我国地方政府的权力寻租现状、原因及治理

上海交通大学硕士学位论文我国地方政府的权力寻租：现状、原因及治理姓名：陈健申请学位级别：硕士专业：公共管理指导教师：胡伟20080607MPAIII20MPAVRENT-SEEKINGOFTHELOCALAUTHORITIESINCHINA:SITUATION,CAUSATIONANDSOLUTIONABSTRACTRent-seekingtheoryistheWestsincethemiddleofthe20thcenturyahottopicineconomiccircles,butalsointoday'smostchallengingeconomiccirclesasoneoftheareas,rent-seekingbehaviourofthemarketeconomycountriesandcountriesintransitionwidespreadphenomenon.AlongwiththedeepeningofChina'sreformandopeningup,andthepromotionofmarket-orientedeconomy,thephenomenonofcorruptionisincreasinglyspread.Inthemidstofthewaveofanti-corruption,thephenomenonofcorruptionhasnotconvergence,butitundoubtedlyincreasedgreatly,notwildfire,windandHealthSpringtrend.Inallsortsofcorruption,isadominantfactorinthecorruptionofpower,andsocialcorruptionincahootstocorruptiontobeamulti-field,multi-level,multi-formandmulti-meansstructuralcorruption,becomeananti-socialistsystemAsiancultureandsmashedthecountry'sorder.Inthepowerofcorruptioninallitsformsandmanifestations,andthenegativeimpactismostserious,againsttheParty,thecountry'slargestpowerisarent-seeking.Thereforein-depthanalysisofChina'slocalgovernmentsthepowertorent-seekingbehaviorisveryimportanttheoreticalandpracticalsignificance.Ontheleasingofpower,alargenumberofdomesticandforeignreportedintheliterature.Amongthem,andscholarstotheUnitedStatesontheachievementsofChina'sacademiccircles,therearemanyscholarsofpowerleasingcarriedoutextensiveandin-depthresearch,scholarsfromstartingtheiracademicbackground,usingdifferentmethodsandresearchparadigmpowerleasing,publishedalargenumberofpapersandmonographs,etc,onthepowerrent-seekingin-depthstudy.However,asearchthroughtheMPAVIliterature,theauthorsfoundonthegovernancepowerfromthesourceofrent-seekingisstillrelativelyweak,thedomesticpowerrent-seekingacademicstudiesandempiricalanalysisofacomprehensivesummationoftheworkhasnotyetcommenced,Lackofinformationisalsoveryimportant.Therefore,thepaperconcludeddisciplineinspectionandsupervisoryworkinpracticeanddrawingontheresultsofresearchondomesticacademicsonthebasisofusingtheResearchofcombiningresearchmethods,systematicallysummedupthepowerofrent-seekingpatterns,objectivedescriptionofthecausesandproposedgovernanceideasandinitiatives,withatheoreticalvalueandpracticalsignificance.Thispaperisdividedintofiveparts:thefirstpart:analysisofthecurrentleaseofthelocalgovernmentpowersofthegrimsituation.PartII:Therent-seeking,powerrent-seeking,andexplainsthemeaningofthepowersofthenatureofrent-seeking,aswellasspecificperformancecharacteristicsofaspreadingtrendrevealsAtthesametime,researchonthepowerofthemeaningoftherent-seekinglisted.PartIII:thepowerofthestateandtherent-seekingsocietycausedbyhazards.PartIV:analysisofthecausesofrent-seekingpower.PARTV:focusingonsystemlevelpowermanagementraisedtherent-seekinginitiatives.Inthispaper,theinnovationmayhavethefollowingthreeaspects:First,theinnovativeresearchmethods-paperbyeconomics,management,sociologyanalysisofthemethod;Second,thestudyofinnovation-thispaperisthatlocalgovernmentsthepowerofrent-seeking;Third,theresultsofthisstudy-Constructionoftheanti-rent-seekingtargetsystem.KEYWORDS:Localgovernment,Rent-seeking,SolutionMPAIMPAII20082008MPA120()(MeChesney1987)(1999)MPA2(l)(2)(3)1(DavidRicardo)(JamesBuchana)(Rent-seekingtheory)(Tolliosn)MPA31967(G.Tullock)(AKrueger)1974(JagdishBhagwati)1:(l)C(Duoglass.C.Nohrt)2(2)(JenaJacquesLaoffnt)(JenaTirole)19933(3)1Campelldonald.Incentives:MotivationandtheEconomicsofInformation[M].London,Englang:CambrigeleniversityPress,199543.2C.[M].199923.3.[M].2003221.MPA44(4)(5)(6):5(7)62(1)7(2)4McChesney.RentExtractionandInterest-GroupOrganizationinaCoaseanModelofRegulation[J].JournalofLegalStudies,1991,20:73-90.5.[M.200012.6.[M].199345.7.[M].19992.MPA58(3)9::8.[M].200055.9.[J].2000121722.MPA61MPA72rentseekingunproductiveprofitseeking,DUP12345MPA861101110[].[J].1998532.11[].[].[M].20007.MPA9220701996JJBuchananGGmyrdalAAkluegerMPA101234MPA11MPA121997102002986191784615013771137790()28996()2422()98121998207103554112830791320002001959332%22546851%212211%3098200264%1997199953017719985.5%199820004804071000122003219.132003311.MPA13140001999177000791097341000200684019991920230442.29%40040%19923270142.32.46618411412280100MPA1478101200800300200259172719965186210001741013MPA1561200MPA16950147676MPA1790987512570GDP13.2%16.8%201220MPA18200338317MPA19MPA208061?MPA2114:14..2001156.MPA2215T.W.:16174141()()15..2001156.16T.W...19685067.17...MPA23:()():42ABC42MPA241818...:?():(transitionaleconomy)?():()MPA26192019...1998940.20.C...199454.MPA27212223;21E.G.S...[]R.A.D..1991231.22...2002119.23..2003930.MPA28:241996-200210!?;24..1961154.MPA292525..2001678.MPA302626..2005621112.MPA315310350%MPA3227:27..2005621112.MPA33MPA34::;:::;MPA3520031031582003528200311840005019971999520(2002820)MPA36:119982310200MPA37[1].[M].31996[2].[J].2003.2[3].[M].1991[4].[M]2001[5].[J].2002.3[6].[J].1998.7[7].1998[J].1989.5[8].[M],2000[9].[M].1993[10].[J].1997.4[11].[J].1996.4[12][]A..[J].[13][]D.[J].1988.5[14].[J],1988.5[15].[J].1999.3MPA3