平狄克微观经济学课件(英文)17

Fernando&YvonnQuijanoPreparedby:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation17CHAPTERCopyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation2of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.CHAPTER17OUTLINE17.1QualityUncertaintyandtheMarketforLemons17.2MarketSignaling17.3MoralHazard17.4ThePrincipal–AgentProblem17.5ManagerialIncentivesinanIntegratedFirm17.6AsymmetricInformationinLaborMarkets:EfficiencyWageTheoryChapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation3of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1●asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCarsFigure17.1Whensellersofproductshavebetterinformationaboutproductqualitythanbuyers,a“lemonsproblem”mayariseinwhichlow-qualitygoodsdriveouthighqualitygoods.In(a)thedemandcurveforhigh-qualitycarsisDH.However,asbuyerslowertheirexpectationsabouttheaveragequalityofcarsonthemarket,theirperceiveddemandshiftstoDM.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation4of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsTheMarketforUsedCars(continued)Figure17.1Likewise,in(b)theperceiveddemandcurveforlow-qualitycarsshiftsfromDLtoDM.Asaresult,thequantityofhigh-qualitycarssoldfallsfrom50,000to25,000,andthequantityoflow-qualitycarssoldincreasesfrom50,000to75,000.Eventually,onlylowqualitycarsaresold.●asymmetricinformationSituationinwhichabuyerandasellerpossessdifferentinformationaboutatransaction.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation5of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheMarketforUsedCarsThelemonsproblem:Withasymmetricinformation,low-qualitygoodscandrivehigh-qualitygoodsoutofthemarket.ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationAdverseSelection●adverseselectionFormofmarketfailureresultingwhenproductsofdifferentqualitiesaresoldatasinglepricebecauseofasymmetricinformation,sothattoomuchofthelow-qualityproductandtoolittleofthehigh-qualityproductaresold.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation6of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1ImplicationsofAsymmetricInformationTheMarketforInsuranceTheMarketforCreditPeoplewhobuyinsuranceknowmuchmoreabouttheirgeneralhealththananyinsurancecompanycanhopetoknow,evenifitinsistsonamedicalexamination.Asaresult,adverseselectionarises,muchasitdoesinthemarketforusedcars.Creditcardcompaniesandbankscan,tosomeextent,usecomputerizedcredithistories,whichtheyoftensharewithoneanother,todistinguishlow-qualityfromhigh-qualityborrowers.Manypeople,however,thinkthatcomputerizedcredithistoriesinvadetheirprivacy.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation7of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1TheImportanceofReputationandStandardizationAsymmetricinformationisalsopresentinmanyothermarkets.Herearejustafewexamples:●Retailstores:Willthestorerepairorallowyoutoreturnadefectiveproduct?●Dealersofrarestamps,coins,books,andpaintings:Aretheitemsrealorcounterfeit?●Roofers,plumbers,andelectricians:Whenarooferrepairsorrenovatestheroofofyourhouse,doyouclimbuptocheckthequalityofthework?●Restaurants:Howoftendoyougointothekitchentocheckifthechefisusingfreshingredientsandobeyinghealthlaws?Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation8of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.QUALITYUNCERTAINTYANDTHEMARKETFORLEMONS17.1Asymmetricinformationisprominentinthefree-agentmarket.Onepotentialpurchaser,theplayer’soriginalteam,hasbetterinformationabouttheplayer’sabilitiesthanotherteamshave.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation9of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2●marketsignalingProcessbywhichsellerssendsignalstobuyersconveyinginformationaboutproductquality.Tobestrong,asignalmustbeeasierforhigh-productivitypeopletogivethanforlow-productivitypeopletogive,sothathigh-productivitypeoplearemorelikelytogiveit.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation10of28Copyright©2009PearsonEducation,Inc.PublishingasPrenticeHall•Microeconomics•Pindyck/Rubinfeld,7e.MARKETSIGNALING17.2ASimpleModelofJobMarketSignalingEquilibriumSignalingFigure17.2Educationcanbeausefulsignalofthehighproductivityofagroupofworkersifeducationiseasiertoobtainforthisgroupthanforalow-productivitygroup.In(a),thelow-productivitygroupwillchooseaneducationlevelofy=0becausethecostofeducationisgreaterthantheincreasedearningsresultingfromeducation.Chapter17:MarketswithAsymmetricInformation11of28Copyright©2009