品牌定位模型-定位理论与定位方式(GDAD)

AnnualIndustrialCapabilitiesReporttoCongressRequiredbySection2504oftitle10,UnitedStatesCodeAugust2012UnderSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition,TechnologyandLogisticsOfficeoftheDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforManufacturingandIndustrialBasePolicyPreparationofthisstudycosttheDepartmentofDefenseatotalofapproximately$98,800dollarsinFiscalYears2011-2012TableofContents1.ExecutiveSummary..................................................................................................12.StrategicGuidance...................................................................................................53.Sector-by-Sector,Tier-by-Tier(S2T2)EvaluationsoftheDefenseIndustrialBase..94.IndustrialSectorAssessments...............................................................................134.1AircraftSectorIndustrialSummary.................................................................134.2InformationTechnology,RadarandElectronicWarfare,andCommand,Control,Communications,andComputers,(IT/C4)SectorSummary............164.3ContractServicesSectorIndustrialSummary.................................................174.4CyberSectorIndustrialSummary...................................................................184.6MaterialsSectorIndustrialSummary..............................................................234.7MunitionsandMissilesSectorIndustrialSummary.........................................244.8ShipbuildingSectorIndustrialSummary.........................................................294.9SpaceSectorIndustrialSummary...................................................................315.DefenseMergersandAcquisitions.........................................................................355.1MajorDefenseSupplierMergerandAcquisitionReviews..............................365.2CommitteeonForeignInvestmentintheUnitedStates..................................376.ProgramsandActionstoSustainCapabilities........................................................396.1TheDefenseProductionAct(DPA)................................................................396.2DoDManufacturingTechnologyProgram.......................................................466.3OtherProgramsandActionstoSustainIndustrialCapabilities.......................52AppendixA-AnnualReportRequirements..................................................................A-1AppendixB-SummaryofKeyIndustrialCapabilitiesAssessmentsCompletedDuringCY2011.......................................................................................................................B-1B.1DoD-Wide......................................................................................................B-1B.2Army..............................................................................................................B-7B.3Navy.............................................................................................................B-13B.4AirForce......................................................................................................B-17B.5DefenseContractManagementAgency......................................................B-24B.6DefenseLogisticsAgency............................................................................B-27AppendixC-RelatedActivities...................................................................................C-1C.1TitleIII–DefenseProductionActSummaries...............................................C-1C.2DoDManTechComponentProgramSummaries........................................C-1811.ExecutiveSummaryThedefenseindustrialbaseiscomprisedofanextremelydiversesetofcompaniesthatprovidebothproductsandservices,directlyandindirectly,tonationalsecurityagencies,1includingthemilitary.Referencesto“the”defenseindustrialbasethatimplyamonolithicentityarenotanalyticallyuseful.Thedefenseindustrialbaseincludescompaniesofallshapesandsizesresourcedfromaroundtheglobe,fromsomeoftheworld'slargestpubliccompaniestosoleproprietorshipstogaragestart-ups.Somecompaniesdealdirectlywiththefederalgovernment,whilethevastmajorityactassuppliers,subcontractors,andservice-providersinavaluechainthatleadstothoseprimecontractors.Companiesatanytier,2andofanysize,mayoffercritical3orhard-to-makeproductsthatultimatelyleadtothecriticalsystems,orcomponentsofsystems,usedbyourWarfighters.Likewise,companiesnottraditionallysupplierstotheDepartmentofDefenseatvarioustiersmayhavetheabilitytoofferhighlycompetitiveproductsorservicesthatcouldbesubstitutedifthespecificproductionartusedbyalegacyproviderwerelost,thusofferingtheDepartmentvitaltechnologyandprocessrefreshmentovertime.Someproductsandservicessoldbycompaniesinthedefenseindustrialbaseareuniquetodefenseapplications,whilemosthavesubstantiallevelsofnon-defensedemandoraresoldexclusivelyoncommercialtermssuchthatthesuppliermaynotevenknowthattheproductisusedinmilitarysystems.Likewise,themilitarymaynotknowitdependsuponaprimarilycommercialcomponent.Finally,whilethepaceofinnovationisextremelyrapidinsomesegmentsacrossthedefenseindustrialbase,othersegmentsarebasedonv