管理经济学英文版最新版教学课件第10章

CHAPTER10GameTheory:InsideOligopolyChapterOutline•Overviewofgamesandstrategicthinking•Simultaneous-move,one-shotgames–Theory–Applicationofone-shotgames•Infinitelyrepeatedgames–Theory–Factorsaffectingcollusioninpricinggames–Applicationofinfinitelyrepeatedgames•Finitelyrepeatedgames–Gameswithanuncertainfinalperiod–Gameswithaknownfinalperiod:theend-of-periodproblem•Multistagegames–Theory–Applicationsofmultistagegames10-2ChapterOverviewIntroduction•Chapter9examinedmarketenvironmentswhenonlyafewfirmscompeteinamarket,anddeterminedthattheactionsofonefirmwillimpactitsrivals.Asaconsequence,amanagermustconsidertheimpactofherbehavioronherrivals.•Thischapterfocusesonadditionalmanagerdecisionsthatariseinthepresenceofinterdependence.Thegeneraltooldevelopedtoanalyzestrategicthinkingiscalledgametheory.10-3ChapterOverviewGameTheoryFramework•Gametheoryisageneralframeworktoaiddecisionmakingwhenagents’payoffsdependsontheactionstakenbyotherplayers.•Gamesconsistofthefollowingcomponents:–Playersoragentswhomakedecisions.–Plannedactionsofplayers,calledstrategies.–Payoffofplayersunderdifferentstrategyscenarios.–Adescriptionoftheorderofplay.–Adescriptionofthefrequencyofplayorinteraction.10-4OverviewofGamesandStrategicThinkingOrderofDecisionsinGames•Simultaneous-movegame–Gameinwhicheachplayermakesdecisionswithouttheknowledgeoftheotherplayers’decisions.•Sequential-movegame–Gameinwhichoneplayermakesamoveafterobservingtheotherplayer’smove.10-5OverviewofGamesandStrategicThinkingFrequencyofInteractioninGames•One-shotgame–Gameinwhichplayersinteracttomakedecisionsonlyonce.•Repeatedgame–Gameinwhichthesameplayersinteracttomakedecisionsmorethanonce.10-6OverviewofGamesandStrategicThinkingOne-ShotGames:Theory•Strategy–Adecisionrulethatdescribestheactionsaplayerwilltakeateachdecisionpoint.•Normal-formgame–Arepresentationofagameindicatingtheplayers,theirpossiblestrategies,andthepayoffsresultingfromalternativestrategies.10-7Simultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesNormal-FormGame10-8Simultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesPlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,10SetofplayersPlayerA’sstrategiesPlayerB’sstrategiesPlayerA’spossiblepayoffsfromstrategy“down”PlayerB’spossiblepayoffsfromstrategy“right”PossibleStrategies•Dominantstrategy–Astrategythatresultsinthehighestpayofftoaplayerregardlessoftheopponent’saction.•Securestrategy–Astrategythatguaranteesthehighestpayoffgiventheworstpossiblescenario.•Nashequilibriumstrategy–Aconditiondescribingasetofstrategiesinwhichnoplayercanimproveherpayoffbyunilaterallychangingherownstrategy,giventheotherplayers’strategies.10-9Simultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesDominantStrategy10-10Simultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesPlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,10PlayerAhasadominantstrategy:UpPlayerBhasnodominantstrategyPlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,10SecureStrategySimultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesPlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,10PlayerA’ssecurestrategy:Up…guaranteesatleasta$10payoffPlayerB’ssecurestrategy:Right…guaranteesatleastan$8payoffPlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,10PlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,1010-11NashEquilibriumStrategySimultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesPlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,10ANashequilibriumresultswhenPlayerA’splays“Up”andPlayerBplays“Left”PlayerAPlayerBStrategyLeftRightUp10,2015,8Down-10,710,1010-12ApplicationofOne-ShotGames:PricingDecisionsSimultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesFirmAFirmBStrategyLowpriceHighpriceLowprice0,050,-10Highprice-10,5010,10ANashequilibriumresultswhenbothplayerscharge“Lowprice”FirmAFirmBStrategyLowpriceHighpriceLowprice0,050,-10Highprice-10,5010,10PayoffsassociatedwiththeNashequilibriumisinferiorfromthefirms’viewpointcomparedtoboth“agreeing”tocharge“Highprice”:hence,adilemma.10-13ApplicationofOne-ShotGames:CoordinationDecisionsSimultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesFirmAFirmBStrategy120-VoltOutlets90-VoltOutlets120-VoltOutlets$100,$100$0,$090-VoltOutlets$0,$0$100,$100TherearetwoNashequilibriumoutcomesassociatedwiththisgame:Equilibriumstrategy1:Bothplayerschoose120-voltoutletsFirmAFirmBStrategy120-VoltOutlets90-VoltOutlets120-VoltOutlets$100,$100$0,$090-VoltOutlets$0,$0$100,$100Equilibriumstrategy2:Bothplayerschoose90-voltoutletsFirmAFirmBStrategy120-VoltOutlets90-VoltOutlets120-VoltOutlets$100,$100$0,$090-VoltOutlets$0,$0$100,$100Waystocoordinateononeequilibrium:1)permitplayercommunication2)governmentsetstandard10-14ApplicationofOne-ShotGames:MonitoringEmployeesSimultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesManagerWorkerStrategyWorkShirkMonitor-1,11,-1Don’tMonitor1,-1-1,1TherearenoNashequilibriumoutcomesassociatedwiththisgame.Q:Howshouldtheagentsplaythistypeofgame?A:Playamixed(randomized)strategy,wherebyaplayerrandomizesovertwoormoreavailableactionsinordertokeeprivalsfrombeingabletopredicthisorheractions.10-15ApplicationofOne-ShotGames:NashBargainingSimultaneous-Move,One-ShotGamesManagementUnionStrategy05010000,00,500,1005050,050,50-1,-1100100,0-1,-1-1,-1TherethreeNashequilibriumoutcomesassociatedwi