控制权转移、高层更换与公司绩效关系的实证研究

华中科技大学硕士学位论文控制权转移、高层更换与公司绩效关系的实证研究姓名：张沛沛申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：夏新平20061031I1999-2003TLogisticChi-Square5IIAbstractInmoderneconomics,corporatecontrolmarketisthemainareaofthecorporategovernanceresearch;topmanagementturnoveraroundthecorporatecontroltransfergainsagreatattentionasanimportantexternaldisciplinaryforce.Throughthismechanism,corporatecontroltransferoftheinefficientmanagedfirms(orfirmsinwhichnon-value-maximizingbehaviordominated)wouldresultinthereplacementoftopmanagementandleadtoamoreefficientuseofresources.Inwesternworld,scholarsgivealotofliteraturesinthisarea,whereasinChina,basedonthespecificinstitutionalbackground,theimpactofChinas’listedfirms’corporatecontroltransferonthemanagementprobablyfundamentallydifferentfromthoseofAmericancases.Itmaybeexpectedthatinthecasewherelacksaneffectiveexecutivemarketandthemanagementofthefirmsaremainlycontrolledbylargestshareholders,itisnotverypossibleforlargestshareholdersofChina’slistedfirmstotransferorpurchasecorporatecontrolforpunishmentofexistingmanagement(SunandLi,2003).Inthismeans,itisverymeaningtostudytherelationshipbetweencorporatecontroltransferandtopmanagementturnover.Inthispaper,weprovideempiricalevidenceonthedisciplinaryroleofcorporatecontroltransferinChina.Employingtheturnoverdataoftopmanagersbetween1999and2003andusingseveralresearchmethodssuchasT-test,Logisticsregression,Chi-squaretest,nonparametrictest,wefindthatthelikelihoodoftopmanagementturnoverincreaseswithpoorpre-corporatecontroltransferperformance,especiallyandmainlyofthechairman.Corporatecontroltransferhassomecharacterswiththeeconomicmeaningthatgreatlyinfluencethetopmanagementturnoverprobabilities.BasedonChina’sspecificinstitutionalbackgroundanpastresearchachievements,thispapernarrowsthefocustoexaminefivecharacteristicvariablesthatmayberelatedtocorporateperformanceandaffectmanagementturnoverinordertofurtherverifywhetherthecorrelationbetweenmanagementturnoverandcorporateperformanceisaffectedbythesefactors.WefindthatthedisciplinaryroleoftheChinesemarketforcorporatecontrolisstill,tosomeextent,subjecttogovernmentintervention.KeyWordsCorporateGovernanceCorporateControlTransferTopManagementTurnoverFirmPerformanceCharacteristicsofControlTransfer_____111.11965ManneJensen1986Walsh1988MergersandAcquisitions200321.2121.32334561.11.1422.1182030BerleMeansBerle-MeansGrossman-HartManne-Jensen2.1.1TheMarketforCorporateControlHenryManne1965JensenRuback1983ManneJensenJensen/5/MannePeterHoll1977PunitiveDisciplineCorrectiveDiscipline2.1.2ManneJensen111ABBA6Marries19662JensenMeckling1976Manne1965Manne3Jensen1986FCFHJensenFreeCashFlowNPV0FCFFCFFCFJensen7JensenLeveragedBuy-outLBOLBOFCFLBOLBOManagementBuy-outMBOEmployeeBuy-outEBOEmployeeStockOwnershipPlanESOPs4Williamson1988Rule-basedGovernanceDiscretionaryGovernanceGrossmanHart1988Jensen1982Jensen5GrossmanHart2.1.3ManneMarris8Mueller1980Gilson1981Jensen1988GrossmanHart1980b123492.22.2.1Free-Rider2JensenFama1983Principal-AgentProblemTakeoverMarketMarketforCorporateControl3ProxyFightsTenderOffersTakeovers23Jensen&Ruback(1983)102.2.245619884proxy530%6112.2.31Walsh19881975-19795537%CEOPresidentEllwood19911023MartinMcConnell19881958-198425361%KennedyLimmack1996CEO68%CanellaHambrick19911980-19849649%AgrawalWalking19941980198680012.7%35.2%2Williamson1964Malatesta198312MartinMcConnell1991KennedyLimmack1996DahyaPowell1998CannellaandHambrick1993Krishnanetal.19972.2.42002199720013922003199720001662002132.31HostileTakeoverFriendlyTakeoverMorcketal.1988DahyaPowell1988MartinMcConnell1991CEO2Pitts1976UnrelatedAcquisitionsDrucker1981RelatedAcquisitionsBricketal.2003Choi1993CEOWalsh1988Horizontal14VerticalProductExtensionMarketExtensionUnrelated1533.13.1.11Roe19942ProxyVoting1/43.1.21116760%70%2200422002121720041720041200421[2004]32004926200412161%2006517182006320041234194200312Steiner19793.2203.2.11112119199956[1999]222199921212021111011983.2.21375%2322CEOCEOChiefExecutiveOfficerCEOCEOCEOCEO2003Wruck1987CEO2344.112320008CCER199920039101A21134199720041964.13230314657199920002001200220034.11999-2003a19992000200120022003b50475168762921817202219963230314657196ab(1)-(3)8MartinMcConnell1991CorporatePerformanceCorporateTakeovers,andManagementTurnover9CCER10DenisSerrano1996112422ROAROAROAROAWindAnnualReports5221914.2120022003H1252Warner1988BonnierBruner1989Weisbach1988Sant1988H24.34.3.11PERROAROA=/ROAROA_adj2DUAL//10PattonBaker1987KesnerDalton19873AGEWeisbach1988MurphyZimmerman1993GoyalPark2002264TENUREAllgoodFarrell200060TIR/59606112104.3.2Turnover13104.3.35141PRICE=1PRICE=02PART=1PART=03PRI=1PRI=0154CROSS=0CROSS=15SWICH=1SWICH=04.21219993919998605513//142003152003274.2PER-11ROAROAPER=ROAROA-1PER=ROA_adjROA-1_adjROA=/PER-22PER=ROAROA-2PER=ROA_adjROA-2_adjDUAL//10AGE/TENURE/TIR/59606110Turnover10PRICE10PART10PRI10CROSS10SWITCH104.41TTTTOne-SampleTTestTT2T2IndependentSampleTTest28WilcoxonWilcoxon3LogisticsLogisticsLogisticsLogistics4-14-1P=Logistics4-24-74-24-34-44-54-612345()1()PTurnoverLnPERDUALAGETENURETIRPTurnoverβββββε=∂+×+×+×+×+×+−123456()1()PTurnoverLnPRICEPERDUALAGETENURETIRPTurnoverββ