商业银行内部控制制度研究

-1-20902090-2--3-Abstract-4-Seriousfinancialcrisisbrokeoutsuccessivelyinmanycountriesin1990’s.Theultimatecauseofthecrisisliesinthedefectsinbanksystemofthesecountries,ofwhichthemostprincipaloneisthefaultinessintheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsincommercialbanking.Thispapermakestheoreticalanddemonstrativeanalysisnotonlyontheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsincommercialbanking,butalsoontheestablishmentandconsummationoftheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsinstate-ownedcommercialbanksinChina.Thispaperconsistsoffourchapters.Chapteronegivesabriefstatementonthegreatfinancialcrisisin1990’sandthenindicatesthetheoreticalandpracticalsignificanceofresearchingtheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsincommercialbanking.InChaptertwotheauthordiscussesthedefinitionandbasiccontentoftheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsincommercialbankingandtheideasandprinciplesoftheinternalcontrolsintheBasleAgreement.Thentheauthormakesanalysisonthecauseofthefinancialcrisisbymeansofinformationeconomicstheory.Whydoesthefaultinessintheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsincommercialbankingcausethefinancialcrisisattheroot?Itismainlybecausethecommercialbanksareliabletobeinfluencedbytheriskfactorcausedbyinformationimperfection.Thiskindofinformationimperfectionconsistsoftwokindsofsituation,symmetryinformationanddissymmetryinformation.Dissymmetryinformationhasagreatimportantsenseindeterminingtheinherentfrangibility.Dissymmetryinformationleadstoadverseselectionbeforethefinancialtransaction,whileitleadsto“moralhazard”afterthefinancialtransaction.Thepremiseofthe“adverseselection”isthatthebankandtheenterpriseareintheinformationdissymmetrystateintheriskofinvestmentbeforethefinancialbusiness,whilethe“moralhazard”iscausedbytheprivateinformation.Thusitcanbeconcludedthattheinformationimperfectionisthekeyfactortobankcrisis.Inordertosolvethisinformationimperfectionandmakeupforthebank’sinherentfrangibilityindealingwiththecreditrisk,itisindispensableforthebanktocarryoutsupervision.Bank’ssupervisioncomprisesexternalsupervisionandinternalcontrol.Althoughexternalsupervisionismorepowerfulthaninternal-5-control,butfavorableinternalcontrolcantakemoreprofoundandenduringeffectthanexternalsupervision,andsoitbecomesthefoundationoftheexternalsupervision.Therefore,“internalcontrolfirst”shouldbecomeafundamentalprincipleofthecommercialbank’smanagement.Inasense,thetimesthatbankobtainedthelivingrightandcompetingstatusbydependingonthebindingandprotectingofthestatesupervisingdepartmenthadbeenover.Ithasbecomethepremierandfundamentalconditioninwhichabankexistsanddevelopsthatweshouldenvisagetheincreasingriskandstrengtheninternalcontrol.Thedemonstrationanalysisonthefaultinessoftheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsincommercialbankingoftheconcerningcountriesshowsthattheradicalcauseoftheirbankscrisisliesinthefaultinessoftheinstitutionofinternalcontrols.InChapterthree,atfirsttheauthordiscussestheinstitutionalcharacteristicsofthestate-ownedcommercialbanksofChinaThatis,itisstate-owned,mainlyservesthestate-ownedenterprises,andundertakesthetasktomakeprofitforthecountryandalsohasthefunctionofpartlymacro-control.Secondly,theauthorrecallsbrieflytheestablishingcourseoftheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsinthestate-ownedcommercialbanking,andindicatedtheprincipalproblemsintheinstitutionofinternalcontrolsinthestate-ownedcommercialbanksnowadays.Theseproblemsmainlyincludetheambiguoustargetoftheinternalcontrol,theweakerfunctionofthemainbodyofinternalcontrol,andunjustifiablesettingofthebankinginternalstructure.Therootoftheseproblemsisthedefectsintheinstitutionofthepropertyrightofthestate-ownedcommercialbanks.Theinstitutionofinternalcontrolswouldhavenotbeenfoundedandbeenhealthfulwithoutthisproblemsolved.InChapterfour,theauthoranalysesthenecessityofthereformoftheinstitutionofthepropertyrightinourstate-ownedcommercialbanksaccordingtomodernpropertyrighttheory.Inpropertyrighttheory,weathertheconfinesofpropertyrightisdistinctdeterminesthevalidityofthemarketdealingandthelocationofresource,Thesymmetryoftherightandrisk-dutyintheinstitutionofpropertyrightistherequiredbythevalidityofsupervision.Therefore,asthecommercialbankactsforthefundamentalstructureofmodernfinancialsystemand-6-afinancialenterprise,itscoreofthestructureandsystemisstilltherelationshipandarrangementofpropertyright.Thatistosay,therelationshipandarrangementofpropertyrightradicallyprescribedecisionstructure,administrativestructure,encouragingmechanismandconstraintmechanismofthecommercialbanks,thusprescribethetargetandtheformoftheactionofcommercialbanks,andmeanwhilehaveaprofoundinfluenceontheoperatingefficiencyofthecommercialbanks.Thefirstreasonis,sincethemoneyinthefinancialfieldisakindofrareresource,atthesametimepeopleareconfrontedwithcollisionandcoordinationinbenefitinthecourseofusingfinancialresource,soitisprovedtobenecessarytosetandarrangeproperlythefinancialpropertyright.Thesecondreasonisthatasakindofsystematicalorganization,thecommercialbankisessentiallyawayofpropertyrightdealingandindenturearrangement.Thedifferentarrangementorstructureofpropertyrightcertainlyprescribesdifferentrelat