Subjective-well-being主观幸福感大学毕业论文外文文献翻译及原文

毕业设计（论文）外文文献翻译文献、资料中文题目：主观幸福感文献、资料英文题目：Subjectivewell-being文献、资料来源：文献、资料发表（出版）日期：院（部）：专业：班级：姓名：学号：指导教师：翻译日期：2017.02.14Subjectivewell-being1Subjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterInthissection,Iexploretherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterinthewritingsonsubjectivemeasures.Iwillarguethatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingdisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter:aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.Asmystartingpoint,Itaketheconceptofwell-being,thatis,whatIhavesofarcalledwell-beingsimpliciter:“whatwehavewhenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Letuscallthisthe“core”conceptofwell-being.Therearemanyothertermsthatareusedinthesamesense,including“aperson’sgood,benefit,advantage,interest,prudentialvalue,welfare,happiness,flourishing,eudaimonia,andutility”(Moore&Crisp,1996,p.599).Becausetheconceptofwell-beingisintendedtocapturewhatisultimately–andnotjustinstrumentally–goodfortheindividual,itisalsosupposedtocapturethatwhichwehavereasontopromote–asanendandnotjustasameans–bothinourownlivesandinthelivesofothers.AsThomasScanlonputsit:Itiscommonlysupposedthatthereisasimplenotionofindividualwell-beingthatplaysthefollowingthreeroles.First,itservesasanimportantbasisforthedecisionsofasinglerationalindividual,atleastforthosedecisionsinwhichheorshealoneisconcerned(thatistosay,inwhichmoralobligationsandconcernsforotherscanbeleftaside).Second,itiswhataconcernedbenefactor,suchasafriendorparent,hasreasontopromote.Third,itisthebasisonwhichanindividual’sinterestsaretakenintoaccountinmoralargument(Scanlon,1998,p.93).3Inparticular,itisfrequentlyassumedthatwell-beingisoneconsiderationorassomepeoplewouldargue,theonlyconsiderationthatshouldserveasanend,andnotjustameansforpublicpolicy.HereIwilltakeitforgrantedthatwhenproponentsofsubjectivemeasurestalkaboutsuchmeasuresasrepresentingwell-being,theyusetheterminthecoresense(Angner,2009a,inpress).First,asindicatedabove,subjectivemeasuresareoftenpresentedasalternativestoothermeasuresofwelfareorwell-being;thiswouldmakelittlesenseif,infact,subjectivemeasureswerenotintendedtorepresentthatwhichtheothermeasuresweredesignedtorepresentviz.welfareorwell-being.Second,theproponents’conceptofwell-beingplaystheverysameroleasthatplayedbythecoreconcept:thosewhodefendtheuseofsubjectivemeasuresofwellbeingoftenemphasizethattheythinkofwell-beingasthatwhichisultimatelygoodfortheindividual,asthatwhichisworthpromotinginthelifeofothers,andasacentral(sometimestheonly)ultimategoalforpublicpolicy(cf.Diener&Seligman,2004,quotedabove).Third,anumberofproponentsexplicitlyciteclassicalphilosophicalliteratureinenthusiasticagreementwhilesignalingthattheyuse“well-being”and/or“happiness”inthesamesenseasphilosophersdo(Kahneman,Wakker,&Sarin,1997;Layard,2005;Watson,1930).Overtheyears,philosophershavetriedtoshedlightontheconceptofwell-beingbydevelopinganddefendingvariousaccounts,orconceptionsofwell-being.Here,IfollowParfit(1984,pp.493–502)individingsuchaccountsintothreemainclasses:mentalstateaccounts,preference-satisfactionordesire-fulfillmentaccounts,andobjective-listaccounts.4Accordingtomental-stateaccounts,well-beingisa“mentalstate”ora“stateofmind.”Becausetheseaccountsallseewelfare“ashavingtoenterourexperience,”theyaresaidtosatisfytheexperiencerequirement(Griffin,1986,p.13).Scanlonwrites:“Experientialtheoriesholdthatthequalityoflife‘forthepersonwholivesit’iscompletelydeterminedbyitsexperientialquality,”where“experientialquality”refersto“whatitwouldbeliketoliveit”(Scanlon,1998,pp.97,99).Onthisview,then,subjectivelyfeltexperienceisbothnecessaryandsufficientforaperson’swell-being.Accordingtodesire-fulfillmentorpreference-satisfactionaccounts,bycontrast,apersoniswellofftotheextentthatherdesiresarefulfilledand/orherpreferencesaresatisfied.Scanlonputsitthisway:Desiretheoriesrejecttheexperiencerequirementandallowthataperson’slifecanbemadebetterandworsenotonlybychangesinthatperson’sstatesofconsciousnessbutalsobychangeselsewhereintheworldwhichfulfillthatperson’spreferences(Scanlon,1993,p.186).Suchaccountsdonotrequirethatapersonwhoiswelloffexperienceanyfeelingsofhappinessorsatisfaction.Whattheydorequireisthatherdesiresarefulfilled(orthatherpreferencesaresatisfied),whichdoesnotcomedowntothesamething.Thetwokindsofaccountdescribedsofararefrequentlyreferredtoassubjectiveaccounts,becausetheydescribeaperson’swell-beingas(atleastpartly)afunctionofhisorherfeelings,experiences,desires,andsoon.Accordingtoso-calledobjectiveaccounts,bycontrast,aperson’swell-beingdoesnotdependonsuchsubjectivefactors.Onsuchaccounts,“certainthingsaregoodorbadforbeings,independentlyinatleastsomecasesofwhethertheyaredesiredorwhethertheygiverisetopleasurableexperiences”(Chappell&Crisp,1998,p.553).Identifyingthelistofthingsthataregoodforpeopleregardlessofwhattheywantisnotoriouslydifficult,butoneprovisionallistofsuchthingsincludes“moralgoodness,rationalac