上市公司独立董事数量_大股东间的博弈均衡点

20101178JOURNALOFZHONGNANUNIVERSITYOFECONOMICSANDLAW.1.2010BimonthlySerial.178上市公司独立董事数量:大股东间的博弈均衡点李宇立(中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081;新疆财经大学会计学院,新疆乌鲁木齐830011):,,20052008A:,logistic,,:;;:F830.9:A:10035230(2010)01013205!,!,,20037,!,:(,),(,),!,,(),LefortUrza,,,[1]MakYuanLi,[2],[3],,,[4],:20091026:李宇立(1976∀),女,河北藁城人,中央财经大学会计学院博士生,新疆财经大学会计学院讲师132[1][5][6],,[7][8][9][10],,,!?,(!)?!?,,#∃(#∃),(20%~50%),;,,()#∃,1%!,#∃,(),,,,,,,(,),,,,,,,,,5,(,),3,,,,,,,,4,1,,,,,2,,:(1)(A),;(2)A,A(,A5,A5);(3)A=A-A;(4)A=A-A,,,:133H0:AA()20052008A%!#∃:!(&1/3)!0;0,200553,124;2008120,54,CSMARCCFR!,,()(),(A)![1][2][3][4][7],:Herfindahl_511CS:,CS=0;,CS=1(A)NSPDA:;A:A(,A5,A5);A=(A-1)-A;A=A-(A+1)TOP1STWN:,STWN=1;,STWN=0Herfindahl_5H_5MSPCEOpw:,CEOpw=1;,CEOpw=0DTALNTI()NSPD2,NSPD(Mean=1989),NSPD(Mean=3871)H0AA!,NSPD,374275392NSPDMeanNStd.DeviationMinimumMaximumKurtosisSkewness1.9891733.7420.0023.008.5332.8093.8711787.5390.0052.8818.8433.934(),NSPD,NSPDMannWhitneyUTest(3):134A(P0)3NSPDMannWhitneyUTestNMeanRankSumofRanksMannWhitneyUWilcoxonWZAsymp.Sig.(2tailed)MonteCarloSig.(1tailed)173156.7927125.5012074.50027125.500-3.4960.0000.000178194.6734650.50()Logistic,,(4):ln(p1-p)=0+1NSPD+2TOP1+3STWN+4H_5+5MSP+6CEOpw+7DTA+8LNTI+,H_5TOP1,,(,)4:NSPD(P=0006);,,(1080),HL(P=0476),,,∋,,4logisticBWaldSig.Exp(B)HosmerandLemeshowTest1.7811.3650.243NSPD0.0777.6210.0061.080TOP10.0261.0060.3161.026STWN0.6797.4500.0061.971H_5-1.8770.3760.5400.153MSP-33.7980.9780.3230.000CEOpw0.0040.0000.9911.004DTA0.2470.6050.4371.281LNTI-0.1494.5030.0340.862Chisquare7.576df8Sig.0.476,STWNLNTI(P00060034)STWN,!,,;,,!LNTI:,,[3][4](),:,,#∃()!,:;:[11],,[12],135,,,,,,,,,,,!,!:%2005~2008,20052008:,2005~2008,;,,,2005~20084,∋HL:,.Logistic:[M].:,2001:65∀67.:[1]Lefort,F.,Urza,F.BoardIndependence,FirmPerformanceandOwnershipConcentration:EvidencefromChile[J].JournalofBusinessResearch,2008,(61):615∀622.[2]Mak,Y.T.,YuanLi.DeterminantsofCorporateOwnershipandBoardStructure:EvidencefromSingapore[J].JournalofCorporateFinance,2001,(7):235∀256.[3],,.[J].,2007,(11):104∀111.[4],,.[J].,2008,(11):66∀67.[5]Dobbins,D.R.TheRelationshipbetweenGovernanceStructureandCorporatePerformanceinEntrepreneurialFirms[J].JournalofBusinessVenturing,1995,(7):375∀386.[6]Ho,C.A.,Williams,S.M.InternationalComparativeAnalysisoftheAssociationbetweenBoardStructureandtheEfficiencyofValueAddedbyaFirmfromItsPhysicalCapitalandIntellectualCapitalResources[J].TheInternationalJournalofAccounting,2003,(38):465∀491.[7].[Z].,2009.[8]Davidson,W.N.,Xie,B.,Xu,W.MarketReactiontoVoluntaryAnnouncementsofAuditCommitteeAppointments:TheEffectofFinancialExpertise[J].JournalofAccountingandPublicPolicy,2004,(23):279∀293.[9].2001~2007[J].,2008,(2):106∀108.[10],.[J].,2008,(1):113∀115.[11]Langevoort,D.C.BeyondIndependent!Directors:AFunctionalApproachtoBoardIndependence[J].HarvardLawReview,2006,(119):1553∀1575.[12].:[J].,2005,(2):39∀45.(:)136IncomeTaxdeferredPension:ThoughtsontheBasisofTaxPreferencesWANGYing(73((DepartmentofPublicFinance,ShanghaiFinanceUniversity,Shanghai201209,China)Abstract:IncometaxdeferredpensionisoneofthebestchoicesforChina)scurrentpensionreformsinceitsinternationalpractices,incentivestoindividualsandprofitmotivestoinsurancecompanies.Thearticlecomparesdifferenttaxationmethodsforpensions,introducestheexperiencesinUSAandUK,andcalculatesthetaxpreferenceamountsinEETmodel,thenprovidesuswiththreekindsoftaxpreferenceschoicesforimplementingincometaxdeferredpensioninChina.Keywords:TaxdeferredPension;EETModel;TaxPreferences;InsuranceSupervisionOnAccountingIndependentDirectorandCorporateGovernanceEffectivenessofAuditCommittees:EmpiricalEvidencesfromChina)sCapitalMarketTUJianming(90((SchoolofAccounting,NanjingAuditUniversity,Nanjing210029,China)Abstract:Basedontheaccountingindependentdirectors)tryingtoavoidtheunfavorableauditopinion,thepapertestswhethertheaccountingindependentdirectorsaffectauditcommittees)effectiveperformanceoncorporategovernancewiththesamplefirmsduringtheapplicationofauditcommitteesystem.Empiricalevidencesshowthattheauditcommitteeswithatleastoneindependentdirectorasaccountingexpertcanreducethepossibilityoflistedfirms)beingissuedunfavorableauditopinions.Andalsoaccountingindependentdirectorsfromdifferentbackgroundsrespondtotheunfavorableauditopinionsdifferently.Theresultsuggeststhatauditcommitteesworkeffectivelyanddifferentlyincorporategovernanceasawhole.Keywords:AuditCommittee;AccountingIndependentDirector;CorporateGovernance;AuditOpinionTheImpactoftheIndustryExpertiseonAuditFee:EmpiricalDataofChineselistedCompaniesfrom2006to2007YANGJifei(96((SchoolofBusiness,TianjinUniversityofFinanceandEconomics,Tianjin300222,China)Abstract:Thispaperexplorestheimpactofindustryexpertiseonauditfeebycitingtraditionalauditpricingmodel.UsingempiricaldataofChineselistedcompaniesfrom2006to2007,thispaperfiguresouttherelationshipbetweenthem.ThedescriptivestatisticsshowsthelowextentofindustryexpertiseintheauditmarketofChina.TheFurtheranalysisshowsthattheindustryexpertisehaspositiveeffectonauditfee.Itisveryimportanttopaymoreattentiontoindustryexpertiseinregula