您好,欢迎访问三七文档
当前位置:首页 > 金融/证券 > 金融资料 > 金融市场与机构-(24)
Chapter24RiskManagementinFinancialInstitutionsMultipleChoiceQuestions1.Banksfacetheproblemof_________inloanmarketsbecausebadcreditrisksaretheonesmostlikelytoseekbankloans.(a)adverseselection(b)moralhazard(c)moralsuasion(d)intentionalfraudAnswer:A2.Ifborrowerswiththemostriskyinvestmentprojectsaremorelikelytoseekbankloansthanborrowerswiththesafestinvestmentprojects,banksfacetheproblemof(a)adversecreditrisk.(b)adverseselection.(c)moralhazard.(d)conflictofinterest.Answer:B3.Becauseborrowers,oncetheyhavealoan,aremorelikelytoinvestinhigh-riskinvestmentprojects,banksfacethe(a)adverseselectionproblem.(b)lemonproblem.(c)adversecreditriskproblem.(d)moralhazardproblem.Answer:D4.Banks’attemptstosolveadverseselectionandmoralhazardproblemshelpexplainloanmanagementprinciplessuchas(a)screeningandmonitoringofloanapplicants.(b)collateralandcompensatingbalances.(c)creditrationing.(d)alloftheabove.(e)only(a)and(b)oftheabove.Answer:D302Mishkin/Eakins•FinancialMarketsandInstitutions,FifthEdition5.Inonesense,_________appearssurprisingsinceitmeansthatthebankisnot_________itsportfolioofloansandthusisexposingitselftomorerisk.(a)specializationinlending;diversifying(b)specializationinlending;rationing(c)creditrationing;diversifying(d)screening;rationingAnswer:A6.Fromthestandpointof_________,specializationinlendingissurprisingbutmakesperfectsensewhenoneconsidersthe_________problem.(a)moralhazard;diversification(b)diversification;moralhazard(c)adverseselection;diversification(d)diversification;adverseselectionAnswer:D7.Provisionsinloancontractsthatproscribeborrowersfromengaginginspecifiedriskyactivitiesarecalled(a)proscriptionbonds.(b)collateralclauses.(c)restrictivecovenants.(d)liens.Answer:C8.Banksattempttoscreengoodfrombadcreditriskstoreducetheincidenceofloandefaults.Todothis,banks(a)specializeinlendingtocertainindustriesorregions.(b)writerestrictivecovenantsintoloancontracts.(c)expendresourcestoacquireaccuratecredithistoriesoftheirpotentialloancustomers.(d)doalloftheabove.Answer:D9.Abank’scommitment(foraspecifiedfutureperiodoftime)toprovideafirmwithloansuptoagivenamountataninterestratethatistiedtoamarketinterestrateiscalled(a)creditrationing.(b)alineofcredit.(c)continuousdealings.(d)noneoftheabove.Answer:B10.Linesofcreditandlong-termrelationshipsbetweenbanksandtheircustomers(a)reducethecostsofinformationcollection.(b)makeiteasierforbankstoscreengoodfrombadrisks.(c)enablebankstodealwithmoralhazardcontingenciesthatareneitheranticipatednorspecifiedinrestrictivecovenants.(d)doalloftheabove.(e)doonly(a)and(b)oftheabove.Chapter24RiskManagementinFinancialInstitutions303Answer:D304Mishkin/Eakins•FinancialMarketsandInstitutions,FifthEdition11.Compensatingbalances(a)areaparticularformofcollateralcommonlyrequiredoncommercialloans.(b)arearequiredminimumamountoffundsthataborrower(i.e.,afirmreceivingaloan)mustkeepinacheckingaccountatthebank.(c)allowbankstomonitorfirms’checkpaymentpracticeswhichcanyieldinformationabouttheirborrowers’financialconditions.(d)alloftheabove.Answer:D12.Abankthatwantstomonitorthecheckpaymentpracticesofitscommercialborrowers,sothatmoralhazardcanbeprevented,willrequireborrowersto(a)placeabankofficerontheirboardofdirectors.(b)placeacorporateofficeronthebank’sboardofdirectors.(c)keepcompensatingbalancesinacheckingaccountatthebank.(d)doalloftheabove.(e)doonly(a)and(b)oftheabove.Answer:C13.Ofthefollowingmethodsthatbanksmightusetoreducemoralhazardproblems,theonenotlegallypermittedintheUnitedStatesistherequirementthat(a)firmskeepcompensatingbalancesatthebanksfromwhichtheyobtaintheirloans.(b)firmsplaceontheirboardofdirectorsanofficerfromthebank.(c)loancontractsincluderestrictivecovenants.(d)individualsprovidedetailedcredithistoriestobankloanofficers.Answer:B14.Whenalenderrefusestomakealoan,althoughborrowersarewillingtopaythestatedinterestrateorevenahigherrate,itissaidtoengagein(a)constrainedlending.(b)strategicrefusal.(c)creditrationing.(d)collusivebehavior.Answer:C15.Whenalenderrefusestomakealoan,eventhoughborrowersarewillingtopaythestatedinterestrateorevenahigherrate,itissaidtoengagein(a)specializedlending.(b)strategicrefusal.(c)diversifiedlending.(d)coercivebehavior.(e)noneoftheabove.Answer:EChapter24RiskManagementinFinancialInstitutions30516.Creditrationingoccurswhenabank(a)refusestomakealoanofanyamounttoaborrower,evenwhensheiswillingtopayahigherinterestrate.(b)restrictstheamountofaloantolessthantheborrowerwouldlike.(c)doeseither(a)or(b)oftheabove.(d)doesneither(a)nor(b)oftheabove.Answer:C17.Becauselargerloanscreategreaterincentivesforborrowerstoengageinundesirableactivitiesthatmakeitlesslikelytheywillrepaytheloans,banks(a)rationcredit,grantingborrowerssmallerloansthantheyhaverequested.(b)rationcredit,charginghigherinterestratestoborrowerswhowantlargeloansthantothosewhowantsmallloans.(c)rationcredit,charginghigherfeesasapercentageoftheloantoborrowerswhowantlargeloansthantothosewhowantsmallloans.(d)dononeoftheabove.Answer:A18.Whenbanksofferborrowerssmallerloansthantheyhaverequested,banksaresaidto(a)shavecredit.(b)discountthel
本文标题:金融市场与机构-(24)
链接地址:https://www.777doc.com/doc-4569380 .html