拆分招标的供应商数量及拆分比例研究

拆分招标的供应商数量及拆分比例研究作者：龚秀瑾学位授予单位：复旦大学参考文献(57条)1.AntonJ.DYaoSecondSourcingandtheExperienceCurve:PriceCompetitioninDefenseProcurement1987(01)2.AntonJ.DYaoSplitAwards,ProcurementandInnovation1989(04)3.AntonJ.DYaoCoordinationinSplitAwardAuctions19924.AshenfelterOHowauctionsworkforwineandart19895.AusubelL.PCramtonDemandreductionandinefficiencyinmulti-unitauctions6.BernheimD.MWhinstonMenuAuctions,ResourceAllocationandEconomicInfluence19867.BackK.ZenderJAuctionsofdivisiblegoods:Ontherationaleforthetreasury8.Experiment19939.BulowJ.PKlempererPricesandthewinner'scurse2002(01)10.CramtonPTheFCCSpectrumAuctions:AnEarlyAssessment199711.DasguptaS.DSpulberManagingProcurementAuctions198912.DanaJ.KSpierDesigningaPrivateIndustry:GovernmentAuctionswithEndogenousMarketStructure1994(01)13.DickAAnEfficiencyExplanationforWhyFirmsSecondSource199214.Engelbrecht-WiggansRRevenueEquivalenceinMulti_ObjectAuctions198815.Engelbrecht-WiggansR.CKahnMulti-unitauctionswithuniformprices199816.ElmaghrabyWJ.PKeskinocakThepracticeofsupplychainmanagement:Wheretheoryandapplicationconverge200317.GilbertRJ.PKlempererAnEquilibriumTheoryofRationing200018.HarstadRM.KagelJ.LevinDEquilibriumBidFunctionsforAuctionswithanUncertainNumberofBidders199019.KrishnaV.RRosenthalSimultaneousauctionswithsynergies199620.KatzmanBTwostagesequentialauctionwithmulti-unitdemands199921.KlempererPaulAuctionTheory:AGuidetotheLiterature199922.KagelJ.DLevinMulti-unitdemandauctionswithsynergies:Behaviorinsealed-bidversusascending-biduniformpriceauctions200223.KatokE.AERothAuctionsofhomogeneousgoodswithincreasingreturns:xperimentalcomparisonofalternativeDutchauctions2004(08)24.LaffontJ-J.JTiroleRepeatedAuctionsofIncentiveContracts,InvestmentandBiddingParitywithanApplicationtoTakeovers1988(04)25.LedyardJ.MOlson.DPorter.J.Swanson,D.P.TormaThefirstuseofacombinedvalueauctionfortransportationservices2002(05)26.MilgromP.WeberRDistributionalstrategiesforgameswithincompleteinformation198627.McAfeeP.JMcMillanAuctionswithEntry198728.McMillanJManagingSuppliers:IncentiveSystemsinJapaneseandUnitedStatesIndustry199029.McAfeeRP.McMillanAuctionsandBidding1987(02)30.McAfeeP.DVincentTheDecliningPriceAnomaly199331.McAfeeP.JMcMillanSellingSpectrumRights199432.MarshallR.MeurerM.J-FRichardCurbingAgencyProblemsintheProcurementProcessbyProtestOversight1994(02)33.McGuireT.MRiordanIncompleteInformationandOptimalMarketStructure:PublicPurchasesfromPrivateProviders1995(01)34.McAfeeRP.McMillanJAuctionsandBidding198735.PiccioneM.TanGASimpleModelofExpertandNonExpertBiddinginFirstPriceAuctions199636.PekecA.MHRothkopfCombinatorialauctiondesign200337.PerryMartinK.JózsefSákovicsAuctionsforSplit-AwardContracts2003(02)38.RichardsonJParallelSourcingandSupplierPerformanceintheJapaneseAutomobileIndustry199339.RiordanM.DSappingtonSecondSourcing1989(01)40.RobFTheDesignofProcurementContracts1986(03)41.SeshadriS.ChatterjeeK.GLilienMultipleSourceProcurementCompetitions1991(03)42.SakuraiY.MYokoo.SMatsubaraAnefficientapproximatealgorithmforwinnerdeterminationincombinatorialauctions199943.SmitkaMJCompetitiveTies:SubcontractingintheJapaneseWilson,R.AuctionsofShares199144.VickreyWilliamCounterspeculation:Auctions,andCompetitiveSealedTenders1961(01)45.VonderFehrN.CRiisOptionvaluesinsequentialmarkets200346.WaehrerK.MKPerryTheEffectsofMergersinOpenAuctionModels200147.WilsonRAuctionsofShares197948.WedadElmaghrabyTheEffectofAsymmetricBidderSizeonanAuction'sPerformance:AreMoreBiddersAlwaysBetter?2005(12)49.PeiyouChenResearchontheModelforDeterminationofMulti-itemsOptimalCombinatorialSupplyPatterns200450.XiujinGong.RongZhouResearchonthenumberofsuppliersandthepercentageofsplitinsplit-awardauctions200451.QiyingHuClearingpriceauctionsinelectricitymarket200452.JunMaASimultaneousDependentAuctionModel200453.SLLiu.KKLaiADEAApproachforWinnerDeterminationforSealed-bidMulti-attributeReverseAuction200454.陈绍刚.赵蜀蓉基于随机估值的两物品拍卖的投标决策[期刊论文]-电子科技大学学报2002(4)55.龚秀瑾.周蓉拆分招标的供应商数量研究[期刊论文]-上海管理科学2006(1)56.刘树林.汪寿阳.黎建强投标与拍卖的对策论模型研究发展199857.马俊.邱菀华多物品拍卖中的多人投标决策问题研究[期刊论文]-系统工程理论与实践2002(1)相似文献(1条)1.期刊论文龚秀瑾.周蓉.GongXiujin.ZhouRong拆分招标的供应商数量研究-上海管理科学2006,28(1)许多企业在采购时,常常将整笔业务拆分为两个合同:较大的第一合同和较小的第二合同,通过分批二级价格封闭式招标来选择不同的供应商供货.本文通过建立分批招标模型分析了供应商的投标策略和买方的采购策略,得出了当参加第一合同竞标的供应商数目和第二合同新引入的供应商数目满足一个不等式时,拆分招标的采购成本小于整体招标的采购成本,并且指出了拆分比例对拆分招标的采购成本的影响.本文链接：授权使用：上海海事大学(wflshyxy)，授权号：6d0d913a-79a7-4042-8a6f-9ddb00551dee下载时间：2010年8月23日