机构股东与公司治理绩效相关性的实证研究

华中科技大学硕士学位论文机构股东与公司治理绩效相关性的实证研究姓名：吴庆红申请学位级别：硕士专业：企业管理指导教师：王宗军20060428I20802001200220032017IIAbstractAfter1980’s,theinstitutionalinvestorsofdevelopedcountriesdevelopedfasterandfaster.Theownershipstructureoflistedcompanieshaschangedfromdispersalintorelativeconcentration.Theinvestmentstrategyofinstitutionalshareholderalsochangedfrom‘armslength’into‘control-oriented’.Consequently,thischangeinducedtheuncontrolled‘Berle-Means’administratorleadingtypeconvertintoinvestorsleadingtypecontrolledbyinstitutionalshareholders.ItwascalledbyDrunkerasan‘unseenrevolution’,alsocalledasinstitutionalshareholderactivismrising.TheownershipstructureofChineselistedcompanyisirrational:lowerproportionofcirculatingsharesandlonelystate-ownedshares.Themarketlawandcodeisfault.Bothofthisbringseriousproblemonthecorporategovernance.Institutionalinvestorsofourcountryareinaflourishdevelopmentlately.Usingtheexperienceofforeigninstitutionalshareholdersinvolvingincorporategovernanceforreference,wesuggestthatthemarketintroducestheinstitutionalinvestortomakeupthespaceofreductionofstate-ownedshares.Andthusitcanoptimizeequitystructureandimproveoperatingperformanceofthelistedcompany.Sequentially,itwillmaketheconversionintotheinvestorsleadinggovernancepatternwhichresidualincomepowerandcontrolpoweraresyncreticcometrue.ThispaperfirstdiscussedthesupervisioneffectivenessofinstitutionalinvestorincorporategovernanceofChineselistedcompanies,thenanalyzedtheinherentreason,exertionmannerofChineseinstitutionalinvestorsparticipatingincorporategovernance.Thenfromtheeconomicalpoint,weuseshareseffectmodel,companynumberseffectmodelandbehaviorgamemodeltomakefurtherstudyoninstitutionalshareholdersactivismbehavior.Afterthat,thispaperexaminestherelativityofinstitutionalshareholdingsandthecorporateperformancethroughanempiricalstudyondataof2017institutionalholdinglistedcompaniesfrom20012003.Theempiricalstudyindicatesthatthereisapositiveandsignificantcorrelationbetweentheproportionofinstitutionalinvestorshareholdingsandcorporategovernanceperformance.Moreover,combingwithcasesofinstitutionalinvestorexertingshareholderactivisminlaterfiveyears,wecarryoutafurtherexemplificationontheeffectivenessofChineseinstitutionalshareholderIIIparticipatingincorporategovernance.Thecasesofinstitutionalinvestorexertingactivismby‘votewithhand’and‘relationshipinvestment’explainfullytheeffectiveofinstitutionalshareholderactivisminmonitoringcontrolshareholderandadministratorsinfractingtheinterestofmiddle-smallshareholders.Thefinalsectionbringsoutcorrespondingcountermeasuresofinstitutionalinvestorimprovingcorporategovernanceperformance.Keywords:InstitutionalInvestorsCorporateGovernanceGovernancePerformanceInstitutionalShareholderActivism_____111.1208020802020%80%20%[1]armslengthcontroloriented[2][3]1998199920012002QFII20032004212003[4]1.21.2.12Hansen1992Grave1988Pound1998123[5]BrickleyLeaseSmith1988[6]KangShivdasani1995KaplanMinton1994GillanStarks200019871994452204235%MichaelP.Smith1996[7]1987199351CALPERSBethelLiebeskindOpler1998OECDAnglo-SaxonandCEJ3TarunKhannaKrishnaPalepu1999[8]QQSukMakhijaSpiro2000988McConnellServaes(1990)[9]QQMcConnellServaes1995)[10]1990Philip,ThomasandChrisCalPERS[11]MuraliPatibandla(2006)[12]MaraFaccioandAmezianeLasfe2000[13]3%Pound19881.2.2XiaonianXuYanWang1997[14]2002[15]19982000Q199819992000Q42003[16][17]2004[18]1.2.3Pound1.3[19][20]51[21]2003[22]6[23]7822.1[24][25]120807250[26]Black1998[27]19[28][29][30][31]CalPERSCaliforniaPublicEmployeesRetirementSyetem50[32]4.2214002101992SEC[33]3[34]411[35]Smith19962.21[36]212Campbell’sSoup19.133.5Pound1998SEC(JoeGrundfest)3[37]113193419421987CREF[38]1080901994TIAA-CREF1814[39][40]22090CalPERS1992[41]TIAA-CREF[42]CalPERS1993CalPERS414[43][44]CalPERS5[45]1995152.32.3.11PaPb+C/S2-1[46]2-1PaPbCSCSC/SPaPb+C/S[47]552iiiiY'=(PP')SCC'−−(−)∑∑2-2iPiP'iiCiC'iiCC'−∑i16iSiY'2-2iiCC'−∑Y'3[48]3-13-1ABCBAA17A2080CCC1LAC2C3BCL’S1S2S3S2-1SCX1Y1X2Y2X3Y3LL’2.3.21[49]18828713-125-13-15-15171003-222P0PaCQ3-33-21-1-11-12-1100SQaaPS-CPQ-CiiaaPSPQ-Ciia0PS-CPSiia0PQ-CPQii19Olson1963Downs19573-3aPS-CiaPQ-CiaPS-CiaPQiaPSiaPQ-Ci0PSi0PQi2)3-4121212C2004[50]203-42a1PS-Cia2PS-Cia1PS-Cia2PSi1a1PSia2PS-Ci01PSi02PSi2133.11232005[51]43.2122ROEqTobin’sqMarket/BookROE2000[52]qM/BqqqSmithWatts1992q[53]12q1q2ChenandXiong(2002)7080801q×++3-12q×++3-2Market/BookqM/B1×++3-3M/B2×++3-4223Inst_r=(++++)/3-53ChowandWongBorenl1987Brabury1992Meeketal.19953-13-1Tobin'sq_1Tobin'sq_2M/B1M/B2Inst_rTop_1Circul_rLn_assetDebt_rHerfTIki12Yearjj12YearjYear12002Year2200320012002Year11Year102003Year210TIk24TI1TI2TI110TI2103.312020012002200320011HNHNAA2PTST3254q1-1201732CCER12WindSPSS11.5forWindows()2644.14-14-11qq11.01710.5063-0.134.42q2q2_80M/B11.46520.4525M/B2M/B2_8021/251/19Inst_r2.35%3.36%0.0011%28.82%350%Herf44-1q12017-0.13274.41821.01710.5063q22017-0.738811.16471.83661.2072q2_802017-0.64439.50061.60491.0476M/B120170.38095.01681.46520.4525M/B22017-0.029112.00482.28541.1604M/B2_8020170.065410.34082.05371.0035Inst_r%20170.001158.82512.35033.3647Top_1%20176.140084.980047.074117.2496Cir