平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)13

Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy13CHAPTERCopyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy2of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER13OUTLINE13.1GamingandStrategicDecisions13.2DominantStrategies13.3TheNashEquilibriumRevisited13.4RepeatedGames13.5SequentialGames13.6Threats,Commitments,andCredibility13.7EntryDeterrence13.8AuctionsChapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy3of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1●gameSituationinwhichplayers(participants)makestrategicdecisionsthattakeintoaccounteachother’sactionsandresponses.●payoffValueassociatedwithapossibleoutcome.●strategyRuleorplanofactionforplayingagame.●optimalstrategyStrategythatmaximizesaplayer’sexpectedpayoff.IfIbelievethatmycompetitorsarerationalandacttomaximizetheirownpayoffs,howshouldItaketheirbehaviorintoaccountwhenmakingmydecisions?Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy4of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1●cooperativegameGameinwhichparticipantscannegotiatebindingcontractsthatallowthemtoplanjointstrategies.●noncooperativegameGameinwhichnegotiationandenforcementofbindingcontractsarenotpossible.NoncooperativeversusCooperativeGamesItisessentialtounderstandyouropponent’spointofviewandtodeducehisorherlikelyresponsestoyouractions.Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy5of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1NoncooperativeversusCooperativeGamesHowtoBuyaDollarBillAdollarbillisauctioned,butinanunusualway.Thehighestbidderreceivesthedollarinreturnfortheamountbid.However,thesecond-highestbiddermustalsohandovertheamountthatheorshebid—andgetnothinginreturn.Ifyouwereplayingthisgame,howmuchwouldyoubidforthedollarbill?Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy6of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.GAMINGANDSTRATEGICDECISIONS13.1YourepresentCompanyA,whichisconsideringacquiringCompanyT.YouplantooffercashforallofCompanyT’sshares,butyouareunsurewhatpricetooffer.ThevalueofCompanyTdependsontheoutcomeofamajoroilexplorationproject.Iftheprojectsucceeds,CompanyT’svalueundercurrentmanagementcouldbeashighas$100/share.CompanyTwillbeworth50percentmoreunderthemanagementofCompanyA.Iftheprojectfails,CompanyTisworth$0/shareundereithermanagement.Thisoffermustbemadenow—beforetheoutcomeoftheexplorationprojectisknown.You(CompanyA)willnotknowtheresultsoftheexplorationprojectwhensubmittingyourpriceoffer,butCompanyTwillknowtheresultswhendecidingwhethertoacceptyouroffer.Also,CompanyTwillacceptanyofferbyCompanyAthatisgreaterthanthe(pershare)valueofthecompanyundercurrentmanagement.Youareconsideringpriceoffersintherange$0/share(i.e.,makingnoofferatall)to$150/share.WhatpricepershareshouldyouofferforCompanyT’sstock?Thetypicalresponse—toofferbetween$50and$75pershare—iswrong.Thecorrectanswertothisproblemappearsattheendofthischapter.Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy7of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.DOMINANTSTRATEGIES13.2●dominantstrategyStrategythatisoptimalnomatterwhatanopponentdoes.SupposeFirmsAandBsellcompetingproductsandaredecidingwhethertoundertakeadvertisingcampaigns.Eachfirmwillbeaffectedbyitscompetitor’sdecision.Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy8of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.DOMINANTSTRATEGIES13.2●equilibriumindominantstrategiesOutcomeofagameinwhicheachfirmisdoingthebestitcanregardlessofwhatitscompetitorsaredoing.Unfortunately,noteverygamehasadominantstrategyforeachplayer.Toseethis,let’schangeouradvertisingexampleslightly.Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy9of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.THENASHEQUILIBRIUMREVISITED13.3DominantStrategies:I’mdoingthebestIcannomatterwhatyoudo.You’redoingthebestyoucannomatterwhatIdo.NashEquilibrium:I’mdoingthebestIcangivenwhatyouaredoing.You’redoingthebestyoucangivenwhatIamdoing.TheProductChoiceProblemTwobreakfastcerealcompaniesfaceamarketinwhichtwonewvariationsofcerealcanbesuccessfullyintroduced.Chapter13:GameTheoryandCompetitiveStrategy10of42Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.THENASHEQUILIBRIUMREVISITED13.3TheBeachLocationGameYou(Y)andacompetitor(C)plantosellsoftdrinksonabeach.Ifsunbathersarespreadevenlyacrossthebeachandwillwalktotheclosestvendor,thetwoofyouwilllocatenexttoeachotheratthecenterofthebeach.ThisistheonlyNashequilibrium.IfyourcompetitorlocatedatpointA,youwouldwanttomoveuntilyouwerejusttotheleft,whereyoucouldcapturethree-fourthsofallsale