横向兼并_福利增进与反垄断政策

[],:(),,,,(),,[];;;:(1986),,(,300071):,,2007,200881,,200892009318,,,,:,,,1982,(),,:(MarketShare)(IndustryConcentration)582009/12261(1),n,ixi,Xxi/X(2)(Herfindahl-HischmanIndex),:HHI=Ni=1(xiX)2,,:HHI=1Ni=1(xiX)2HHI,()GeorgeStigler1950,(),Willianson[1](18-36)Harberger,,,McafeeWilliams[2](181-187),,,McafeeJosephFarrellCarlShapiro[3](107-126)),:,,,,()(),,,,:,;,,,,(),:(1),2009/1226159,()(),(2),,,(),:,(3),,,,,,:(1),(2),()n,XX,p,p0,ixi,iyi,yi=jixj=X-xi,,i:i(xi,yi)=p(xi+yi)xi-ci(xi),i,9i(xi,yi)/9xi=0:p(X)+xip(X)-ci(xi)=0,i=1,,n(1)isi=xi/X,:E=-Xp(X)/p(X)E1,Xp(X)+p(X)0,ci(xi)p,,ixiFX()11,(),:,12X^,602009/12261x^1,x^212,x^1Ex^20,,,,,,:(X^-x^1-x^2)cM,M,xM,,9M/9xM=0,,xM=x^1+x^2,,:9M/9xM|xM=x^1+x^20,12,:cM(x^1+x^2)c1(x^1)(2)(2),,,(x^1+x^2),121:,,21,,,,?Joseph,,,,,(I),ixi,XI=iIxi:W=p(X)x(p)dp+i|I[p(X)xi-c(xi)](3),p(X)x(p)dp,i|I[p(X)xi-c(xi)]dW0,,:sIF-i|Isi(dxidX)(4),p(X)=a-XK,:x=ALK,,==12,w=12,-dxidx=si/,,(4):sIF1i|I(si)2,,dW0,3:,HHI,2009/1226161,,,,2009318,,?9,,,2005,,60%,,,,,,,HHI,1,HHI=Ni=1(xiX)221(%)815016114511141307114101486120217121131100914326156:://news1xinhuanet1com21118%815%2013%HHIHHIHHI114(140)3152(352)5152(552),,HHI352552,1000HHIE500,,(3),,622009/12261,,,,4(2008)2:1i|I(si)2=14114=0135,sI=01203,sIF1i|I(si)2,,,HHI,dWE0,,,3HHIHHIHHIE30003000HHIE18001800HHIE14001400HHIE1000HHI1000HHI500500HHI,,,,,:(1),,()(2),,(3),,1/40,,,,2009/1226163,,,,,,,,,,,,:[1]Williamson1Economiesasanantitrustdefense:thewelfaretradeoffs1AmericanEconomicReview,1968,58.[2]McAfeeRP,WilliamsMA1Horizontalmergersandantitrustpolicy1TheJournalofIndustrialEconomics,1992,11(2).[3]JosephFarrell,CarlShapiro1HorizontalMergers:AnEquilibriumAnalysis1TheAmericanEconomicReview,Vol180.HorizontalMerger,WelfarePromotionandAntitrustPolicyLiuDayongAbstract:Therearetwoimportantindexeswhicharemarketshareandindustrialconcentrationincheckupofantitrustforhorizontalmergersofenterprises.Thispapersummedupthethreeantitrustcriterions(welfarecriterion)ofhorizontalmergersintotwosituations:welfarepromotionbylowerpricesandbyraisingthetotalsurplus.Inthethirdandfourthsectionthispaperseparatelyestablishesequilibriumwelfaremodeltoanalyzetheconditionsoftheenterpriseandmarketinaccordancewiththetwoformersituationsofwelfarepromotion.Fromtheconditionthispapergainscriterioninordertomoredefinitelydeterminetheresultofantitrust.ThispaperalsoanalyzesthefirstandonlycasewiththefailureaftertheimplementationofChinasAntimonopolyLaw(mergerofCoca-ColaandHuainan).Basedontheresultsofthecasestudy,theantitrustactualityinChinaandthemodelanalysis,thispaperbringsforwardsomepiecesofrelativeadvice.Keywords:Antitrust;HorizontalMergers;IndustrialConcentration;Surplus[:200911019:][]F271[]A[]1000-8306(2009)12-0058-07642009/12261