042:00PMPage414Thesethreelecturesareextractsfromamanuscriptinprogress.Ipre-sentedthreelecturesinbothCanberraandCambridge,England,butinbothcasesamuchlongermanuscript,availableonawebsite,wasthebasisfordiscussion.Thethreemanuscriptspublishedhereareanuneasycompromisebetweenthelongerwebsiteversionandtheshorterlectureversion.LectureIisfuller;LecturesIIandIIIarepresentedmoreorlessasdelivered.(ThereasonforthisisthattheargumentativestructureofmypositionislaidoutinLectureI,whereasLecturesIIandIIIcontinuethegenerallineofargumentpresentedinLectureI.)Thewebsitever-sionmaybeconsultedbythosewhowouldliketoseethelongerver-sions.ButitisaŠrstdraft,andthewholeprojectisundercontract,inbookform,toHarvardUniversityPress;itisbeingrevisedcurrently,andmanychanges(whichIhopeareimprovements)arebeingintro-duced.Theprojectbeginsfromtheassumptionthattheoriesofjusticeinthesocial-contracttraditionareamongthestrongesttheoriesofjusticewecurrentlyhave.Thesetheoriesalsohaveanuntoldinšuenceonpub-licpolicy,ofteninasimpliŠedanddegenerateform.Althoughsuchthe-ories—bothinthehistoricaltraditionandtoday—areverystrong,andalthoughJohnRawls’stheory,inparticular,isprobablythestrongesttheoryofjusticewecurrentlyhave,severalaspectsofthecontracttradi-tionseemproblematicwhenweapproachthreeofthemosturgentprob-lemsofjusticeinourtime:justiceforpeoplewithdisabilities(especiallymentaldisabilities),justiceacrossnationalboundaries,andjusticefornonhumananimals.RawlshimselfrecognizesthathistheoryrunsupagainstsomedifŠcultproblemsinjusttheseareas.InPoliticalLiberalismhementionsfourproblemsthataredifŠcultforhisconceptionofjusticetohandle:whatisowedtopeoplewithdisabilities(bothtemporaryandperma-nent,bothmentalandphysical),justiceacrossnationalboundaries,“whatisowedtoanimalsandtherestofnature”(asweshallsee,Rawlsdoesnotgrantthattheseareissuesofjustice),andtheproblemofsavingforfuturegenerations.1Ofalltheseheconcludes:“Whilewewouldlike[415]1JohnRawls,PoliticalLiberalism,expandedpaperbackedition(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996),pp.20–21(hereafterPL).636-p.qxd4/19/20042:00PMPage415eventuallytoanswerallthesequestions,Iverymuchdoubtwhetherthatispossiblewithinthescopeofjusticeasfairnessasapoliticalcon-ception”(PL,p.21).Hegoesontosaythathisconceptioncanbeex-tendedtogiveplausibleanswerstotheproblemoffuturegenerations(Iagree,andthereforeIhavenottreatedthatproblemhere).Similarly,heclaims,hisconceptionmaybeextendedtodealwiththeproblemofin-ternationaljustice;andofcourseTheLawofPeoplesrepresentshisat-tempttomakegoodonthatclaim.(AsIshallargueinLectureII,Ibelievethathedidnotinfactgiveasatisfactoryanswertothatsetofproblems.)Asfortheothertwoproblems,however,hesaysthattheyare“problemsonwhichjusticeasfairnessmayfail.”Withregardtothosecaseswherejusticeasfairness“mayfail,”heseestwopossibilities.Oneis“thattheideaofpoliticaljusticedoesnotcovereverything,norshouldweexpectitto.”Theotherpossibilityisthattheproblemisindeedoneofjustice,“butjusticeasfairnessisnotcorrectinthiscase,howeverwellitmaydoforothercases.Howdeepafaultthisismustwaituntilthecaseitselfcanbeexamined”(PL,p.21).AlthoughmyprojectdidnotinfactbeginfromthisremarkofRawls’s,itisusefultothinkofitasansweringthechallengethatRawlsposesheretohimselfandtoothers,toworkontheseproblemsandtoseetowhatextentatheoryofhistypecanhandlethem.Thatismyproject.IshallarguethatRawls’stheorycannotintheenddeliversatisfactoryanswerstoanyofthesethreeproblemsandthataversionofthecapabil-itiesapproach,asIhavedevelopeditinWomenandHumanDevelopment,2candealwiththeseissuesbetter.Myconclusionisnotthatweshouldre-jectRawls’stheoryoranyothercontractariantheorybutthatweshouldkeepworkingonalternativetheories,whichmaypossiblyenhanceourunderstandingofjustice,particularlywiththesedifŠc