资产专用性与经济组织

InternationalJournalofIndustrialOrganization3(1985)365-378.North-HollandASSETSPECIFICITYANDECONO_MICORGANIZATION*MichaelH.RIORDANStanfordUniversity,Stanford,CA94305,USAOliverE.WILLIAMSONYaleU~dversity,NewHaven,CT06520,USAFinalt,ersionreceivedMay1985Thispaperexaminestheoptimizationproblemoffirmandmarketorganizationinwhichbothproductioncostandtransactioncostdifferencesareexpressedasafunctionofassetspecificity.Ingeneral,marketsenjoyadvantagesbyaggregatingthedemandsofmanybuyers,therebyrealinngeconomiesofscaleorscope.Suchproductioncostsavingsneedtobeassessedinrelationtothetransactioncostadvantagesthatinternalorganizationsometimesenjoysovermarketsinadaptingtochangedcircumstances.Asitturnsout,bothproductioncosteconomiesandthetransactioncostdifferencesbetweenfirmandmarketorganizationvarysystematicallywiththecharacteristicsoftheinvestments.Thispaperemploysaunifiedframeworktoassessthechoiceoforganizationform.Theconditionofassetspecificityisfeatured.1.IntroductionTransactioncosteconomicsregardsthetransactionasthebasicunitofanalysisandholdsthattheorganizationofeconomicactivityislargelytobeunderstoodintransactioncosteconomizingterms.Sucheconomiesarerealizedbyaligninggovernancestructures(ofwhichfirmsandmarketsaretheleadingtypes)withtheattributesoftransactionsinadiscriminatingway.Technologicalfeaturesofeconomicorganizationarethusrelegatedtoasecondaryrolebythisapproach.Gi~,enthatsuccessivestagesofeconomicactivityaretechnologicallyseparable,howough~,thetradinginterfacetobeorganized?Verticalintegration-or,inmoremundaneterms,the'make-or-buy'decision-istheparadigmprobk~m.Transactioncosteconomicsmaintainsthattheresolutionofthisissueturnsontheattributesofthe*TheauthorsareAssistantProfessorofEconomics,StanfordUniversityandGordonB.TweedyProfessorofEconomicsofLawandOrsanization.YaleUniversity,respectively.HelpfulcommentsfromAvinashDixit,DavidSappington,RichardSchmalensee,PabloSpillerandanonymousrefereesaregratefullyacknowledged.0167-7187/85/$3.30©1985,ElsevierSciencePublishersB.V.(North-Holland)366M.H.RiordanandOE.William~on,~.,~etspecificityandeconomicorganizationtransaction,ofwhichtheconditionofassctspecificityisthemostimportant)Avarietyofrelatedandsomeratherdistantcontractualrelationsturnsouttobevariationsonthissameunderlyingtheme.2Thisisgratifyingsince,asFriedrichHayek(1967,p.50)observed,'wheneverthecapacityofrecognizinganabstractrulewhichthearrangementoftheseattributesfollowshasbeenacquiredinonefield,thesamemastermouldwillapplywhenthesignsforthoseabstractattributesareevokedbyaltogetherdifferentelements'.Althoughthistransactioncostapproachtocontra,'inghasbeengainingwideracceptance,3itisnotnowanddoesnotthreatentobecometheneworthodoxy.Even,moreover,amongthosewhoarepersuadedthatatrans-actioncostorientationisneededtogetatthecoreissuesofcomparativeeconomicorganization,thereissomediscomfitwiththeapparentdisjunctionbetweenneoclassicalandtransactioncostmodesofeconomicanalysiswherethcformcremphasizesproductioncostsandviewsthefirmasaproductionfunction,whilethelatterfocusesontransactioncostsandregardsthefirmasagovernancestructare.Bothapproaches,however,maintainaneconomizingorientation.Andplainlyproductionandtransactioncostsbothneedtobetakenintoaccountinanyefforttorealizeabroadlyconccivedeconomizingresult.Thispaperisanefforttopullthesetwocostcategoriestogetherinacommonframework.Itishighlypreliminary,inthatwe(1)dealonlywithpolaralternatives,namelyncoclassicalmarketsandhierarchicalfirmsofverystylizedkinds,(2)lookatonlyonetransactionatatime,and(3)employareducedformtypeofanalysis,inthatweascriberathertbanderivethebasicproductionandgovernancecostcompctenciesoffirmsandmarkets.4Thepapermainlyconfirmsimplicationsthathavebeenadvancedearlierusingmoreheuristicarguments.Inthissense,thcrearefewsurprises-thoughthismaybeasurprisetothosewhoholddifferentpriors.Surprisesor1Theargumentisadvancedandassessedinthetheoretical,empirical,andpubl.~cpolicyliteraturesinwhichtransactioncosteconomicsisfeatured.ThetheoryissetoutinWilliamson(1971,1975,1979,1983,1985),Kleinetal.(1978),Masten(1982),andAlchian(1984).CorroboratingevidenceisdevelopedinStuckey(1983),MonteverdeandTeece(1982),Palay(1984,1985),Masten(1984),WalkerandWeber(1984),AndersonandSchmittlein(1984),andJoskow(1985).ApplicationstopublicpolicyincludeWilliamson(1976,1982),andJoskowandSchmalensee(1983).2Variationsonthebasictransactioncosteconomizingthemeincludeapplicationstolabormarketorganization,verticalrestrictionsofvariouskinds,franchising,reciprocaltrading(includingproductexchangeagreements),regulation,corporategovernance,andevenfamilyorganization.ThisitotistreatedbyBen-Porath(1980)andPollak(1985).TheothersarediscussedinWilliamson(1983).aAIchian,whoonceheldotherwise,nowagreesthatassetspecificity!.~thekeyconditiononwhichthestudyoffirmandmarketorganizationturns(1984,pp.38-39).Therecenttreatmentofverticalinteg'ationbyGrossmanandHart(1984)alsoassumesaconditionofassetspecificity.*ItisthusakintoM~sten'searliertreatmentofthesematters(l'.~z).Whileouranalysisismoreexpansive,histreatmentand~ur,;bothemployreducedform