Lecture-5-Price-Discrimination

(IndustrialOrganization)1Lecture5:PriceDiscrimination价格分歧（歧视）Introduction：什么是价格歧视？Pricediscriminationtheuseofnon-uniformpricing（非统一定价）：对不同消费者定不同的价格Chargingconsumersdifferentpricesforthesameproduct.对不同数量定不同价格Chargingaconsumerapricewhichvarieswiththequantitybought.Introduction：什么是价格歧视？价格不同一定意味着价格分歧吗？非也！判断价格歧视的充分条件：1，产品要相同：反例，经济舱与头等舱；动车与普通车2，成本要相同：反例，高峰定价3，价格要不同：4Introduction:价格歧视的例子Magazines,movieormuseumstickets,trainticketssoldatnormalpriceandconcessionprice（优惠价）forstudentsandseniorcitizens.(3rddegree)Theuseofrebatecoupons(折扣优惠券):McDonaldsCoupons.(2nddegree)Prescriptiondrugs,musicCDs,ormovieDVDsarecheaperinsomecountries.GasolinepriceinSingaporeandinJohor.（3rddegree）Businessandfirstclasstravelvs.economyclass.;first-classseatofthetrain？（2nd）5价格分歧的类型概念：willingnesstopay保留价格（愿意支付的最高价格）一级价格歧视EachconsumerpaysadifferentpricedependingontheWTPconsumersareleftwithnoconsumersurplus.(榨取所有消费者剩余)举例：苹果按口定价。三级价格歧视(grouppricing)eachgroupofconsumersfacesitsownpriceperunitthefirmisnotabletocaptureallconsumersurplus.（可以观察消费者类型）中医收费除了第一类和第三类，其他都是第二类二级价格歧视(ormenupricing)thepriceperunitdependsonthenumberofunitspurchasedthefirmisnotabletocaptureallconsumersurplus.（消费者类型不可观察）：数量折扣，麦当劳优惠券6Introduction…Whypricediscriminationisprofitable?becauseconsumershavedifferentvaluations(willingness-to-pay/WTP)thosewithhighervaluationspaymoreincontrasttotheuniformpricing.实行价格歧视的条件:Thefirmadoptingthepolicymusthavesomemarketpower(abletosetpMC).（市场势力）ThefirmmustbeabletodistinguishconsumersonthebasisoftheirWTPdirectlyorindirectlythisWTPmustvaryacrossconsumersand(or)unitspurchased.（区分消费者）Thefirmmustbeabletopreventarbitrageorresalefromconsumerswhopayatalowerpricetoconsumerswhoarewillingtopayahigherprice.（无法套利）：services;adulteration;transactioncost;warranties;contractualremedies(limitsales);verticalintegration;7PriceDiscrimination…价格歧视的策略:Two-PartTariff（两部定价）:Thefirmchargesalump-sumfee(thefirstpartofthetariff)fortherighttoparticipateinthetransaction,andapriceperunitofproduct(thesecondpart)e.g.amusement/themeparks,coverchargeinclubs.Blockpricing(分段定价)orQuantityDiscount(数量折扣)pricediscountforlargepurchasese.g.buy2get1freescheme.（买二送一）？Tie-in-Sale（搭售）aconsumercanbuyoneproductonlyifanotherproductisalsoboughte.g.coffeemachinethatrequiresaspecialcoffeecapsulefromthecompany.QualityDiscrimination（质量歧视）sellingdifferentqualitiestodifferenttypeofconsumers.8FirstDegreePriceDiscriminationAmonopolistcanchargemaximumpricethateachconsumeriswillingtopayextractsallconsumersurplus.Profit=totalsurplusfirst-degreepricediscriminationisefficient.qMCpcMRp(q)p($)p’firmchargesallconsumers,firmchargesallconsumers,exceptthemarginalconsumer,exceptthemarginalconsumer,PriceMC.PriceMC.qMCpcpmMRp(q)deadweightloss(DWL)p($)consumersurplusprofitQQ**QQ**profit9FirstDegreePriceDiscrimination…First-degreepricediscriminationishighlyprofitablebutrequiresdetailedinformationandabilitytoavoidarbitrage.Itleadstotheefficientchoiceofoutput.Butthereareotherpricingschemesthatwillachievethesameoutcome:Non-LinearPrices(e.g.two-partpricing（两部定价）,inwhichalump-sumfee(membershipfee)andaperunitpricearecharged.Block-pricing（区域定价）：将产量分为不同区域，按区域定价。例如花120元购买12件，花64购买8件。10Two-PartPricingConsiderthefollowingexampleSt.JamesPowerStationClubservestwotypesofcustomers;teenagers(t)andyoungprofessionals(p).青年YoungprofessionalsThedemandforentryplusQydrinksisP=Vy–Qy，Vy==$1616少年TeenagersThedemandforentryplusQtdrinksisP=Vt–QtVt=$12Thereareequalnumbersofeachtype.假定VyVt青年人比少年更愿意支付更多（保留价格更高）Costofoperationoftheclub:C(Q)=F+cQ11Two-PartPricing…首先考虑传统线性定价“traditional”linearpricingfreeentry(nocovercharge:饮食附加费)andasetpricefordrinks.总需求isQU=Qy+Qt=(16+12)–2PU反需求isPU=14–QU/2边际收益MRMR=14–QU=MC=4andsolveforQtogiveQU=10，PU=9EachyoungprofessionalbuysQy=16-9=7drinks.EachteenagerbuysQy=12-9=3drinks.Profitfromeachpairoftheyoungpro.andteenagerisU=（7+3）*(9-4)=5012Two-PartPricing…Thisexamplecanbeillustratedasfollows(thedemandfromeachcustomer):PriceQuantityVyVyPriceQuantityVtVtPriceQuantityVyVy+VtMCMR(a)YoungProfessionals(b)Teenagers(c)YoungPro/TeenagerpairofcustomersVy+Vt2-ccVy+Vt4+c2hijkabdefgLinearpricingleaveseachtypeofconsumerwithconsumersurplusVy+vt+c/213Two-PartPricing…Theclubownercanactuallydobetterthanjustsettingauniformprice.消费者剩余Consumersurplusattheuniformlinearprice:青年：CSUy=.5*（16-9）*7=24.5少年：CSUt=.5*（12-9）*3=4.5问题：厂商能够进一步提高利润？怎么办？TheseCSrepresentsthesurplusthatthemonopolistfailstoextract.Thefirmcandobetterbysettingatwo-parttariff.14Two-PartPricing…Chargetheyoungprofessionalsacovercharge(Ey)equalstoCSUyandteenagersacovercharge(Et)equalstoCSUthowtoimplement?e.g.checkIDonthefrontdoor.Also,continuetochargetheuniformpricingPUperdrink.Inourexample:Ey=$24.5;Et=$4.5andPu=$9.Payingcoverchargereducethecustomers’surplustozerobutdoesnotmakeitnegative.ThispricingwillincreaseprofitbyEy=$24.5peryoungprofessionalandEt=$4.5perteenagerinadditionto;从青年消费者那里得到：24.5+7*(9-4)=59.5；从少年消费者那里得到：4.5+3*(9-4)=19.5企业的利润水平：59.5+19.5=7950问题：企业是否能够继续提高利润？15Two-PartPricing…