Jensen-1976-企业理论、代理成本及所有权结构

TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructureMichaelC.JensenHarvardBusinessSchoolandWilliamH.MecklingUniversityofRochesterAbstractThispaperintegrateselementsfromthetheoryofagency,thetheoryofpropertyrightsandthetheoryoffinancetodevelopatheoryoftheownershipstructureofthefirm.Wedefinetheconceptofagencycosts,showitsrelationshiptothe‘separationandcontrol’issue,investigatethenatureoftheagencycostsgeneratedbytheexistenceofdebtandoutsideequity,demonstratewhobearscostsandwhy,andinvestigatetheParetooptimalityoftheirexistence.Wealsoprovideanewdefinitionofthefirm,andshowhowouranalysisofthefactorsinfluencingthecreationandissuanceofdebtandequityclaimsisaspecialcaseofthesupplysideofthecompletenessofmarketsproblem.Thedirectorsofsuch[joint-stock]companies,however,beingthemanagersratherofotherpeople’smoneythanoftheirown,itcannotwellbeexpected,thattheyshouldwatchoveritwiththesameanxiousvigilancewithwhichthepartnersinaprivatecopartneryfrequentlywatchovertheirown.Likethestewardsofarichman,theyareapttoconsiderattentiontosmallmattersasnotfortheirmaster’shonour,andveryeasilygivethemselvesadispensationfromhavingit.Negligenceandprofusion,therefore,mustalwaysprevail,moreorless,inthemanagementoftheaffairsofsuchacompany.—AdamSmith(1776)Keywords:Agencycostsandtheory,itnernalcontrolsystems,conflictsofinterest,capitalstructure,internalequity,outsideequity,demandforsecurityanalysis,completenessofmarkets,supplyofclaims,limitedliability©1976JensenandMecklingJournalofFinancialEconomics,October,1976,V.3,No.4,pp.305-360.ReprintedinMichaelC.Jensen,ATheoryoftheFirm:Governance,ResidualClaimsandOrganizationalForms(HarvardUniversityPress,December2000)availableat(SSRN)ElectronicLibraryat:=94043TheoryoftheFirm:ManagerialBehavior,AgencyCostsandOwnershipStructureMichaelC.JensenHarvardBusinessSchoolandWilliamH.Meckling*UniversityofRochester1.Introduction1.1.MotivationofthePaperInthispaperwedrawonrecentprogressinthetheoryof(1)propertyrights,(2)agency,and(3)financetodevelopatheoryofownershipstructure1forthefirm.Inadditiontotyingtogetherelementsofthetheoryofeachofthesethreeareas,ouranalysiscastsnewlightonandhasimplicationsforavarietyofissuesintheprofessionalandpopularliteratureincludingthedefinitionofthefirm,the“separationofownershipandcontrol,”the“socialresponsibility”ofbusiness,thedefinitionofa“corporateobjectivefunction,”thedeterminationofanoptimalcapitalstructure,thespecificationofthecontentofcreditagreements,thetheoryoforganizations,andthesupplysideofthecompletenessofmarketsproblems.1Wedonotusetheterm‘capitalstructure’becausethattermusuallydenotestherelativequantitiesofbonds,equity,warrants,tradecredit,etc.,whichrepresenttheliabilitiesofafirm.Ourtheoryimpliesthereisanotherimportantdimensiontothisproblem—namelytherelativeamountofownershipclaimsheldbyinsiders(management)andoutsiders(investorswithnodirectroleinthemanagementofthefirm).*AssociateProfessorandDean,respectively,GraduateSchoolofManagement,UniversityofRochester.AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheConferenceonAnalysisandIdeology,Interlaken,Switzerland,June1974,sponsoredbytheCenterforResearchinGovernmentPolicyandBusinessattheUniversityofRochester,GraduateSchoolofManagement.WeareindebtedtoF.Black,E.Fama,R.Ibbotson,W.Klein,M.Rozeff,R.Weil,O.Williamson,ananonymousreferee,andtoourcolleaguesandmembersoftheFinanceWorkshopattheUniversityofRochesterfortheircommentsandcriticisms,inparticularG.Benston,M.Canes,D.Henderson,K.Leffler,J.Long,C.Smith,R.Thompson,R.Watts,andJ.Zimmerman.JensenandMecklingOurtheoryhelpsexplain:219761.whyanentrepreneurormanagerinafirmwhichhasamixedfinancialstructure(containingbothdebtandoutsideequityclaims)willchooseasetofactivitiesforthefirmsuchthatthetotalvalueofthefirmislessthanitwouldbeifhewerethesoleownerandwhythisresultisindependentofwhetherthefirmoperatesinmonopolisticorcompetitiveproductorfactormarkets;2.whyhisfailuretomaximizethevalueofthefirmisperfectlyconsistentwithefficiency;3.whythesaleofcommonstockisaviablesourceofcapitaleventhoughmanagersdonotliterallymaximizethevalueofthefirm;4.whydebtwasrelieduponasasourceofcapitalbeforedebtfinancingofferedanytaxadvantagerelativetoequity;5.whypreferredstockwouldbeissued;6.whyaccountingreportswouldbeprovidedvoluntarilytocreditorsandstockholders,andwhyindependentauditorswouldbeengagedbymanagementtotestifytotheaccuracyandcorrectnessofsuchreports;7.whylendersoftenplacerestrictionsontheactivitiesoffirmstowhomtheylend,andwhyfirmswouldthemselvesbeledtosuggesttheimpositionofsuchrestrictions;8.whysomeindustriesarecharacterizedbyowner-operatedfirmswhosesoleoutsidesourceofcapitalisborrowing;9.whyhighlyregulatedindustriessuchaspublicutilitiesorbankswillhavehigherdebtequityratiosforequivalentlevelsofriskthantheaveragenonregulatedfirm;10.whysecurityanalysiscanbesociallyproducti