财务报告质量与投资决策来自新兴市场家族企业的证据

TheAssociationbetweenFinancialReportingQualityandInvestmentDecisionsforFamilyFirmsinanEmergingMarketChan-JaneLinDepartmentandGraduateInstituteofAccountingNationalTaiwanUniversityTaipei,[e-mail]†SchoolofAccountancyShidlerCollegeofBusinessUniversityofHawaiiatManoaHonolulu,[e-mail]-JungPanDepartmentandGraduateInstituteofAccountingNationalTaiwanUniversityTaipei,[e-mail]†Correspondingauthor1TheAssociationbetweenFinancialReportingQualityandInvestmentDecisionsforFamilyFirmsinanEmergingMarketAbstractThispaperinvestigatestherelationbetweenfinancialreportingqualityandinvestmentinefficiencyforfamilyfirmsinanemergingmarket.Buildingonpriorliteratureregardingfamilyfirms’financialreportingqualityandinvestmentbehavior,wehypothesizethatfamilyfirmsaremorelikelytounder-investandfinancialreportingqualitycanhelpalleviatesuchbehavior.UsingasampleoflistedfirmsinTaiwanfrom1996to2009,weshowthat,comparingtonon-familyfirms,financialreportingqualitycanreducefamilyfirms’inefficientinvestmentbehavior,especiallyforunder-investment.Inaddition,forfamilyfirms,whenthedeviationofcontrolfromownershipanduncertaintyarehigh,sucheffectismorepronounced.Keywords:investmentinefficiency;financialreportingquality;familyfirmJELClassifications:M41,G31,D812TheAssociationbetweenFinancialReportingQualityandInvestmentDecisionsforFamilyFirmsinanEmergingMarket1.IntroductionPriorliteraturehasdocumentedlargeshareholders’impactonafirm’sinvestmentdecisions.Forexample,FamaandJensen(1985)statethatlarge,undiversifiedshareholdersmayinvestbasedontheirownriskpreferences.Differently,Edmans(2009)showsthatblockholderscanreducemanagerialincentivestopursuemyopicinvestmentdecisions.Ourstudyalsofocusesoninvestmentdecisionsbutonaparticularclassoflargeshareholders,familyowners.Familycontrolledfirmsareprevalentintheworld,especiallyinEuropeandinAsia(FaccioandLang,2002;AndersonandReeb,2003),andhavecontributedasignificantportiontotheworld’sGDP(Fanetal.,2011).Familyfirms’investmentdecisions,differentfromnon-familyfirms,areshapedbythecommitmentofthefamily(Carlock,2010).Inaddition,asfamilyowners’interestsarelinkedtightlytothefirm’sperformance,familyownersneedtomakesurenottoendangertheexistingfamilybusinessandthelong-termsurvivalofthefirmwhenmakinginvestmentdecisions(e.g.,Carlock,2010;KleinandWard,2012).Theabovementionedfactorsraisetheconcernofinvestmentinefficiencyoffamilyfirms.Investmentinefficiencyisdefinedasafirmgivesupinvestmentprojectsthatcanotherwiseincreaseitsvalueorinvestinprojectsthatdonotincreaseitsvalue(e.g.,Biddleetal.,2009).Anumberofrecentstudieshaveinvestigatedtherelationbetweenfinancialreportingqualityandinvestingdecisions(e.g.Bushmanetal.,2006;McNicholsandStubben,2008;LiandTang,2008;Biddleetal.,2009;KediaandPhilippon,2009).Thesestudiesclaimthat,differentfromothergovernancemechanisms,financialreportingqualityhasimportanteconomicimplicationsforinvestmentdecisionsbyreducingtheagencyconflictsbetween3managersandexternalcapitalsuppliers.1However,theassociationbetweenfinancialreportingqualityandinvestmentinefficiencyisnotexanteclearinthecontextoffamilyfirmsintheemergingmarketbecauseofthefollowingreasonsandasdetailedinSection2.First,basedonpriorliterature,itisinconclusivewhetherfamilyfirmshavebetterfinancialreportingqualityorinvestmoreefficiently,comparingtonon-familyfirms(AndersonandReeb,2003;Wang,2006;Alietal.,2007;Chenetal.,2008;Andersonetal.,2009;Andersonetal.,2010).Second,priorstudiesonfamilyfirms’investmentbehavioraremainlybasedonU.S.andEuropeansamplefirms.ThefamilyfirmsintheU.S.andEuropemaybehavedifferentlycomparingtothoseinemergingmarkets(Fanetal.,2011)especiallywhenemergingmarketsarecharacterizedwithlowerrelevanceofaccountinginformation,possiblyworsefinancialreportingqualitybutfewerinformationsourcesotherthanfinancialreports(AliandHwang,2000;Balletal.,2000;Chenetal.,2011).Basedontheabovediscussion,themainpurposeofthisstudyistoinvestigatetheimpactoffinancialreportingqualityoninvestmentdecisionsforfamilyversusnon-familyfirmsinanemergingmarket.Inparticular,asfamilyfirmsintheemergingmarketaremorelikelytounder-invest(seedetaileddiscussioninSection2),wefocusonwhetherfinancialreportingqualitycanreduceunder-investmentbehaviormoreforfamilyfirms,comparingtonon-familyfirms.Wefurtherexaminehowthecharacteristicsoffamilyfirms,namely,deviationofcontrolfromownershipanduncertainty,wouldaffectsuchassociationasthesetwocanworsentheagencyconflictsbetweenthecontrollingownerandminorityshareholders.Toaddressourresearchquestions,weusethelistedfirmsinTaiwanbetween1996and2009asoursample.TheTaiwanesefirmsareselectedforouranalysesbecause(1)Taiwanisanemergingmarket,and(2)approximatelytwo-thirdsofthelistedfirmsinTaiwan1Forexample,Biddleetal.(2009)providemixedevidenceonwhetheralternativegovernancemechanismssuchasinstitutionalownershipandanalystcoverageimproveinvestmentinefficiency.However,theassociationbetweenfinancialreportingqualityandinvestmentremainsnegativeandsignificantaftercontrollingforthesecorporategovernancevariables.4arefam