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华东交通大学硕士学位论文控股股东掏空上市公司方式及防范对策研究姓名:蔡晓丹申请学位级别:硕士专业:会计学指导教师:黎毅20071108IAbstractIIRESEARCHONTUNNELINGFORMSUSEDBYCONTROLLINGSHAREHOLDERSANDPREVENTINGMEASURESABSTRACTThephenomenonoftunnelinglistedcompaniesbycontrollingshareholdersemergesinanendlessstreamduetotheimmaturecapitalmarketandthedefectsexistedinChina’slegalsystem.Itseriouslyharmsminorityinvestorsandeventhehealthydevelopmentofthesecuritymarket.So,itisofgreatnecessitytoinvestigateonthephenomenonoftunnelingandfigureoutsomemeasurestosolvetheproblems.Firstly,thispaperanlylizestheformsoftunnelingbyaresearchontheexsitingtunnelingphenomenon.Tunnelingformsincluderelated-partytransactions,M&Aandexcessivedividend.Amongthese,related-partytransactionsismostcommonlyusedM&Aprovidesachannelforothertunnelingmethods;Excessivedividendislessusedbecauseofitscost.Secondly,weusethetheoryoftrianglecheatingexplainsthereasonsoftunnelinghappenedinChina’slistedcompanies.Thefirstreasonismotivation,whichmeanscontrolingshareholderscanbebenifitedfromtunneling;Thesecondreasonisopportunity,whichmeanstheinstitutionhasflawsandcontrollingshareholderscanmakeuseofthem;Thethirdreasonisexcuse,whichmeansthecontrolingshareholdershavetheconfidencetocovertheillegalactandevadesthepunishment.Finanly,thepapersuggestsseveralmeasurestopreventtunnelingfromhappening,suchasperfectinglegalsystemandcapitalstructureanddevelopinginstitutionalinvestor.Perfectinglegalsystemandcapitalstructureareoftheutmostimportancetopreventtunneling.Developinginstitutionalinvestorcannotdisplayitsfunctionwithoutaflawlessinstitution.KeyWords:coporategovernance,tunneling,related-partytransactions,shareholderbalance____________________________________________________________11.12002117596720038[2003]56,20054200511200620062006600093*ST2007SSS*STS*STS*ST17(1),(2)2(3)1.2(1)(2)(3)Johnson2000[1]3-51.33Johnson2000[1]42.12.1.1tunnelingJohnson[1](2000)tunnelingtunneling2.1.22007[2]52.22.2.1gubemare,corporategovernance1995[3][4]OliverHartPhlipL.CochranStevenL.Wartick61988122.2.21principal-agencytheoryABAAprincipalB(agents)(informedplayer)(uninformedplayer)()219987residualrightsofcontrol2.32.3.1[5]2.3.2182342.42.4.191(2)2000[6]3102.4.22.52.5.1,2004[7]112.5.2Johnson[1](1)(2005)[8]1998-2001AJianWong(2003)[9](2)FaccioLangYoung(2001)[10]LeeXiao(2002)[11]ChenJian(2003)[12](2006)[13](2003)[14]121502.5.31Bertrand,2002[15]1932BerleMeans[16]200BerleMeansLerner1966DemsetzWilliamsonPuttermanMecklingFamaJensenKnightDemsetz(1983)[17]DemsetzWilliamsonPuttermanWilliamson(1985)[18]Putterman(1993)[19]KnightFamaJensen13ShleiferVishny(1997)[20]LaPorta,Lopez-de-Silanes(1998)[21]Johnson,LaPorta,Lopez-de-SilanesShleifer(2000)[1](tunneling),Claessens,Djankov,FanLang(2002)[22]92000[23]2003[24]2004MBO2001141998[25](2002)(2003)2003(2002)(2004)[26]2.5.41LaPorta1998[21]Morck2000[27]Johnson(2000)[1]15commonlawcivillawthedutyofloyalty,thedutyofcareJohnsonLaPorta2002[28]IrrIss[0,)ssrI(1s)rIa(1s)rIaJohnson2000[1]C(k,s)skkckscscCk0,Cs0,Css0Cks0ssrIC(k,s)rI(1)a(1-s)rI+srI-C(k,s)rI2srIa(1-s)rI+srI-C(k,s)rIU=a(1-s)+s-C(k,s)316sDU/S0,Us=-a+1-Cs(k,s)=04Cs(k,s)=1-a(5)4kCks(k,s)+Css(k,s)ds*/dk=0(6)ds*/dkCks(k,s)/Css(k,s)Css0Cks0ds*/dkCks(k,s)/Css(k,s)072004[29](2006)[30]LaPorta2002[28]2006[13]22003[31][33]Bai(2004)[32]2005[33]10%173Wahal(1996)[34]WebbBeckMckinnon[35](2004)[36]2004[37]200360036ShleiferVishny(1986)[20]McConnellServaesChung,FirthKim[38]()AccrualsBushee[39][40][41]2005[42](Johnson2000[1])18Johnson2000[1]3.13.1.1(1)Coase(1937)[43]20052001GCCL83.7%12220025320051819(2)2004[44]3-13-11200992STB37457833002000693*ST17052642003600187*ST7732642004000587ST7714300005600800*ST7543493006600876G617270000760060860205100080009225920000009000506*ST553120000100007995276080003-2203-21600743ST527361132000693*ST106615.793600773*ST98691.794600065*ST65490.325600700*ST64569.276600735ST36221.55760013936083.448000650*ST27790.14900092225550.41000098224487.7720062006915(3)19971224978510019050(45)(40)212007(600226)(600155)(600771)500020162004-200624.35419%9.0411.34248.24%31816.7893.07370052.02112.3734002.93000400011.34248.24%103.19700094.418.32007626(4)2220011282002142002143.6420035814.873.1.2(1)(600227)200592.2156513.33022124;100047509390319072320000005832003914PDA6323545TPMI26002005630A(000573)A(000533)(000529)(000522)(600057)(000999)(600130)(2)1999199931.295%123.9(3)24(000905)200117956900.00200214886100.0014795900.001011223.80600000.00160000.00200317130962.2017327026.201011223.8600000.00()3.23.2.12+2=52003[45]600783195019881110056.8222199038;1992920311996128682.525()1998582.51998860.74%1998112640002.0280806500.10654650199834.48%519991282%19995455.7199881655%60%22621891.5199992265060%48001312.2263.2.212005[46](2)3-320063-320060.16140.11.870.000.16275880.69700.42944477.380.02182.05965880.39280.38600.83750.05180.15005882006143458841%0.161469.70%731,5.09%,12.41ST0008874477.38%0.050.001STST27ST200120053-43-420012005ST200120022003200420050.050.050000.110.05-0.05-1.090.020.450.86000ST06ST2006STST*ST69.77%STSTLeechandLeahy1991[47]:(Majority50%);(PredominantMinority30%-50%):(SubstantialMinority1
本文标题:控股股东掏空上市公司方式及防范对策研究
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