资本结构

TheEngineeringEconomist,53:173–196,2008Copyright©2008InstituteofIndustrialEngineersISSN:0013-791Xprint/1547-2701onlineDOI:10.1080/00137910802262887OPERATIONALDECISIONS,CAPITALSTRUCTURE,ANDMANAGERIALCOMPENSATION:ANEWSVENDORPERSPECTIVEXiaodongXu1andJohnR.Birge21DeutscheAssetManagement,NewYork,NewYork,USA2TheUniversityofChicagoGraduateSchoolofBusiness,Chicago,Illinois,USAWhilefirmgrowthcriticallydependsonfinancingabilityandaccesstoex-ternalcapital,theoperationsmanagementandengineeringeconomicslit-eratureseldomconsiderstheeffectsoffinancialconstraintsonthefirms’operationaldecisions.Anothercriticalassumptionintraditionalopera-tionsmodelsisthatcorporatemanagersalwaysactinthefirmowners’bestinterests.Managersare,however,agentsoftheownersofthecom-pany,whoseinterestsareoftennotalignedwiththoseofequityholdersordebtholders;hence,managersmaymakemajordecisionsthataresuboptimalfromthefirmowners’pointofview.Thisarticlebuildsonanewsvendormodeltomakeoptimalproductiondecisionsinthepres-enceoffinancialconstraintsandmanagerialincentives.Weexploretherelationshipbetweenoperatingconditionsandfinancialleverageandob-servethatfinancialleveragecanincreaseasmarginsreacheitherloworhighextremes.Wealsoprovidesomeempiricalsupportforthisobserva-tion.Wefurtherextendourmodeltoconsidertheeffectsofagencycostsonthefirm’sproductiondecisionanddebtchoicebyincludingperformance-basedbonusesinthemanager’scompensation.Ouranalysesshowhowmanagerialincentivesmaydriveamanagertodeviatefromfirm-optimaldecisionsandthatlow-marginproducersfacesignificantriskfromthisagencycostwhilehigh-marginproducersfacerelativelylowriskinusingsuchcompensation.AddresscorrespondencetoJohnBirge,GraduateSchoolofBusiness,5807SouthWoodlawnAvenue,Chicago,IL60637.E-mail:[e-mail]ationsmanagementandengineeringeconomicsliteraturehaslargelyignoredcorporatefinancingdecisionsontheassumptionthatafirm’soptimalinventorylevelorproductiondecisionscanbefullyfinancedbyinternalcapitalorinthecapitalmarketwithoutaffectingtheoperationaldecision.Inreality,firmsfacefinancialconstraints;theirdevelopmentheavilydependsondebtissues,bankloans,venturecapital,orotherexternalequityinvestmentsthatmayhaveavarietyofcostsdue,forexample,todirectsourcessuchasfeesandindirectcostssuchasfinancialdistress.Anothercriticalassumptionintraditionalmodelsisthatthefirm’smanageralwaysactsintheshareholders’sbestinterest.Corporatemanagersmay,however,deviatefromvalue-maximizingoperationalandfinancingdecisionsandpursuetheirownself-interests;hence,ignoringtheeffectsoffinancialconstraintsandagencycostscreatesagapbetweentheoreticalresearchandindustrialreality.Inthisarticle,webuildonpreviouswork(XuandBirge2004)thatstudiedtheinteractivemechanismbetweenafirm’sproductiondecisionanditscapitalstructurechoice.Wewillreviewthatanalysisandconsidertheeffectofdifferentoperatingconditionsoncapitalstructure,includingsomeempiricalsupportofourpredictedrelationshipbetweenproductionmarginandmarketleverage.Wewillthenextendourmodeltoincorporatetheinterestconflictbetweencorporatemanagersandowners.Ourresultsshowtherelevanceoftheseagencyeffectsfortraditionalengineeringeconomicdecisions,suchasthescaleofproductionoperations.Webelievethattheseresultsaresignificantandrelativeenoughtowarrantinclusioninindustrialengineeringcurricula.Althoughfewresearchersintheoperationsmanagementcommunityhaveincorporatedfinancialconsiderationsintoinventoryorproductiondecisions,anextensiveliteratureconsidersquestionsininventorycontrol,capacityexpansion,andsupplychainmanagement.Thevastmajorityofmodelsforthesedecisionsassumethatthefirmcanalwaysfinanceitsopti-malproductionorinventorylevelwithoutconsideringfinancialconstraints.Inreality,manyfirmsfacefinancialconstraintsandcriticallydependonexternalcapital.Debt,forexample,iscommonplaceacrossallfirms.Ac-cordingtodataonallpubliclyheldU.S.firms(Damodaran2004),theaveragedebt-to–marketvalueleverageratiois27.28%,whilethedebt-to–bookvalueleverageratioisevenhigherat52.53%oftotalcompanyvalue.TheFederalReserveBank(2004)alsoreportsthatthetotalamountofnetbondsissuedbydomesticcorporationswas$608billionin2003,andthetotalamountofbusinessloansofallcommercialbankswas$880billionbyJune2004.OperationalDecisions175Whilefinancialeconomistshavelongconsideredtheeffectsofcap-italstructureonfirmvaluation,theyusuallyassumethatinvestmentorproductiondecisionsareexogenouslydetermined.TheseminalworkbyModiglianiandMiller(MM)(1958)providedsomejustificationbyshow-ingthatafirm’svalueisindependentofitscapitalstructureinaperfectcapitalmarket.MMtheorydirectlyleadstotheseparationbetweenafirm’soperationalandfinancialdecisions.Duetomarketimperfections,suchastaxes,agencycosts,andasymmetricinformation,however,thechoiceofafirm’scapitalstructuremayinfactbecloselyrelatedtoitsproductiondecisions.Threemajortheoriesaddressmarketimperfectionsinthecapitalstruc-turecategory.AccordingtoModiglianiandMiller’straditionaltrade-offmodel(1963),thechiefbenefitofdebtisthetaxadvantageofinterestdeductibility,whiletheprimarycostsarethoseassociatedwithfinancialdistressandpersonaltaxexpe