Public Diplomacy

JournalofAmerican-EastAsianRelations17(2010)35–55©KoninklijkeBrillNV,Leiden,2010DOI10.1163/187656110X523708brill.nl/jaerChina’s“PublicDiplomacy”towardtheUnitedStatesbeforePearlHarborTsuchidaAkioChuoUniversityEmail:[e-mail]akofSino-JapaneseWarin1937,ChinasoughtsupportandsanctionsagainstJapanfromtheinternationalcommunity,especiallytheUnitedStates.Thegovernmentstrategyencompassedbothofficialdiplomaticchannelsandnon-statechannelssuchaspropagandaandprivateorganizations.DrawingfrommaterialsintheUnitedStatesandChina,thisarticlepresentstheevolutionofChina’s“publicdiplomacy”towardtheUnitedStatesduringtheearlyyearsoftheSino-JapaneseWar.Itargues:(1)China’s“publicdiplomacy”wasconductedthroughtheInternationalDepartmentofMinistryofInformationoftheChineseNationalistPartyunderthedirectcontrolofChiangKai-shek.(2)ResidentagentsofChinaplayedanindispensableroleinformingtheAmericanCommitteeforNon-ParticipationinJapaneseAggression,aprivateorganizationsupportingChina’scause.(3)TheCommitteecarriedoutintensivecampaignstobringaboutpro-ChinapoliciesandtopromoteanembargoagainstJapan.(4)TheChinesegovernmentanditsagentssupportedtheCommitteefinanciallyandorganizationallyuntilitsdisbandmentin1941.ThisarticlethusdemonstratesthatwartimeChinawasattemptingtocompensateforitsmilitaryweaknessbymanipulatingAmericanpublicopiniontoachieveitsowndiplomaticgoals.KeywordsPublicdiplomacy,Non-statediplomacy,Sino-JapaneseWar,propaganda,ChineseNationalistParty(GMD),ChiangKai-shek,AmericanCommitteeforNon-ParticipationinJapaneseAggressionJapanenjoyedconsiderablesympathyfromtheWesternpowersinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesbutsufferedinternationalcriticismandbecameincreasinglyisolatedaftertheManchurianIncidentof1931.Incontrast,China,whichhadbeenisolatedandevendespised,cametowinwidespreadsympathyfrominternationalpublicopinionduringtheSino-JapaneseWar.Ofcourse,supportbyinternationalpublicopinionwasdiffer-entfromdiplomaticsupportfromtheLeagueofNationsortangiblemilitaryandeconomicassistancesuchasthatsuppliedtoChinabytheSovietUnion.36TsuchidaAkio/JournalofAmerican-EastAsianRelations17(2010)35–55After1937,ChiangKai-shekturnedtohiswife,herfamily,andthemanyotherreturnedstudentswhohadstudiedintheUnitedStatestomakethemostofthisbackingfrominternationalpublicopinionandelicitAmericanmaterialsupportandsanctionsagainstJapan.TheypromotedorganizationsaswidelyvariedastheChinabranchoftheInternationalPeaceCampaign,aninternationalanti-warleaguefoundedin1936;theChinaDefenseLeague,organizedbyMadameChiang’ssister,SongQingling,inHongKong;andtheChineseIndustrialCooperatives,officiallysponsoredbyH.H.Kung(KongXiangxi),Chiang’sbrother-in-law.1Thiscampaign,whichaimedtoelicitsupportfromtheinternationalcom-munityinfavorofChinathroughprivatechannels,wascalledguominwaijiao.Althoughitsliterarytranslationis“national”or“people’s”diplomacy,theusageinwartimeChinawasveryakintowhatisnowcalled“publicdiplo-macy,”alsocloselyrelatedtotherecentconceptof“softpower.”Dominantinternationalplayerstreat“softpower”asbothacomplementandalternativetomilitaryandeconomicforce,butChina’spublicdiplomacyinthisperiodwasineffectthediplomacyofweakness.AttheVersaillesConferenceof1919,theChinesedelegationwasvirtuallyignored.Thepro-testsonMayFourthofthatyearledtoyearsofnationalpopularmovementswhichsupportedthegovernment’spolicyofresistancetoJapanbutalsocon-strainedorundermineditsdiplomacywithnationalistfervor.DuringtheSino-JapaneseWar,1937-41,publicdiplomacyalsoinvolvedgovernmentalpropagandaoperationsaimedatthepeoplesofothercountriesandatthefacilitationofthegovernment’sdiplomacythroughprivateandsometimessecretroutes.2Using“publicdiplomacy”inthelattersense,IwillanalyzeandexamineChina’spropagandacampaignaimedattheAmericanpeopleandthecorre-spondingmovementintheUnitedStatesseekingsupportforChinaandsanctionsagainstJapan.InparticularIwillfocusontheformationandactivi-tiesoftheAmericanCommitteeforNon-ParticipationinJapaneseAggression,1ShenQinglin,Zhongguokangzhanshiqideguojiyuanzhu(InternationalassistanceforChinaduringthewarofresistance)(Shanghai:Shanghairenminchubanshe,2000);KikuchiKazutaka,Chūgokukōgyōgassakuundōshinokenkyū(AhistoryoftheChineseIndustrialCooperativeMovement)(Tokyo:KyūkoShoin,2002).2Ontheconceptof“guominwaijiao,”seeZhengYanfen,“Guanyuguominwaijiao”(Onpublicdiplomacy),Fan-qinlüe(Anti-aggression)1(1939).ForChiangKai-shek’ssuccessfuldevelopmentofwarmrelationswiththeIndiannationalistmovement,seeAvinashMohanSaklani,“Nehru,ChiangKai-ShekandtheSecondWorldWar,”inMadhaviThampi,ed.,IndiaandChinaintheColonialWorld(NewDelhi:SocialSciencePress,2005).TsuchidaAkio/JournalofAmerican-EastAsianRelations17(2010)35–5537duringthefirsthalfoftheSino-JapaneseWar,theperiodbeforePearlHarbor.ThisChinese“publicdiplomacy”wasnotformaldiplomacycarriedoutbythenationalgovernmentdirectlywiththeAmericangovernmenteventhoughitwasinitiatedandcontrolledatthehighestlevels;itwasimplementedthroughtheMinistryofInformation(Xuanchuanbu),anorganoftheCentralCommitteeoftheChineseNationalistParty(Guomindang,orGMD)andtheref