税收筹划的外文翻译

外文文献翻译2011届译文一：企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（上）译文二：企业税收筹划的有效性：基于对报酬的激励作用（下）学生姓名周伟学号07062136院系经济与管理学院专业会计指导教师许庆高完成日期2010年12月2日1CorporateTax-PlanningEffectiveness:TheRoleofCompensation-BasedIncentives(Ⅰ)JohnD.PhillipsUniversityofConnecticutABSTRACTThisstudyinvestigateswhethercompensatingchiefexecutiveofficersandbusiness-unitmanagersusingafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadstolowereffectivetaxrates,theempiricalsurrogateusedfortax-planningeffectiveness.Utilizingproprietarycompensationdataobtainedinasurveyofcorporateexecutives,therelationbetweeneffectivetaxratesandafter-taxperformancemeasuresismodeledandestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthatcorrectsfortheendogeneitybiasassociatedwithfirms'decisionstocompensatemanagersonapre-versusafter-taxbasis.Theresultsareconsistentwiththehypothesisthatcompensatingbusiness-unitmanagers,butnotchiefexecutiveofficers,onanafter-taxbasisleadstolowereffectivetaxrates.KEYWORDStaxplanning;performancemeasures;endogenoustreatmenteffects.I.INTRODUCTIONEffectivetaxplanning,definedbyScholesetal.(2002)astaxplanningthatmaximizesthefirm'sexpecteddiscountedafter-taxcashflows,requiresmanagerstoconsidertheirdecisions'after-taxconsequences.Inthispaper,Iinvestigatewhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadtolowereffectivetaxrates(ETR),myempiricalsurrogatefortaxplanningeffectiveness.1TheETR,anincome-statement-basedoutcomemeasurecalculatedastheratiooftotalincometaxexpensetopre-taxincome,generallymeasurestheeffectivenessoftaxreductionstrategiesthatleadtohigherafter-taxincome.AlowerETR,however,canonlyproxyfortaxsavingsanddoesnotalwaysimplythatafter-taxincomeand/orcashflowshavebeenmaximized.2Despitethislimitation,theETRhasbeenusedtomeasuretheeffectivenessofspendingonthetaxfunction(Millsetal.1998)andcorporatetaxdepartmentperformance(Douglasetal.1996).Also,loweringtheETRisfrequentlycitedasawaytoincreaseearnings2(e.g.,Ziegler1997)andincreaseshareprice(e.g.,Mintz1999;Swenson1999).Accountingresearchhasaddressedtherelationbetweenaccounting-basedcompensationandmanagers'actions(e.g.,Larcker1983;Healy1985;Wallace1997).Thispaperisthefirsttoaddresswhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresmotivatemanagerstotakeactionsthathelplowertheirfirms'ETRanddoessoatboththechiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)andbusiness-unit(SBU)managerlevels.Priorafter-taxperformancemeasureresearchhasfocusedonlyonthedeterminantsofcompensationCEOsusingpre-versusafter-taxearnings(e.g.,Newman1989;CarnesandGuffey2000;Atwoodetal.1998;Dhaliwaletal.2000)andprovidesnoevidenceconcerningafter-taxcompensation'seffectivenessinloweringafirm'staxliability.ExtendingthisinvestigationtotheSBUlevelismotivatedoutoftheapparentconflictbetweenargumentsthattaxesshouldbeallocatedtoSBUforincentivecompensationpurposes(e.g.,McLemore1997)withempiricalobservationsthatamajorityoffirmsdonotdoso(e.g.,Douglasetal.1996).4ThecurrentinvestigationprovidesevidenceconcerningtheincrementaleffectivenessofexplicitlymotivatingCEOsandSBUmanagerstoincorporatetaxconsequencesintotheiroperatingandinvestmentdecisions.Acommonissueincross-sectionalstudiesthatattempttolinkaparticularmanagementaccountingchoicetoanoutcomemeasureisthatallsamplefirmsmaybeoptimizingwithrespecttothechoicebeinginvestigated(IttnerandLarcker2001).Withoutaddressingtheendogeneityofafirm'schoice,itisdifficulttoprovideevidenceconsistentwiththischoiceleadingtoanimprovedoutcome.Toaddressthisissue,therelationbetweenETRandCEOandSBU-managerafter-taxperformancemeasuresisestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthathelpscorrectforthepotentialendogeneitybiasassociatedwiththesetwochoicevariables.Asafirststepinimplementingthisapproach,theAntleandDemski(1988)controllabilityprincipleisusedtomodelafirm'sdecisionstoadoptafter-taxCEOandSBU-managerperformancemeasures.Toincludeaparticularmeasureinamanager'scompensationcontract,thisprinciplerequiresthattheexpectedbenefitsfromholdingamanagerresponsibleforameasuremustbegreaterthantheadditionalwagethatmustbepaidtocompensatethemanagerfortheresultingadditionalriskandeffort.Accordingly,anafter-taxperformancemeasureshouldbeusedasacontractingvariableinamanager'sincentivecompensationcontractonlyifthemanager'sinvolvementintax-planningeffortsleadstoadifferencebetweenpre-taxandafter-taxaccountingresults,whichisgenerallyreflectedintheETR.Consistentwithpriorresearch,thepre-versusafter-taxCEOandSBU-managerselectionmodelsincludevariablesthatcontrolforafirm'stax-planningopportunitiesbecausethepresenceofsuchopportunitiesreflecttheextenttowhichamanager'sactionscanbeexpectedtolowertheETR.3Evenifamanager'seffortsareexpectedtoleadtoalowerETR,afirmwilluseanafter-taxperformancemeasureonlyiftheexpectedbenefitsexceedtheexpectedcostsofdoingso.Anafter-taxperformancemeasureisexpectedtoleadtoalowerETRbecauseitmotivatesthemanager'sincreasedcooperationwithtaxprofessionalstohelpidentify,develop,andexecutetax-planningstrategies.McLemore(1997,1)citesHewlettPackard'staxdirectortosupporttheneedforSBU-managerinvolvementintax-planningefforts:Taxplanningisonlyasgoodasbeinginvolvedintheearlystagesofsuchthingsasbusinessplannin